A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field

Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent

TAC-02 was the third in a series of Trading Agent Competition events fostering research in automating trading strategies by showcasing alternate approaches in an open-invitation market game. TAC presents a challenging travel-shopping scenario where agents must satisfy client preferences for complementary and substitutable goods by interacting through a variety of market types. Michigan's entry, Walverine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel economy. Using this Walrasian model, we construct a decision-theoretic formulation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walverine solves in each round of bidding for each good. Walverine's optimal bidding approach, as well as several other features of its overall strategy, are potentially applicable in a broad class of trading environments.trading agent, trading competition, tatonnement, competitive equilibrium

Automated Auction Mechanism Design with Competing Markets

Resource allocation is a major issue in multiple areas of computer science. Despite the wide range of resource types across these areas, for example real commodities in e-commerce and computing resources in distributed computing, auctions are commonly used in solving the optimization problems involved in these areas, since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes. Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. Following this line of work, we present what we call a grey-box approach to automated auction mechanism design using reinforcement learning and evolutionary computation methods. We first describe a new strategic game, called \cat, which were designed to run multiple markets that compete to attract traders and make profit. The CAT game enables us to address the imbalance between prior work in this field that studied auctions in an isolated environment and the actual competitive situation that markets face. We then define a novel, parameterized framework for auction mechanisms, and present a classification of auction rules with each as a building block fitting into the framework. Finally we evaluate the viability of building blocks, and acquire auction mechanisms by combining viable blocks through iterations of CAT games. We carried out experiments to examine the effectiveness of the grey-box approach. The best mechanisms we learnt were able to outperform the standard mechanisms against which learning took place and carefully hand-coded mechanisms which won tournaments based on the CAT game. These best mechanisms were also able to outperform mechanisms from the literature even when the evaluation did not take place in the context of CAT games. These results suggest that the grey-box approach can generate robust double auction mechanisms and, as a consequence, is an effective approach to automated mechanism design. The contributions of this work are two-fold. First, the grey-box approach helps to design better auction mechanisms which can play a central role in solutions to resource allocation problems in various application domains of computer science. Second, the parameterized view and the reinforcement learning-based search method can be used in other strategic, competitive situations where decision making processes are complex and difficult to design and evaluate manually

Designing an Agent for Information Extraction from Persian E-shops

E-shops are among the most conventional applications of Electronic Commerce. In these shops, the buyers search for their goods through key words or classifications and read the product description provided by the sellers. Though, when the number of items is high, this gets to be difficult for the users. On the one hand, there are too many e-shops, and browsing in these shops to find the best and most appropriate goods is a difficult and time-consuming process. On the other hand, product descriptions are not the same in different websites, and there are different product forms. This study investigates about products and sellers in various websites based on the conditions and user requirements through software agents which present the extracted information in the form of a table to the users which enables them to compare prices and each seller’s conditions without spending too much time for browsing. Using this method increases precision and recall indices comparing to a conventional user browsing

INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE COGNITIVE ABILITIES OF ALTERNATE LEARNING CLASSIFIER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES

The Learning Classifier System (LCS) and its descendant, XCS, are promising paradigms for machine learning design and implementation. Whereas LCS allows classifier payoff predictions to guide system performance, XCS focuses on payoff-prediction accuracy instead, allowing it to evolve optimal classifier sets in particular applications requiring rational thought. This research examines LCS and XCS performance in artificial situations with broad social/commercial parallels, created using the non-Markov Iterated Prisoner\u27s Dilemma (IPD) game-playing scenario, where the setting is sometimes asymmetric and where irrationality sometimes pays. This research systematically perturbs a conventional IPD-playing LCS-based agent until it results in a full-fledged XCS-based agent, contrasting the simulated behavior of each LCS variant in terms of a number of performance measures. The intent is to examine the XCS paradigm to understand how it better copes with a given situation (if it does) than the LCS perturbations studied.Experiment results indicate that the majority of the architectural differences do have a significant effect on the agents\u27 performance with respect to the performance measures used in this research. The results of these competitions indicate that while each architectural difference significantly affected its agent\u27s performance, no single architectural difference could be credited as causing XCS\u27s demonstrated superiority in evolving optimal populations. Instead, the data suggests that XCS\u27s ability to evolve optimal populations in the multiplexer and IPD problem domains result from the combined and synergistic effects of multiple architectural differences.In addition, it is demonstrated that XCS is able to reliably evolve the Optimal Population [O] against the TFT opponent. This result supports Kovacs\u27 Optimality Hypothesis in the IPD environment and is significant because it is the first demonstrated occurrence of this ability in an environment other than the multiplexer and Woods problem domains.It is therefore apparent that while XCS performs better than its LCS-based counterparts, its demonstrated superiority may not be attributed to a single architectural characteristic. Instead, XCS\u27s ability to evolve optimal classifier populations in the multiplexer problem domain and in the IPD problem domain studied in this research results from the combined and synergistic effects of multiple architectural differences

Interaction and communication among autonomous agents in multiagent systems

The main goal of this doctoral thesis is to investigate a fundamental topic of research within the Multiagent Systems paradigm: the problem of defining open, heterogeneous, and dynamic interaction frameworks. That is to realize interaction systems where multiple agents can enter and leave dynamically and where no assumptions are made on the internal structure of the interacting agents. Such topic of research has received much attention in the past few years. In particular the need to realize applications where artificial agents can interact negotiate, exchange information, resources, and services has become more and more important thanks to the advent of Internet. I started my studies by developing a trading agent that took part to an international trading on-line game: the First Trading Agent Competition (TAC). During the design and development phase of the trading agent some crucial and critical troubles emerged: the problem of accurately understanding the rules that govern the different auctions; and the problem of understanding the meaning of the numerous messages. Another general problem is that the internal structure of the developed trading agent have been strongly determined by the peculiar interface of the interaction system, consequently without any changes in its code, it would not be able to take part to any other competition on the Web. Furthermore the trading agent would not have been able to exploit opportunities, to handle unexpected situations, or to reason about the rules of the various auctions, since it is not able to understand the meaning o the exchanged messages. The presence of all those problems bears out the need to find a standard common accepted way to define open interaction systems. The most important component of every interaction framework, as is remarked also by philosophical studies on human communication is the institution of language. Therefore I start to investigate the problem of defining a standard and common accepted semantics for Agent Communication Languages (ACL). The solutions proposed so far are at best partial, and are considered as unsatisfactory by a large number of specialists. In particular, they are unable to support verifiable compliance to standards and to make agents responsible for their communicative actions. Furthermore such proposals make the strong assumption that every interacting agent may be modeled as a Belief-Desire-Intention agent. What is required is an approach focused on externally observable events as opposed to the unobservable internal states of agents. Following Speech Act Theory that views language use as a form of action, I propose an operational specification for the definition of a standard ACL based on the notion of social commitment. In such a proposal the meaning of basic communicative acts is defined as the effect that it has on the social relationship between the sender and the receiver described through operation on an unambiguous, objective, and public "object": the commitment. The adoption of the notion of commitment is crucial to stabilize the interaction among agents, to create an expectation on other agents behavior, to enable agents to reason about their and other agents actions. The proposed ACL is verifiable, that is, it is possible to determine if an agent is behaving in accordance to its communicative actions; the semantics is objective, independent of the agent's internal structure, flexible and extensible, simple, yet enough expressive. A complete operational specification of an interaction framework using the proposed commitment-based ACL is presented. In particular some sample applications of how to use the proposed framework to formalize interaction protocols are reported. A list of soundness conditions to test if a protocol is sound is proposed