19,251 research outputs found
A Case Study on Logical Relations using Contextual Types
Proofs by logical relations play a key role to establish rich properties such
as normalization or contextual equivalence. They are also challenging to
mechanize. In this paper, we describe the completeness proof of algorithmic
equality for simply typed lambda-terms by Crary where we reason about logically
equivalent terms in the proof environment Beluga. There are three key aspects
we rely upon: 1) we encode lambda-terms together with their operational
semantics and algorithmic equality using higher-order abstract syntax 2) we
directly encode the corresponding logical equivalence of well-typed
lambda-terms using recursive types and higher-order functions 3) we exploit
Beluga's support for contexts and the equational theory of simultaneous
substitutions. This leads to a direct and compact mechanization, demonstrating
Beluga's strength at formalizing logical relations proofs.Comment: In Proceedings LFMTP 2015, arXiv:1507.0759
Computability and analysis: the legacy of Alan Turing
We discuss the legacy of Alan Turing and his impact on computability and
analysis.Comment: 49 page
On the connection between Nonstandard Analysis and Constructive Analysis
Constructive Analysis and Nonstandard Analysis are often characterized as completely antipodal approaches to analysis. We discuss the possibility of capturing the central notion of Constructive Analysis (i.e. algorithm, finite procedure or explicit construction) by a simple concept inside Nonstandard Analysis. To this end, we introduce Omega-invariance and argue that it partially satisfies our goal. Our results provide a dual approach to Erik Palmgren's development of Nonstandard Analysis inside constructive mathematics
Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth
of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under
any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of
general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be
interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical
truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical,
Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of
Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts
of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a
constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version
is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht
Mass problems and intuitionistic higher-order logic
In this paper we study a model of intuitionistic higher-order logic which we
call \emph{the Muchnik topos}. The Muchnik topos may be defined briefly as the
category of sheaves of sets over the topological space consisting of the Turing
degrees, where the Turing cones form a base for the topology. We note that our
Muchnik topos interpretation of intuitionistic mathematics is an extension of
the well known Kolmogorov/Muchnik interpretation of intuitionistic
propositional calculus via Muchnik degrees, i.e., mass problems under weak
reducibility. We introduce a new sheaf representation of the intuitionistic
real numbers, \emph{the Muchnik reals}, which are different from the Cauchy
reals and the Dedekind reals. Within the Muchnik topos we obtain a \emph{choice
principle} and a \emph{bounding principle} where range over Muchnik
reals, ranges over functions from Muchnik reals to Muchnik reals, and
is a formula not containing or . For the convenience of the
reader, we explain all of the essential background material on intuitionism,
sheaf theory, intuitionistic higher-order logic, Turing degrees, mass problems,
Muchnik degrees, and Kolmogorov's calculus of problems. We also provide an
English translation of Muchnik's 1963 paper on Muchnik degrees.Comment: 44 page
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