E-Government Evaluation: Reflections on two Organisational studies

Senior executives in public sector organisations have been charged with delivering an e-Government agenda. A key emerging area of research is that of the evaluation of e-Government, given that economic factors have traditionally dominated any traditional ICT evaluation process. In this paper the authors report the findings from two interpretive in-depth case studies in the UK public sector, which explore e-Government organisational evaluation within a public sector setting. This paper seeks to offer insights to organisational and managerial aspects surrounding the improvement of knowledge and understanding of e-Government evaluation. The findings that are elicited from the case studies are analysed and presented in terms of a framework derived from organisational analysis to improve e-Government evaluation, with key lessons learnt being extrapolated from practice. The paper concludes that e-Government evaluation is both an under developed and under managed area, and calls for senior executives to engage more with the e-Government agenda and for organisations to review e-Government evaluation to improve evaluation practice

E-government evaluation: Reflections on three organisational case studies

The deployment of e-Government continues at a significant cost and pace in the worldwide public sector. An important area of research is that of the evaluation of e-Government. In this paper the authors report the findings from three interpretive in-depth organisational case studies that explore e-Government evaluation within UK public sector settings. The paper elicits insights to organisational and managerial aspects with the aim of improving knowledge and understanding of e- Government evaluation. The findings that are extrapolated from the analysis of the three case studies are classified and mapped onto a tentative e-Government evaluation framework and presented in terms lessons learnt. These aim to inform theory and improve e- Government evaluation practice. The paper concludes that e-Government evaluation is an under developed area and calls for senior executives to engage more with the e- Government agenda and commission e-Government evaluation exercises to improve evaluation practice

The Hubble Hypothesis and the Developmentalist's Dilemma

Developmental psychopathology stands poised at the close of the 20th century on the horns of a major scientific dilemma. The essence of this dilemma lies in the contrast between its heuristically rich open system concepts on the one hand, and the closed system paradigm it adopted from mainstream psychology for investigating those models on the other. Many of the research methods, assessment strategies, and data analytic models of psychology’s paradigm are predicated on closed system assumptions and explanatory models. Thus, they are fundamentally inadequate forstudying humans, who are unparalleled among open systems in their wide ranging capacities for equifinal and multifinal functioning. Developmental psychopathology faces two challenges in successfully negotiating the developmentalist’s dilemma. The first lies in recognizing how the current paradigm encourages research practices that are antithetical to developmental principles, yet continue to flourish. I argue that the developmentalist’s dilemma is sustained by long standing, mutually enabling weaknesses in the paradigm’s discovery methods and scientific standards. These interdependent weaknesses function like a distorted lens on the research process by variously sustaining the illusion of theoretical progress, obscuring the need for fundamental reforms, and both constraining and misguiding reform efforts. An understanding of how these influences arise and take their toll provides a foundation and rationale for engaging the second challenge. The essence of this challenge will be finding ways to resolve the developmentalist’s dilemma outside the constraints of the existing paradigm by developing indigenous research strategies, methods, and standards with fidelity to the complexity of developmental phenomena

Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process

The paper develops its core argument in 12 sections structured in three parts: I Positive analysis; II Normative proposal; and III Operationalisation. Section B illustrates the traditional justification for the utilitarian perception of competition and analyses its main weaknesses. Section C explores conceptual differences and underlines the fundamental similarities of the two major deontological antitrust schools (Austrian and Ordoliberal). Section D provides some conceptual argumentation for the treatment of competition as a constitutional value. Section E introduces the theoretical framework of value pluralism which reconciles the conflicts between constitutional values. The methodology of value pluralism is applied in order to balance the value of competition with the interests of welfare. Section F opens the second part of the paper. It explores competition as the essence of liberal democracy, claiming that the economic aspects of competition together with its political (elections) and cultural (free speech) elements constitute the core of democratic governance. Accordingly, these values should be protected as a matter of evolutionary choice of society without any utility-based verification. Section G conceptualises the ‘Oroboros dilemma’ of self-destructive freedom and democracy, which is described in the domain of competition by Robert Bork as the ‘antitrust paradox: a policy at war with itself ’. Section H continues the comparative analysis of competition. It explores regulatory practices developed for the protection of free elections (political competition) and free speech (cultural competition) on one hand and economic competition on the other. It reveals the main methodological error of antitrust, which prevents immunisation of some anticompetitive practices from sanctions on non-utilitarian grounds. This section concludes that, unlike its political and cultural counterparts, economic competition is gradually transforming into a purely instrumental consequentialist policy which corresponds neither to the semantics nor even to the syntax of the term ‘competition’. The logic of such transformation is a direct consequence of the above-mentioned methodological inconsistency between economic competition on one hand and the political and cultural aspects of competition on the other. Section I develops the argument that in certain situations anticompetitive agreements are immunised from antitrust sanctions provided that they simultaneously promote competition more than they distort it. This possibility exists in the regulation of the political and cultural aspects of competition, but it is missing in the economic context. The current structure of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not envisage this option. Therefore in practice courts tend to develop indirect ways of granting immunity to undertakings which cannot conform to the rigid utilitarian requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. While acceptable, this solution is far from optimal. For this reason the section proposes a conceptual amendment of Article 101 TFEU. This proposal is designed as a contribution to the academic debate on the role of the competitive process in antitrust rather than as a direct call for changes in primary European law. Section J clarifies that the proposed deontological benchmark for competition does not diminish the importance of utilitarian values since the proposal merely extends the current regulatory framework without substituting any of its existing parts. The application of the amended Article 101 (3) TFEU would still be based upon the discretion of the decision-maker. The will of the decision-maker (be it the Commission, national authorities or courts) constitutes the central part of this section. It analyses the balancing techniques, developed by the legal and constitutional theories and implements them into the area of antitrust. Section K continues the analysis of the balancing act, dealing specifically with the technique of separation of different values. It proposes a two-step methodology of balancing. The first one is purely value-centric. It artificially isolates each value from all others in order to undertake their independent analysis which helps to understand the internal essence of each value separately. The second consecutive step recontextualises previously isolated values into the main regulatory agenda. This section demonstrates that the present-day regulatory status of competition does not enable it to be in the par-in-parem relationships with other values, because all balancing acts are performed as a one-step analysis: each value is only balanced against the others at the external level, where the one with the higher importance always prevails. This section is designed to provide the operational justification for the normative proposal developed in Section I. The last section summarises the main findings of the paper

Capitalistic Competition as a Communicative Community - Why Politics Is Less “Deliberative” than Markets

Discourse theorists such as Habermas tend to disregard the communicative character and discoursive power of market processes and at the same time overrate the ability of political deliberation to discover and implement social problem solutions. Mainstream economists have little to contribute to this debate since they regard both economic and political “markets” as simple instruments for the aggregation of given preferences. Hayek and other “Austrian” market process theorists, however, provide a rich theory that highlights the role of competition as a process of discovery, persuasion, experimentation and opinion formation. I use this analytical framework in order to show first that real market processes in many respects correspond to most ambitious claims of ideal deliberation such as “domination-free discourse” or “the unforced force of the better argument”. Next, I confront the deliberative ideal with predicaments of real political discourse, stressing opportunity costs (rational ignorance, shortage of attention, decision costs), asymmetric incompetence and the interventionist bias of political deliberation, and problems of “cheap talk” (preference falsification, opinion cascades, enclave deliberation). In order to make political discourse most effective within the limits described above, I argue in favour of privatisation, decentralisation and constitutionalisation as policy conclusions. I end with a summary comparison of economic and political competition as means to discover and disseminate local knowledge in society.discourse theory; market process theory; deliberative democracy; preference falsification; opinion formation; interventionism