Alternation-Trading Proofs, Linear Programming, and Lower Bounds

A fertile area of recent research has demonstrated concrete polynomial time lower bounds for solving natural hard problems on restricted computational models. Among these problems are Satisfiability, Vertex Cover, Hamilton Path, Mod6-SAT, Majority-of-Majority-SAT, and Tautologies, to name a few. The proofs of these lower bounds follow a certain proof-by-contradiction strategy that we call alternation-trading. An important open problem is to determine how powerful such proofs can possibly be. We propose a methodology for studying these proofs that makes them amenable to both formal analysis and automated theorem proving. We prove that the search for better lower bounds can often be turned into a problem of solving a large series of linear programming instances. Implementing a small-scale theorem prover based on this result, we extract new human-readable time lower bounds for several problems. This framework can also be used to prove concrete limitations on the current techniques.Comment: To appear in STACS 2010, 12 page

Easiness Amplification and Uniform Circuit Lower Bounds

We present new consequences of the assumption that time-bounded algorithms can be "compressed" with non-uniform circuits. Our main contribution is an "easiness amplification" lemma for circuits. One instantiation of the lemma says: if n^{1+e}-time, tilde{O}(n)-space computations have n^{1+o(1)} size (non-uniform) circuits for some e > 0, then every problem solvable in polynomial time and tilde{O}(n) space has n^{1+o(1)} size (non-uniform) circuits as well. This amplification has several consequences: * An easy problem without small LOGSPACE-uniform circuits. For all e > 0, we give a natural decision problem, General Circuit n^e-Composition, that is solvable in about n^{1+e} time, but we prove that polynomial-time and logarithmic-space preprocessing cannot produce n^{1+o(1)}-size circuits for the problem. This shows that there are problems solvable in n^{1+e} time which are not in LOGSPACE-uniform n^{1+o(1)} size, the first result of its kind. We show that our lower bound is non-relativizing, by exhibiting an oracle relative to which the result is false. * Problems without low-depth LOGSPACE-uniform circuits. For all e > 0, 1 < d < 2, and e < d we give another natural circuit composition problem computable in tilde{O}(n^{1+e}) time, or in O((log n)^d) space (though not necessarily simultaneously) that we prove does not have SPACE[(log n)^e]-uniform circuits of tilde{O}(n) size and O((log n)^e) depth. We also show SAT does not have circuits of tilde{O}(n) size and log^{2-o(1)}(n) depth that can be constructed in log^{2-o(1)}(n) space. * A strong circuit complexity amplification. For every e > 0, we give a natural circuit composition problem and show that if it has tilde{O}(n)-size circuits (uniform or not), then every problem solvable in 2^{O(n)} time and 2^{O(sqrt{n log n})} space (simultaneously) has 2^{O(sqrt{n log n})}-size circuits (uniform or not). We also show the same consequence holds assuming SAT has tilde{O}(n)-size circuits. As a corollary, if n^{1.1} time computations (or O(n) nondeterministic time computations) have tilde{O}(n)-size circuits, then all problems in exponential time and subexponential space (such as quantified Boolean formulas) have significantly subexponential-size circuits. This is a new connection between the relative circuit complexities of easy and hard problems

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs

Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing. Existing interactive-proof games largely fall into two categories: either as games of cooperation such as multi-prover interactive proofs and cooperative rational proofs, where the provers work together as a team; or as games of conflict such as refereed games, where the provers directly compete with each other in a zero-sum game. Neither of these extremes truly capture the strategic nature of service providers in outsourcing applications. How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem. In this paper, we introduce a mechanism-design approach to define a multi-prover interactive-proof model in which the provers are rational and non-cooperative - they act to maximize their expected utility given others\u27 strategies. We define a strong notion of backwards induction as our solution concept to analyze the resulting extensive-form game with imperfect information. We fully characterize the complexity of our proof system under different utility gap guarantees. (At a high level, a utility gap of u means that the protocol is robust against provers that may not care about a utility loss of 1/u.) We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P^{NEXP}

Money is more than memory

Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts\u2019 past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions\u2014or memory\u2014should supersede the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not. Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors

Money is More Than Memory

Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts’ past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions—or memory—should supersede the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not. Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors