4,755 research outputs found

    Risk-Seeking Governance

    Get PDF
    Venture capitalists (“VCs”) are increasingly abandoning their traditional role as monitors of their portfolio companies. They are giving startup founders more equity and control and promising not to replace them with outside executives. At the same time, startups are taking unprecedented risks—defying regulators, scaling in unsustainable ways, and racking up billion-dollar losses. These trends raise doubts about the dominant model of VC behavior, which claims that VCs actively monitor startups to reduce the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection. We propose a new theory in which VCs use their role in corporate governance to persuade risk-averse founders to pursue high-risk strategies. VCs are motivated to take risks because most of the gains in venture funds come from the exponential growth of one or two outlier companies. By contrast, founders are reluctant to gamble because they bear firm-specific risk that cannot be diversified. To compensate founders for their risk exposure, VCs offer an implicit bargain in which the founders agree to pursue high-risk strategies and, in exchange, the VCs provide them private benefits. VCs can promise to give founders early liquidity when their startup grows, job security when it struggles, and a soft landing if it fails. In our model, VCs who develop a founder-friendly reputation have a competitive advantage in ex ante pricing but are more exposed to poor performance ex post due to suboptimal monitoring. Stakeholders who are not party to the VC-founder bargain—and society at large—are forced to bear uncompensated risk

    Risk-Seeking Governance

    Get PDF
    Venture capitalists (“VCs”) are increasingly abandoning their traditional role as monitors of their portfolio companies. They are giving startup founders more equity and control and promising not to replace them with outside executives. At the same time, startups are taking unprecedented risks—defying regulators, scaling in unsustainable ways, and racking up billion-dollar losses. These trends raise doubts about the dominant model of VC behavior, which claims that VCs actively monitor startups to reduce the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection. We propose a new theory in which VCs use their role in corporate governance to persuade risk-averse founders to pursue high-risk strategies. VCs are motivated to take risks because most of the gains in venture funds come from the exponential growth of one or two outlier companies. By contrast, founders are reluctant to gamble because they bear firm-specific risk that cannot be diversified. To compensate founders for their risk exposure, VCs offer an implicit bargain in which the founders agree to pursue high-risk strategies and, in exchange, the VCs provide them private benefits. VCs can promise to give founders early liquidity when their startup grows, job security when it struggles, and a soft landing if it fails. In our model, VCs who develop a founder-friendly reputation have a competitive advantage in ex ante pricing but are more exposed to poor performance ex post due to suboptimal monitoring. Stakeholders who are not party to the VC-founder bargain—and society at large—are forced to bear uncompensated risk

    Punishment and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements.

    Get PDF
    This paper interprets dispute settlement procedures and punishments as responses to the fact that trade agreements are incomplete contracts. If no weight is given to the adjudication phase and if the degree of trade relatedness is known with certainty, the negotiated trade agreement will feature commensurate punishments, will induce violation of the dispute settlement ruling, and will deliver optimal liberalization and optimal unilateral trade-related action. With the adjudication phase of concern, the trade agreement will feature less liberalization, but still with a presumption of at least approximate commensurate punishment. The optimal trade agreement will likely induce abiding by the ruling when negotiators attach more importance to the adjudication phase, and violating it when they attach less.

    Determining factors of the development of a national financial center: The case of China

    Get PDF
    This study explores, theoretically and empirically, one of the important issues of the geography of finance, namely the location of high-level financial services. Specifically, we will try to explain why foreign financial services are spatially concentrated in a particular city so as to form a national financial center in China. By reviewing various forces behind the formation of a financial center, we argue that information problems have created the need for geographic agglomeration of financial activities based on the source of information. This is true even in an era when financial markets work through sophisticated telecommunication networks. Based on a survey of the actual location of multinational corporation (MNC) regional headquarters, and through investigation of reasons for the agglomeration of these headquarters, we anticipate that Beijing, as the prime source of policy information, is more likely than other Chinese cities to be the national pre-eminent financial center when the Chinese financial markets become more open to foreign firms in the near future. This study illustrates, using China as a case study, that geography still provides strong justification of why major financial services continue to have a high degree of spatial agglomeration in particular locations, despite the fact that the electronic transmission of information has substantially reduced the friction of distance. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.postprin

    Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World

    Get PDF
    Understanding just how finance contributes to development—and how good policy can help guarantee its contribution—has been the focus of a major research effort in recent years. This research has included systematic case-study analyses of the experiences of specific countries, as well as more recent econometric analyses of extensive cross-country data sets. Finance for Growth draws on this research and uses it to develop an integrated view of how financial sector policy can be used to foster growth, maintain stability and bring about poverty reduction.Financial sector development; financial regulation; globalization of finance; finance in developing countries

