951 research outputs found
Platform for Testing and Evaluation of PUF and TRNG Implementations in FPGAs
Implementation of cryptographic primitives like
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and True Random Number
Generators (TRNGs) depends significantly on the underlying
hardware. Common evaluation boards offered by FPGA vendors
are not suitable for a fair benchmarking, since they have different
vendor dependent configuration and contain noisy switching
power supplies. The proposed hardware platform is primary
aimed at testing and evaluation of cryptographic primitives
across different FPGA and ASIC families. The modular platform
consists of a motherboard and exchangeable daughter board
modules. These are designed to be as simple as possible to
allow cheap and independent evaluation of cryptographic blocks
and namely PUFs. The motherboard is based on the Microsemi
SmartFusion 2 SoC FPGA. It features a low-noise power supply,
which simplifies evaluation of vulnerability to the side channel
attacks. It provides also means of communication between the
PC and the daughter module. Available software tools can be
easily customized, for example to collect data from the random
number generator located in the daughter module and to read it
via USB interface. The daughter module can be plugged into
the motherboard or connected using an HDMI cable to be
placed inside a Faraday cage or a temperature control chamber.
The whole platform was designed and optimized to fullfil the
European HECTOR project (H2020) requirements
Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: a survey
The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic
viewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of
the established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not
provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established
by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for
which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can
vary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in
security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other
cryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly
centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We
first review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment
techniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic
scenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures:
1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a
point-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the
objective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the
constraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts.
We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD
technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research.Comment: Revised version of the SECOQC White Paper. Published in the special
issue on QKD of TCS, Theoretical Computer Science (2014), pp. 62-8
A Survey on Wireless Sensor Network Security
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted a lot of interest in
the research community due their wide range of applications. Due to distributed
nature of these networks and their deployment in remote areas, these networks
are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their
proper functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is deployed
for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical battlefield.
Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios.
Due to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security
mechanisms with large overhead of computation and communication are infeasible
in WSNs. Security in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging
task. This paper discusses the current state of the art in security mechanisms
for WSNs. Various types of attacks are discussed and their countermeasures
presented. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN
security is also included.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figures, 2 table
Countermeasure implementation and effectiveness analysis for AES resistance against side channel attacks
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) is composed of a bunch of techniques employed to extract secret information from hardware operations through statistical analyses of execution data. For instance, the secret key of a crypto-algorithmic implementation could be targeted and its value could be retrieved. The data is obtained by measuring the power consumption or electromagnetic radiation of a device while performing an operation due to the linear relationship between the currents flowing through the circuitry during the execution of chip operations. Side channel is one of the most widely used attack methods in cryptanalysis. In order to avoid such attacks, the algorithmic implementations can be protected from side channel leakage with the use of different countermeasures. These countermeasures can be built on either software or hardware. The objective is to reduce, or even completely eliminate, the leakage of the device related to confidential data. Generally speaking, there are two main approaches to do so. The first aims to reduce the side channel observability, while the second intends to undermine the predictability of the data. This project focuses on designing and implementing different countermeasures that protect cryptographic implementations from side channel attacks, and test and analyze them afterwards. The countermeasures will be implemented in software and then tested though Correlation Power Analysis in a hardware device. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm will be used as a base structure, in order to improve its cryptographic security with the different countermeasures designed. However, the election of AES does not reduce the scope of this project since the implemented countermeasures could be applied to other cryptographic algorithms as well
Towards a Secure Smart Grid Storage Communications Gateway
This research in progress paper describes the role of cyber security measures
undertaken in an ICT system for integrating electric storage technologies into
the grid. To do so, it defines security requirements for a communications
gateway and gives detailed information and hands-on configuration advice on
node and communication line security, data storage, coping with backend M2M
communications protocols and examines privacy issues. The presented research
paves the road for developing secure smart energy communications devices that
allow enhancing energy efficiency. The described measures are implemented in an
actual gateway device within the HORIZON 2020 project STORY, which aims at
developing new ways to use storage and demonstrating these on six different
demonstration sites.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figure
Resilient networking in wireless sensor networks
This report deals with security in wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
especially in network layer. Multiple secure routing protocols have been
proposed in the literature. However, they often use the cryptography to secure
routing functionalities. The cryptography alone is not enough to defend against
multiple attacks due to the node compromise. Therefore, we need more
algorithmic solutions. In this report, we focus on the behavior of routing
protocols to determine which properties make them more resilient to attacks.
Our aim is to find some answers to the following questions. Are there any
existing protocols, not designed initially for security, but which already
contain some inherently resilient properties against attacks under which some
portion of the network nodes is compromised? If yes, which specific behaviors
are making these protocols more resilient? We propose in this report an
overview of security strategies for WSNs in general, including existing attacks
and defensive measures. In this report we focus at the network layer in
particular, and an analysis of the behavior of four particular routing
protocols is provided to determine their inherent resiliency to insider
attacks. The protocols considered are: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR),
Gradient-Based Routing (GBR), Greedy Forwarding (GF) and Random Walk Routing
(RWR)
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