149,309 research outputs found
Normativity, interpretation, and Bayesian models
It has been suggested that evaluative normativity should be expunged from the psychology of reasoning. A broadly Davidsonian response to these arguments is presented. It is suggested that two distinctions, between different types of rationality, are more permeable than this argument requires and that the fundamental objection is to selecting theories that make the most rational sense of the data. It is argued that this is inevitable consequence of radical interpretation where understanding others requires assuming they share our own norms of reasoning. This requires evaluative normativity and it is shown that when asked to evaluate othersâ arguments participants conform to rational Bayesian norms. It is suggested that logic and probability are not in competition and that the variety of norms is more limited than the arguments against evaluative normativity suppose. Moreover, the universality of belief ascription suggests that many of our norms are universal and hence evaluative. It is concluded that the union of evaluative normativity and descriptive psychology implicit in Davidson and apparent in the psychology of reasoning is a good thing
Relevance and Conditionals: A Synopsis of Open Pragmatic and Semantic Issues
Recently several papers have reported relevance effects on the cognitive assessments of indicative conditionals, which pose an explanatory challenge to the Suppositional Theory of conditionals advanced by David Over, which is influential in the psychology of reasoning. Some of these results concern the âEquationâ (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)), others the de Finetti truth table, and yet others the uncertain and-to-inference task. The purpose of this chapter is to take a Birdseye view on the debate and investigate some of the open theoretical issues posed by the empirical results. Central among these is whether to count these effects as belonging to pragmatics or semantics
Herding and Social Pressure in Trading Tasks: A Behavioural Analysis
We extend the experimental literature on Bayesian herding using evidence from a financial decision-making experiment. We identify significant propensities to herd increasing with the degree of herd-consensus. We test various herding models to capture the differential impacts of Bayesian-style thinking versus behavioural factors. We find statistically significant associations between herding and individual characteristics such as age and personality traits. Overall, our evidence is consistent with explanations of herding as the outcome of social and behavioural factors. Suggestions for further research are outlined and include verifying these findings and identifying the neurological correlates of propensities to herd
Decision by sampling: the role of the decision environment in risky choice
Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts
Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future
Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with
more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles in
behavioral economics. This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and
methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising
new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chaptersâ coverage of topics
Herbert Simon's decision-making approach: Investigation of cognitive processes in experts
This is a post print version of the article. The official published can be obtained from the links below - PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved.Herbert Simon's research endeavor aimed to understand the processes that participate in human decision making. However, despite his effort to investigate this question, his work did not have the impact in the âdecision makingâ community that it had in other fields. His rejection of the assumption of perfect rationality, made in mainstream economics, led him to develop the concept of bounded rationality. Simon's approach also emphasized the limitations of the cognitive system, the change of processes due to expertise, and the direct empirical study of cognitive processes involved in decision making. In this article, we argue that his subsequent research program in problem solving and expertise offered critical tools for studying decision-making processes that took into account his original notion of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, these tools were ignored by the main research paradigms in decision making, such as Tversky and Kahneman's biased rationality approach (also known as the heuristics and biases approach) and the ecological approach advanced by Gigerenzer and others. We make a proposal of how to integrate Simon's approach with the main current approaches to decision making. We argue that this would lead to better models of decision making that are more generalizable, have higher ecological validity, include specification of cognitive processes, and provide a better understanding of the interaction between the characteristics of the cognitive system and the contingencies of the environment
Evolving Non-Dominated Parameter Sets for Computational Models from Multiple Experiments
© Peter C. R. Lane, Fernand Gobet. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY-NC 3.0)Creating robust, reproducible and optimal computational models is a key challenge for theorists in many sciences. Psychology and cognitive science face particular challenges as large amounts of data are collected and many models are not amenable to analytical techniques for calculating parameter sets. Particular problems are to locate the full range of acceptable model parameters for a given dataset, and to confirm the consistency of model parameters across different datasets. Resolving these problems will provide a better understanding of the behaviour of computational models, and so support the development of general and robust models. In this article, we address these problems using evolutionary algorithms to develop parameters for computational models against multiple sets of experimental data; in particular, we propose the âspeciated non-dominated sorting genetic algorithmâ for evolving models in several theories. We discuss the problem of developing a model of categorisation using twenty-nine sets of data and models drawn from four different theories. We find that the evolutionary algorithms generate high quality models, adapted to provide a good fit to all available data.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio
Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children's intuitive reasoning
This is an author-created version of this article. The original source of publication is Psychon Bull Rev. 2006 Dec;13(6):935-53
The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF0321390
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A quantum geometric model of similarity
No other study has had as great an impact on the development of the similarity literature as that of Tversky (1977), which provided compelling demonstrations against all the fundamental assumptions of the popular, and extensively employed, geometric similarity models. Notably, similarity judgments were shown to violate symmetry and the triangle inequality, and also be subject to context effects, so that the same pair of items would be rated differently, depending on the presence of other items. Quantum theory provides a generalized geometric approach to similarity and can address several of Tverskyâs (1997) main findings. Similarity is modeled as quantum probability, so that asymmetries emerge as order effects, and the triangle equality violations and the diagnosticity effect can be related to the context-dependent properties of quantum probability. We so demonstrate the promise of the quantum approach for similarity and discuss the implications for representation theory in general
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