19,504 research outputs found

    A Fault-Tolerant Emergency-Aware Access Control Scheme for Cyber-Physical Systems

    Full text link
    Access control is an issue of paramount importance in cyber-physical systems (CPS). In this paper, an access control scheme, namely FEAC, is presented for CPS. FEAC can not only provide the ability to control access to data in normal situations, but also adaptively assign emergency-role and permissions to specific subjects and inform subjects without explicit access requests to handle emergency situations in a proactive manner. In FEAC, emergency-group and emergency-dependency are introduced. Emergencies are processed in sequence within the group and in parallel among groups. A priority and dependency model called PD-AGM is used to select optimal response-action execution path aiming to eliminate all emergencies that occurred within the system. Fault-tolerant access control polices are used to address failure in emergency management. A case study of the hospital medical care application shows the effectiveness of FEAC

    Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems

    Full text link
    SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the state values of the physical process. In this work we present a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA systems that are undetectable by the above mentioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the communication channels between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a fake view of the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking manual actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages generated by the operator's actions, reversing their semantic meaning while causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes and timing, the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS's state all remain legitimate. We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security assessment tool, that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs and cause the HMI to display a coherent system--wide fake view. Our tool is configured with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML) we designed, which may be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout and possible equipment damage

    Integrated controls and health monitoring for chemical transfer propulsion

    Get PDF
    NASA is reviewing various propulsion technologies for exploring space. The requirements are examined for one enabling propulsion technology: Integrated Controls and Health Monitoring (ICHM) for Chemical Transfer Propulsion (CTP). Functional requirements for a CTP-ICHM system are proposed from tentative mission scenarios, vehicle configurations, CTP specifications, and technical feasibility. These CTP-ICHM requirements go beyond traditional reliable operation and emergency shutoff control to include: (1) enhanced mission flexibility; (2) continuously variable throttling; (3) tank-head start control; (4) automated prestart and post-shutoff engine check; (5) monitoring of space exposure degradation; and (6) product evolution flexibility. Technology development plans are also discussed

    Overlay networks for smart grids

    Get PDF
    corecore