54,614 research outputs found

    House Markets with Matroid and Knapsack Constraints

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    Classical online bipartite matching problem and its generalizations are central algorithmic optimization problems. The second related line of research is in the area of algorithmic mechanism design, referring to the broad class of house allocation or assignment problems. We introduce a single framework that unifies and generalizes these two streams of models. Our generalizations allow for arbitrary matroid constraints or knapsack constraints at every object in the allocation problem. We design and analyze approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for this framework. Our algorithms have best possible approximation guarantees for most of the special instantiations of this framework, and are strong generalizations of the previous known results

    Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design

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    We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same time maximize a given valuation function. This framework captures the budgeted version of several well known optimization problems, and when the resources are owned by strategic agents the goal is to design truthful and budget feasible mechanisms, i.e. elicit the true cost of the resources and ensure the payments of the mechanism do not exceed the budget. Budget feasibility introduces more challenges in mechanism design, and we study instantiations of this problem for certain classes of submodular and XOS valuation functions. We first obtain mechanisms with an improved approximation ratio for weighted coverage valuations, a special class of submodular functions that has already attracted attention in previous works. We then provide a general scheme for designing randomized and deterministic polynomial time mechanisms for a class of XOS problems. This class contains problems whose feasible set forms an independence system (a more general structure than matroids), and some representative problems include, among others, finding maximum weighted matchings, maximum weighted matroid members, and maximum weighted 3D-matchings. For most of these problems, only randomized mechanisms with very high approximation ratios were known prior to our results

    Mechanism Design via Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition

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    In random allocation rules, typically first an optimal fractional point is calculated via solving a linear program. The calculated point represents a fractional assignment of objects or more generally packages of objects to agents. In order to implement an expected assignment, the mechanism designer must decompose the fractional point into integer solutions, each satisfying underlying constraints. The resulting convex combination can then be viewed as a probability distribution over feasible assignments out of which a random assignment can be sampled. This approach has been successfully employed in combinatorial optimization as well as mechanism design with or without money. In this paper, we show that both finding the optimal fractional point as well as its decomposition into integer solutions can be done at once. We propose an appropriate linear program which provides the desired solution. We show that the linear program can be solved via Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition. Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition is a direct implementation of the revised simplex method which is well known to be highly efficient in practice. We also show how to use the Benders decomposition as an alternative method to solve the problem. The proposed method can also find a decomposition into integer solutions when the fractional point is readily present perhaps as an outcome of other algorithms rather than linear programming. The resulting convex decomposition in this case is tight in terms of the number of integer points according to the Carath{\'e}odory's theorem
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