13,102 research outputs found
Making Code Voting Secure against Insider Threats using Unconditionally Secure MIX Schemes and Human PSMT Protocols
Code voting was introduced by Chaum as a solution for using a possibly
infected-by-malware device to cast a vote in an electronic voting application.
Chaum's work on code voting assumed voting codes are physically delivered to
voters using the mail system, implicitly requiring to trust the mail system.
This is not necessarily a valid assumption to make - especially if the mail
system cannot be trusted. When conspiring with the recipient of the cast
ballots, privacy is broken.
It is clear to the public that when it comes to privacy, computers and
"secure" communication over the Internet cannot fully be trusted. This
emphasizes the importance of using: (1) Unconditional security for secure
network communication. (2) Reduce reliance on untrusted computers.
In this paper we explore how to remove the mail system trust assumption in
code voting. We use PSMT protocols (SCN 2012) where with the help of visual
aids, humans can carry out addition correctly with a 99\% degree of
accuracy. We introduce an unconditionally secure MIX based on the combinatorics
of set systems.
Given that end users of our proposed voting scheme construction are humans we
\emph{cannot use} classical Secure Multi Party Computation protocols.
Our solutions are for both single and multi-seat elections achieving:
\begin{enumerate}[i)]
\item An anonymous and perfectly secure communication network secure against
a -bounded passive adversary used to deliver voting,
\item The end step of the protocol can be handled by a human to evade the
threat of malware. \end{enumerate} We do not focus on active adversaries
Distributed Protocols at the Rescue for Trustworthy Online Voting
While online services emerge in all areas of life, the voting procedure in
many democracies remains paper-based as the security of current online voting
technology is highly disputed. We address the issue of trustworthy online
voting protocols and recall therefore their security concepts with its trust
assumptions. Inspired by the Bitcoin protocol, the prospects of distributed
online voting protocols are analysed. No trusted authority is assumed to ensure
ballot secrecy. Further, the integrity of the voting is enforced by all voters
themselves and without a weakest link, the protocol becomes more robust. We
introduce a taxonomy of notions of distribution in online voting protocols that
we apply on selected online voting protocols. Accordingly, blockchain-based
protocols seem to be promising for online voting due to their similarity with
paper-based protocols
HandiVote: simple, anonymous, and auditable electronic voting
We suggest a set of procedures utilising a range of technologies by which a major democratic deïŹcit of modern society can be addressed. The mechanism, whilst it makes limited use of cryptographic techniques in the background, is based around objects and procedures with which voters are currently familiar. We believe that this holds considerable potential for the extension of democratic participation and control
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