The Regulation of Labor

We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that richer countries regulate labor less than poorer countries do, although they have more generous social security systems. The political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems. Socialist and French legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries, and the inclusion of legal origin wipes out the effect of the political power of the left. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are difficult to reconcile with efficiency and political power theories of institutional choice, but are broadly consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.

Power and temporal commitment preference: An investigation in Portugal, Turkey, and the United States

The current research explores the impact of power on temporal commitment preference (an individual?s preference for shorter or longer time durations for agreements in decision making situations) across three countries: Portugal, Turkey, and the United States. A pilot study (N = 356) established cultural differences in uncertainty avoidance, which was expected to impact choices and behaviors involving power and temporality. The main study (N = 433) investigated the relationship between power and temporal commitment preference. Across all countries, high power individuals preferred shorter temporal commitments than low power individuals. In addition, the U.S. participants preferred longer temporal commitments than either the Portuguese or Turkish participants. We argue that differences in uncertainty avoidance help explain some of the differences in individuals? temporal commitment preferences across diverse cultural settings. Implications for practice and future directions are also discussed.Power, Time, National culture, Uncertainty avoidance

Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform and Economic Development

The current global financial crisis has provoked intense criticism of the regulatory framework for financial markets. Financial market flexibility, once considered the key to successful financial institutions and economic growth, has now come under intense scrutiny. In contrast, labor market flexibility is still promoted by scholars and international policymakers as an essential part of the recipe for economic development. This Article argues that the predominant understanding of labor flexibility is misguided and needs to be revised. To illustrate why, the Article undertakes a critical examination of labor flexibility as developed by a leading World Bank project, called “Doing Business.” It argues that the project mischaracterizes countries’ labor regulations by failing to consider the full range of legal sources, surveying only the law in the books, and remaining blind to the realities of lack of enforcement and rampant economic informality. More importantly, the project promotes a binary understanding of flexibility that fails to capture the relational character of legal entitlements. Proposed legal reforms in the direction of “flexibilization” can therefore be both costly and ineffective. As an alternative, this Article develops a framework which, incorporating insights from comparative law and legal theory, proceeds in two steps. First, it undertakes a doctrinal assessment of the respective rights, duties, and privileges of employers and employees in the labor market, and asks whose flexibility is enhanced. Second, it pays attention to the link between the formal and informal economic sectors. Using the examples of the United States and Mexico, the Article illustrates how this new framework can lead to a better sense of the relationship between labor law and a country’s economy, and can be used as a better map for regulatory reforms

Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments: An Empirical Analysis

Successful formation and long-term stability of cooperative ventures is often linked to the perceived fairness of the cost and resource allocations that these ventures employ. Indeed, the lack of a consensus over what basis should be used for gauging equitable allocation can undermine the prospects for collaboration. We use irrigation cost sharing as a context for examining the equity basis selections of cooperative ventures that successfully form and endure. Our analysis reveals that these selections are explained by features of the cooperative environment and inequities in the derived benefits from the irrigation water.irrigation, cost allocation, equity, probit model, Risk and Uncertainty,

Cooperative Organizational Strategies: A Neo-Institutional Digest

This paper describes the neo-institutional approaches of transaction cost economics, agency theory, and property rights analysis and summarizes efforts by economists to apply these concepts to cooperatives. Several problems intrinsic to the cooperative organizational form and its property rights structure are reviewed. These problems have been hypothesized to affect the comparative economic efficiency of cooperative firms and have led to the development of life cycle models seeking to explain the formation, growth, and eventual decline of cooperatives as markets evolve. In this context, statistical analyses of the comparative efficiency of cooperatives and ex post studies of cooperative conversions are surveyed.Agribusiness,

The quest for corporate growth

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1996.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 116-122).by Gabriel D. Obrador Ramos and Edmundo E. Ruiz Rodriguez.M.S

Labour Market Flexibility, Wages and Incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s..

This paper provides an overview of how African labour markets have performed in the 1990s. It is argued that the failure of African labour markets to create good paying jobs has resulted in excess labour supply in the form of either open unemployment or a growing self-employment sector. One explanation for this outcome is a lack of labour market 'flexibility' keeping formal sector wages above their equilibrium level and restricting job creation. We identify three attributes of labour market flexibility. First, whether real wages decline over time; secondly, the tendency for wages to adjust in the face of unemployment; and thirdly, the extent of wage differentials between sectors and/or firms of various size. Recent research shows that real wages in Africa during the 1990s may have been more downwardly flexible than previously thought and have been surprisingly responsive to unemployment rates, yet large wage differentials between formal and informal sector firms remain. This third sense of the term 'inflexibility' can explain a common factor across diverse African economies--the high income divide between those working in large firms and those not. Those working in the thriving self-employment sector in Ghana have something in common with the unemployed in South Africa--both have very low income opportunities relative to those in large firms.

Reinterpreting social pacts: theory an evidence

Economists have largely neglected the analysis of the relevant factors that induce policymakers and trade unions to sign social pacts, despite their clear implications for economic policies and the functioning of labour markets. In this paper we fill this gap. We build a simple theoretical framework that models social pacts as the outcome of a bargaining process, where the probability of observing a pact is essentially determined by politico-economic factors. Then we test the model using a new and original data set that documents the features of social pacts implemented in advanced economies over the last 30 years.Social pacts, institutions macroeconomic outcomes