A canonical theory of dynamic decision-making

Decision-making behavior is studied in many very different fields, from medicine and eco- nomics to psychology and neuroscience, with major contributions from mathematics and statistics, computer science, AI, and other technical disciplines. However the conceptual- ization of what decision-making is and methods for studying it vary greatly and this has resulted in fragmentation of the field. A theory that can accommodate various perspectives may facilitate interdisciplinary working. We present such a theory in which decision-making is articulated as a set of canonical functions that are sufficiently general to accommodate diverse viewpoints, yet sufficiently precise that they can be instantiated in different ways for specific theoretical or practical purposes. The canons cover the whole decision cycle, from the framing of a decision based on the goals, beliefs, and background knowledge of the decision-maker to the formulation of decision options, establishing preferences over them, and making commitments. Commitments can lead to the initiation of new decisions and any step in the cycle can incorporate reasoning about previous decisions and the rationales for them, and lead to revising or abandoning existing commitments. The theory situates decision-making with respect to other high-level cognitive capabilities like problem solving, planning, and collaborative decision-making. The canonical approach is assessed in three domains: cognitive and neuropsychology, artificial intelligence, and decision engineering

Automating decision making to help establish norm-based regulations

Norms have been extensively proposed as coordination mechanisms for both agent and human societies. Nevertheless, choosing the norms to regulate a society is by no means straightforward. The reasons are twofold. First, the norms to choose from may not be independent (i.e, they can be related to each other). Second, different preference criteria may be applied when choosing the norms to enact. This paper advances the state of the art by modeling a series of decision-making problems that regulation authorities confront when choosing the policies to establish. In order to do so, we first identify three different norm relationships -namely, generalisation, exclusivity, and substitutability- and we then consider norm representation power, cost, and associated moral values as alternative preference criteria. Thereafter, we show that the decision-making problems faced by policy makers can be encoded as linear programs, and hence solved with the aid of state-of-the-art solvers

Computer-supported collaborative argumentation

http://www.di.unipi.it/~morge/publis/morge04cnma.pdfInternational audienceIn this paper, we propose a computer-supported collaborative argumentation for the public debate. For this purpose, we use the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), that can be viewed as an argumentation-based decision-making process, to help stakeholders to build an argumentation schema and to express preferences about it. Considering this multi-criteria decision-making as an argumentationbased decision-making, we construct a dialogue system of agents with reasoning abilities to support the group decision. Each user is assisted by an agent representing him in automated dialogues. Therefore, the system provides tools for the collaborative development of the argumentation schemas on one hand and to check the consistency or the inconsistency among preferences between two users allowing the conflicts and the consensus seeking on the other hand

Les systèmes d'argumentation basés sur les préférences : application à la décision et à la négociation

L'argumentation est considérée comme un modèle de raisonnement basé sur la construction et l'évaluation d'arguments. Ces derniers sont sensés soutenir/expliquer/attaquer des assertions qui peuvent être des décisions, des avis, etc... Cette thèse contient trois parties. La première concerne la notion d'équivalence de systèmes d'argumentation. Nous avons proposé différents critères d'équivalence, étudié leurs liens et montré sous quelles conditions deux systèmes sont équivalents selon les critères proposés. La notion d'équivalence est ensuite utilisée pour calculer les noyaux d'un système d'argumentation. Un noyau est un sous-système fini d'un système d'argumentation et équivalent à celui-ci. La deuxième partie de la thèse concerne l'utilisation des préférences dans l'argumentation. Nous avons étudié les rôles que les préférences peuvent jouer dans un système d'argumentation. Deux rôles particuliers ont été identifiés. Nous avons montré que les travaux existant ont abordé seulement le premier rôle et les approches proposées peuvent retourner des résultats contre-intuitifs lorsque la relation d'attaque entre arguments n'est pas symétrique. Nous avons développé une approche qui pallie ces limites. La troisième partie applique notre modèle d'argumentation à la décision et à la négociation. Nous avons proposé une instanciation de notre modèle pour la décision argumentée. Puis, nous avons étudié la dynamique de cette instanciation. Plus précisément, nous avons montré comment le statut des options change à la lumière d'un nouvel argument. Nous avons également employé notre modèle afin de montrer les avantages de l'argumentation dans des dialogues de négociation.Argumentation is a promising approach for reasoning with uncertain or incoherent knowledge or more generally with common sense knowledge. It consists of constructing arguments and counter-arguments, comparing the different arguments and selecting the most acceptable among them. This thesis contains three parts. The first one concerns the notion of equivalence between two argumentation frameworks. We studied two families of equivalence: basic equivalence and strong equivalence. We proposed different equivalence criteria, investigated their links and showed under which conditions two frameworks are equivalent w.r.t. each of the proposed criteria. The notion of equivalence is then used in order to compute the core(s) of an argumentation framework. A core of a framework is its compact version, i.e. an equivalent sub-framework. The second part of the thesis concerns the use of preferences in argumentation. We investigated the roles that preferences may play in an argumentation framework. Two particular roles were identified. Besides, we showed that almost all the existing works have tackled only the first role. Moreover, the proposed approaches suffer from a drawback which consists of returning conflicting extensions. We proposed a general approach which solves this problem and takes into account both roles of preferences. The third part illustrates our preference-based argumentation frameworks (PAF) in case of decision making and negotiation. We proposed an instantiation of our PAF which rank-orders options in a decision making problem and studied the dynamics of this model. We also used our PAF in order to show the benefits of arguing in negotiation dialogues