    The Invention of Health Law

    Get PDF
    By default, the courts are inventing health law. The law governing the American health system arises from an unruly mix of statutes, regulations, and judge-crafted doctrines conceived, in the main, without medical care in mind. Courts are ill-equipped to put order to this chaos, and until recently they have been disinclined to try. But political gridlock and popular ire over managed care have pushed them into the breach, and the Supreme Court has become a proactive health policy player. How might judges make sense of health law\u27s disparate doctrinal strands? Scholars from diverse ideological starting points have converged toward a single answer: the law should look to deploy medical resources in a systematically rational manner, so as to maximize the benefits that every dollar buys. This answer bases the orderly development of health care law upon our ability to reach stable understandings, in myriad circumstances, of what welfare maximization requires. In this Article, I contend that this goal is not achievable. Scientific ignorance, cognitive limitations, and normative disagreements yield shifting, incomplete, and contradictory understandings of social welfare in the health sphere. The chaotic state of health care law today reflects this unruliness. In making systemic welfare maximization the lodestar for health law, we risk falling so far short of aspirations for reasoned decision making as to invite disillusion about the possibilities for any sort of rationality in this field. Accordingly, I urge that we define health law\u27s aims more modestly, based on acknowledgment that its rationality is discontinuous across substantive contexts and changeable with time. This concession to human limits, I argue, opens the way to health policy that mediates wisely between our desire for public action to maximize the well being of the many and our intimate wishes to be treated non-instrumentally, as separate ends. I conclude with an effort to identify the goals that health law, so constructed, should pursue and to suggest how a strategy of accommodation among these goals might apply to a variety of legal controversies

    Throw Me a Lifeline: A Comparison of Port Cities with Antithetical Adaptation Strategies to Sea-Level Rise

    Get PDF
    Sea-level rise (SLR) is a manifestation of climate change that is particularly hazardous to port cities that must remain on the waterfront to function, yet are increasingly battered and flooded by encroaching storms, and sinking into the rising saltwater. Despite sharing a common high level of risk, port cities are choosing antithetical adaptation strategies that range from hard-engineered structural flood protection, to behavioral modifications, to innovative soft-engineered measures, to doing nothing at all. Why is this? Are transnational city networks, such as C40 Cities, a lifeline to drowning cities? Do differences in governance structure, financial capacity, risk tolerance to the hazard, or the influence of special interest groups matter? These factors and the interplay of civil, public, and corporate actors in the context of changing environmental conditions are examined in this cross-disciplinary qualitative study to understand their effects on adaptation decision-making processes over time. Four at-risk global port cities—Venice, Rotterdam, Guangzhou, and Miami—were selected for comparison based on their antithetical adaptation strategies of retreating, climate proofing, innovating, and denying. The Panarchy model of nested four-stage adaptive renewal cycles frames the ongoing and cross-scalar interaction of stakeholders and special interest groups at the city, national, transnational, and international levels. This methodology enables the identification of patterns, power distributions, and path dependencies that contribute to appropriate or maladaptive adaptation. As is characteristic of complex adaptive systems, this study finds that decisions cannot be correlated with a single factor. For those cities that display key characteristics of resilience, SLR is a catalyst for proactive and appropriate adaptation. For others, socio-economic and socio-political factors trump environmental factors in deciding whether, when, and how a city decreased its risk to SLR hazard

    Chapter 17 - Economics of adaptation

    Get PDF
    This chapter assesses the literature on the economics of climate change adaptation, building on the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) and the increasing role that economic considerations are playing in adaptation decisionmaking and policy. AR4 provided a limited assessment of the costs and benefits of adaptation, based on narrow and fragmented sectoral and regional literature (Adger et al, 2007). Substantial advances have been made in the economics of climate change adaptation after AR4

    Purpose in the for-profit firm: a review and framework for management research

    Get PDF
    Purpose is a concept often used in managerial communities to signal and define a firm’s benevolent and pluralistic approach to its stakeholders beyond its focus on shareholders. While some evidence has linked purpose to positive organizational outcomes such as growth, employee satisfaction, innovation, and superior stock market performance, the definition and application of purpose in management research has been varied and frequently ambiguous. We review literature streams that invoke purpose in the for-profit firm and propose a unifying definition. Next, we develop a framework to study purpose that decouples its framing and formalization within firms from its realization, thus helping to avoid conflation of the presence of purpose with positive organizational outcomes. The framework also highlights internal and external drivers that shape the framing of purpose as well as the influence of the institutional context on its adoption and effectiveness. Finally, we provide a rich agenda for future research on purpose

    Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law

    Get PDF
    Delaware corporate law has a new brand of loyalty claim: the opportunity-cost conflict. Such a conflict arises when a fiduciary operates under strong incentives to withdraw human and financial capital for redeployment into new investment opportunities. The concept has its roots in venture capital investing, where board members affiliated with venture capital funds may have incentives to shut down viable start-ups in order to focus on more promising companies. Recognizing this type of conflict has conceptual value-it provides a coherent framework for assessing a fiduciary\u27s incentives, and it may help explain frequently criticized features of corporate fiduciary law. But this article argues that courts should invoke the doctrine sparingly to avoid upsetting the law\u27s current balance between policing managerial abuse and litigation abuse
    corecore