Digital Image

This paper considers the ontological significance of invisibility in relation to the question ‘what is a digital image?’ Its argument in a nutshell is that the emphasis on visibility comes at the expense of latency and is symptomatic of the style of thinking that dominated Western philosophy since Plato. This privileging of visible content necessarily binds images to linguistic (semiotic and structuralist) paradigms of interpretation which promote representation, subjectivity, identity and negation over multiplicity, indeterminacy and affect. Photography is the case in point because until recently critical approaches to photography had one thing in common: they all shared in the implicit and incontrovertible understanding that photographs are a medium that must be approached visually; they took it as a given that photographs are there to be looked at and they all agreed that it is only through the practices of spectatorship that the secrets of the image can be unlocked. Whatever subsequent interpretations followed, the priori- ty of vision in relation to the image remained unperturbed. This undisputed belief in the visibility of the image has such a strong grasp on theory that it imperceptibly bonded together otherwise dissimilar and sometimes contradictory methodol- ogies, preventing them from noticing that which is the most unexplained about images: the precedence of looking itself. This self-evident truth of visibility casts a long shadow on im- age theory because it blocks the possibility of inquiring after everything that is invisible, latent and hidden

Algorithmic recognition of infinite cyclic extensions

We prove that one cannot algorithmically decide whether a finitely presented $\mathbb{Z}$-extension admits a finitely generated base group, and we use this fact to prove the undecidability of the BNS invariant. Furthermore, we show the equivalence between the isomorphism problem within the subclass of unique $\mathbb{Z}$-extensions, and the semi-conjugacy problem for deranged outer automorphisms.Comment: 24 page

Computational universes

Suspicions that the world might be some sort of a machine or algorithm existing ``in the mind'' of some symbolic number cruncher have lingered from antiquity. Although popular at times, the most radical forms of this idea never reached mainstream. Modern developments in physics and computer science have lent support to the thesis, but empirical evidence is needed before it can begin to replace our contemporary world view.Comment: Several corrections of typos and smaller revisions, final versio

Computability and Algorithmic Complexity in Economics

This is an outline of the origins and development of the way computability theory and algorithmic complexity theory were incorporated into economic and finance theories. We try to place, in the context of the development of computable economics, some of the classics of the subject as well as those that have, from time to time, been credited with having contributed to the advancement of the field. Speculative thoughts on where the frontiers of computable economics are, and how to move towards them, conclude the paper. In a precise sense - both historically and analytically - it would not be an exaggeration to claim that both the origins of computable economics and its frontiers are defined by two classics, both by Banach and Mazur: that one page masterpiece by Banach and Mazur ([5]), built on the foundations of Turing’s own classic, and the unpublished Mazur conjecture of 1928, and its unpublished proof by Banach ([38], ch. 6 & [68], ch. 1, #6). For the undisputed original classic of computable economics is Rabinís effectivization of the Gale-Stewart game ([42];[16]); the frontiers, as I see them, are defined by recursive analysis and constructive mathematics, underpinning computability over the computable and constructive reals and providing computable foundations for the economist’s Marshallian penchant for curve-sketching ([9]; [19]; and, in general, the contents of Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 219, Issue 1-2). The former work has its roots in the Banach-Mazur game (cf. [38], especially p.30), at least in one reading of it; the latter in ([5]), as well as other, earlier, contributions, not least by Brouwer.