1,146 research outputs found
An Analysis Framework for Metric Voting based on LP Duality
Distortion-based analysis has established itself as a fruitful framework for
comparing voting mechanisms. m voters and n candidates are jointly embedded in
an (unknown) metric space, and the voters submit rankings of candidates by
non-decreasing distance from themselves. Based on the submitted rankings, the
social choice rule chooses a winning candidate; the quality of the winner is
the sum of the (unknown) distances to the voters. The rule's choice will in
general be suboptimal, and the worst-case ratio between the cost of its chosen
candidate and the optimal candidate is called the rule's distortion. It was
shown in prior work that every deterministic rule has distortion at least 3,
while the Copeland rule and related rules guarantee worst-case distortion at
most 5; a very recent result gave a rule with distortion .
We provide a framework based on LP-duality and flow interpretations of the
dual which provides a simpler and more unified way for proving upper bounds on
the distortion of social choice rules. We illustrate the utility of this
approach with three examples. First, we give a fairly simple proof of a strong
generalization of the upper bound of 5 on the distortion of Copeland, to social
choice rules with short paths from the winning candidate to the optimal
candidate in generalized weak preference graphs. A special case of this result
recovers the recent guarantee. Second, using this generalized
bound, we show that the Ranked Pairs and Schulze rules have distortion
. Finally, our framework naturally suggests a combinatorial
rule that is a strong candidate for achieving distortion 3, which had also been
proposed in recent work. We prove that the distortion bound of 3 would follow
from any of three combinatorial conjectures we formulate.Comment: 23 pages An abbreviated version appears in Proceedings of AAAI 202
Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship
We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with
private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that
lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal
is to produce such an assignment that minimizes the social cost, i.e., the
total distance between the most-preferred points of the agents and their
corresponding facilities in the assignment, under the constraint of
truthfulness, which ensures that agents do not misreport their most-preferred
points.
We propose a resource augmentation framework, where a truthful mechanism is
evaluated by its worst-case performance on an instance with enhanced facility
capacities against the optimal mechanism on the same instance with the original
capacities. We study a very well-known mechanism, Serial Dictatorship, and
provide an exact analysis of its performance. Although Serial Dictatorship is a
purely combinatorial mechanism, our analysis uses linear programming; a linear
program expresses its greedy nature as well as the structure of the input, and
finds the input instance that enforces the mechanism have its worst-case
performance. Bounding the objective of the linear program using duality
arguments allows us to compute tight bounds on the approximation ratio. Among
other results, we prove that Serial Dictatorship has approximation ratio
when the capacities are multiplied by any integer . Our
results suggest that even a limited augmentation of the resources can have
wondrous effects on the performance of the mechanism and in particular, the
approximation ratio goes to 1 as the augmentation factor becomes large. We
complement our results with bounds on the approximation ratio of Random Serial
Dictatorship, the randomized version of Serial Dictatorship, when there is no
resource augmentation
Three Puzzles on Mathematics, Computation, and Games
In this lecture I will talk about three mathematical puzzles involving
mathematics and computation that have preoccupied me over the years. The first
puzzle is to understand the amazing success of the simplex algorithm for linear
programming. The second puzzle is about errors made when votes are counted
during elections. The third puzzle is: are quantum computers possible?Comment: ICM 2018 plenary lecture, Rio de Janeiro, 36 pages, 7 Figure
An oil painters recognition method based on cluster multiple kernel learning algorithm
A lot of image processing research works focus on natural images, such as in classification, clustering, and the research on the recognition of artworks (such as oil paintings), from feature extraction to classifier design, is relatively few. This paper focuses on oil painter recognition and tries to find the mobile application to recognize the painter. This paper proposes a cluster multiple kernel learning algorithm, which extracts oil painting features from three aspects: color, texture, and spatial layout, and generates multiple candidate kernels with different kernel functions. With the results of clustering numerous candidate kernels, we selected the sub-kernels with better classification performance, and use the traditional multiple kernel learning algorithm to carry out the multi-feature fusion classification. The algorithm achieves a better result on the Painting91 than using traditional multiple kernel learning directly
Algorithm Design for Ordinal Settings
Social choice theory is concerned with aggregating the preferences of agents into a single outcome. While it is natural to assume that agents have cardinal utilities, in many contexts, we can only assume access to the agents’ ordinal preferences, or rankings over the outcomes. As ordinal preferences are not as expressive as cardinal utilities, a loss of efficiency is unavoidable. Procaccia and Rosenschein (2006) introduced the notion of distortion to quantify this worst-case efficiency loss for a given social choice function.
We primarily study distortion in the context of election, or equivalently clustering problems, where we are given a set of agents and candidates in a metric space; each agent has a preference ranking over the set of candidates and we wish to elect a committee of k candidates that minimizes the total social cost incurred by the agents.
In the single-winner setting (when k = 1), we give a novel LP-duality based analysis framework that makes it easier to analyze the distortion of existing social choice functions, and extends readily to randomized social choice functions. Using this framework, we show that it is possible to give simpler proofs of known results. We also show how to efficiently compute an optimal randomized social choice function for any given instance. We utilize the latter result to obtain an instance for which any randomized social choice function has distortion at least 2.063164. This disproves the long-standing conjecture that there exists a randomized social choice function that has a worst-case distortion of at most 2.
When k is at least 2, it is not possible to compute an O(1)-distortion committee using purely ordinal information. We develop two O(1)-distortion mechanisms for this problem: one having a polylog(n) (per agent) query complexity, where n is the number of agents; and the other having O(k) query complexity (i.e., no dependence on n). We also study a much more general setting called minimum-norm k-clustering recently proposed in the clustering literature, where the objective is some monotone, symmetric norm of the the agents' costs, and we wish to find a committee of k candidates to minimize this objective. When the norm is the sum of the p largest costs, which is called the p-centrum problem in the clustering literature, we give low-distortion mechanisms by adapting our mechanisms for k-median. En route, we give a simple adaptive-sampling algorithm for this problem. Finally, we show how to leverage this adaptive-sampling idea to also obtain a constant-factor bicriteria approximation algorithm for minimum-norm k-clustering (in its full generality)
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