Risk Aversion in Finite Markov Decision Processes Using Total Cost Criteria and Average Value at Risk

In this paper we present an algorithm to compute risk averse policies in Markov Decision Processes (MDP) when the total cost criterion is used together with the average value at risk (AVaR) metric. Risk averse policies are needed when large deviations from the expected behavior may have detrimental effects, and conventional MDP algorithms usually ignore this aspect. We provide conditions for the structure of the underlying MDP ensuring that approximations for the exact problem can be derived and solved efficiently. Our findings are novel inasmuch as average value at risk has not previously been considered in association with the total cost criterion. Our method is demonstrated in a rapid deployment scenario, whereby a robot is tasked with the objective of reaching a target location within a temporal deadline where increased speed is associated with increased probability of failure. We demonstrate that the proposed algorithm not only produces a risk averse policy reducing the probability of exceeding the expected temporal deadline, but also provides the statistical distribution of costs, thus offering a valuable analysis tool

Regularized Decomposition of High-Dimensional Multistage Stochastic Programs with Markov Uncertainty

We develop a quadratic regularization approach for the solution of high-dimensional multistage stochastic optimization problems characterized by a potentially large number of time periods/stages (e.g. hundreds), a high-dimensional resource state variable, and a Markov information process. The resulting algorithms are shown to converge to an optimal policy after a finite number of iterations under mild technical assumptions. Computational experiments are conducted using the setting of optimizing energy storage over a large transmission grid, which motivates both the spatial and temporal dimensions of our problem. Our numerical results indicate that the proposed methods exhibit significantly faster convergence than their classical counterparts, with greater gains observed for higher-dimensional problems

Risk-sensitive Inverse Reinforcement Learning via Semi- and Non-Parametric Methods

The literature on Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) typically assumes that humans take actions in order to minimize the expected value of a cost function, i.e., that humans are risk neutral. Yet, in practice, humans are often far from being risk neutral. To fill this gap, the objective of this paper is to devise a framework for risk-sensitive IRL in order to explicitly account for a human's risk sensitivity. To this end, we propose a flexible class of models based on coherent risk measures, which allow us to capture an entire spectrum of risk preferences from risk-neutral to worst-case. We propose efficient non-parametric algorithms based on linear programming and semi-parametric algorithms based on maximum likelihood for inferring a human's underlying risk measure and cost function for a rich class of static and dynamic decision-making settings. The resulting approach is demonstrated on a simulated driving game with ten human participants. Our method is able to infer and mimic a wide range of qualitatively different driving styles from highly risk-averse to risk-neutral in a data-efficient manner. Moreover, comparisons of the Risk-Sensitive (RS) IRL approach with a risk-neutral model show that the RS-IRL framework more accurately captures observed participant behavior both qualitatively and quantitatively, especially in scenarios where catastrophic outcomes such as collisions can occur.Comment: Submitted to International Journal of Robotics Research; Revision 1: (i) Clarified minor technical points; (ii) Revised proof for Theorem 3 to hold under weaker assumptions; (iii) Added additional figures and expanded discussions to improve readabilit

Model and Reinforcement Learning for Markov Games with Risk Preferences

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the game) and randomized mixed strategies (due to all other players). An appropriate risk-aware equilibrium concept is proposed and the existence of such equilibria is demonstrated in stationary strategies by an application of Kakutani's fixed point theorem. We further propose a simulation-based Q-learning type algorithm for risk-aware equilibrium computation. This algorithm works with a special form of minimax risk measures which can naturally be written as saddle-point stochastic optimization problems, and covers many widely investigated risk measures. Finally, the almost sure convergence of this simulation-based algorithm to an equilibrium is demonstrated under some mild conditions. Our numerical experiments on a two player queuing game validate the properties of our model and algorithm, and demonstrate their worth and applicability in real life competitive decision-making.Comment: 38 pages, 6 tables, 5 figure