57,533 research outputs found
Consequences of a Goedel's misjudgment
The fundamental aim of the paper is to correct an harmful way to interpret a
Goedel's erroneous remark at the Congress of Koenigsberg in 1930. Despite the
Goedel's fault is rather venial, its misreading has produced and continues to
produce dangerous fruits, as to apply the incompleteness Theorems to the full
second-order Arithmetic and to deduce the semantic incompleteness of its
language by these same Theorems. The first three paragraphs are introductory
and serve to define the languages inherently semantic and its properties, to
discuss the consequences of the expression order used in a language and some
question about the semantic completeness: in particular is highlighted the fact
that a non-formal theory may be semantically complete despite using a language
semantically incomplete. Finally, an alternative interpretation of the Goedel's
unfortunate comment is proposed. KEYWORDS: semantic completeness, syntactic
incompleteness, categoricity, arithmetic, second-order languages, paradoxesComment: English version, 19 pages. Fixed and improved terminolog
Approval-Based Shortlisting
Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a
(smaller) set of best or most suitable alternatives from which a final winner
will be chosen. Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards
or in recommender systems to display featured objects. In this paper, we
analyze shortlisting methods that are based on approval data, a common type of
preferences. Furthermore, we assume that the size of the shortlist, i.e., the
number of best or most suitable alternatives, is not fixed but determined by
the shortlisting method. We axiomatically analyze established and new
shortlisting methods and complement this analysis with an experimental
evaluation based on biased voters and noisy quality estimates. Our results lead
to recommendations which shortlisting methods to use, depending on the desired
properties
Justice, Claims and Prioritarianism: Room for Desert?
Does individual desert matter for distributive justice? Is it relevant, for purposes of justice, that the pattern of distribution of justice’s “currency” (be it well-being, resources, preference-satisfaction, capabilities, or something else) is aligned in one or another way with the pattern of individual desert?
This paper examines the nexus between desert and distributive justice through the lens of individual claims. The concept of claims (specifically “claims across outcomes”) is a fruitful way to flesh out the content of distributive justice so as to be grounded in the separateness of persons. A claim is a relation between a person and a pair of outcomes. If someone is better off in one outcome than a second, she has a claim in favor of the first. If she is equally well off in the two outcomes, she has a null claim between the two. In turn, whether one outcome is more just than a second depends upon the pattern of claims between them.
In prior work, I have elaborated the concept of claims across outcomes, and have used it to provide a unified defense of the Pareto and Pigou-Dalton axioms. Adding some further, plausible, axioms, we arrive at prioritarianism.
Here, I consider the possibility of desert-modulated claims—whereby the strength of an individual’s claim between two outcomes is determined not only by her well-being levels in the two outcomes, and her well-being difference between them, but also by her desert. This generalization of the notion of claims suggests a new axiom of justice: Priority for the More Deserving, requiring that, as between two individuals at the same well-being level, a given increment in well-being be allocated to the more deserving one.
If individual desert is intrapersonally fixed, this new axiom, together with a desert-modulated version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, and the Pareto axioms, yields a desert-modulated prioritarian account of distributive justice. Trouble arises, however, if an individual’s desert level can be different in different outcomes. In this case of intrapersonally variable desert, Priority for the More Deserving can conflict with the Pareto axioms (both Pareto indifference and strong Pareto).
This conflict, I believe, is sufficient reason to abandon the proposal to make claim strength a function of individual desert on top of well-being levels and differences. If distributive justice is truly sensitive to each individual’s separate perspective—if the justice ranking of outcomes is built up from the totality of individual rankings—we should embrace the Pareto axioms as axioms of justice and reject Priority for the More Deserving. In short: desert-modulated prioritarianism is a nonstarter. Rawls was right to sever distributive justice from desert
Standard State Space Models of Unawareness
The impossibility theorem of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini has been thought to demonstrate
that standard state-space models cannot be used to represent unawareness. We first show that Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini do not establish this claim. We then distinguish three notions of awareness,
and argue that although one of them may not be adequately modeled using standard state spaces,
there is no reason to think that standard state spaces cannot provide models of the other two notions.
In fact, standard space models of these forms of awareness are attractively simple. They allow us
to prove completeness and decidability results with ease, to carry over standard techniques from
decision theory, and to add propositional quantifiers straightforwardly
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