Three-valued logics, uncertainty management and rough sets

This paper is a survey of the connections between three-valued logics and rough sets from the point of view of incomplete information management. Based on the fact that many three-valued logics can be put under a unique algebraic umbrella, we show how to translate three-valued conjunctions and implications into operations on ill-known sets such as rough sets. We then show that while such translations may provide mathematically elegant algebraic settings for rough sets, the interpretability of these connectives in terms of an original set approximated via an equivalence relation is very limited, thus casting doubts on the practical relevance of truth-functional logical renderings of rough sets

Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?

The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status, and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open, modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and Alonso, E., 201

Borderline vs. unknown: comparing three-valued representations of imperfect information

International audienceIn this paper we compare the expressive power of elementary representation formats for vague, incomplete or conflicting information. These include Boolean valuation pairs introduced by Lawry and González-Rodríguez, orthopairs of sets of variables, Boolean possibility and necessity measures, three-valued valuations, supervaluations. We make explicit their connections with strong Kleene logic and with Belnap logic of conflicting information. The formal similarities between 3-valued approaches to vagueness and formalisms that handle incomplete information often lead to a confusion between degrees of truth and degrees of uncertainty. Yet there are important differences that appear at the interpretive level: while truth-functional logics of vagueness are accepted by a part of the scientific community (even if questioned by supervaluationists), the truth-functionality assumption of three-valued calculi for handling incomplete information looks questionable, compared to the non-truth-functional approaches based on Boolean possibility–necessity pairs. This paper aims to clarify the similarities and differences between the two situations. We also study to what extent operations for comparing and merging information items in the form of orthopairs can be expressed by means of operations on valuation pairs, three-valued valuations and underlying possibility distributions

Negation in natural language

Negation is ubiquitous in natural language, and philosophers have developed plenty of different theories of the semantics of negation. Despite this, linguistic theorizing about negation typically assumes that classical logic's semantics for negation---a simple truth-functional toggle---is adequate to negation in natural language, and philosophical discussions of negation typically ignore vital linguistic data. The present document is thus something of an attempt to fill a gap, to show that careful attention to linguistic data actually militates {\\em against} using a classical semantics for negation, and to demonstrate the philosophical payoff that comes from a nonclassical semantics for natural-language negation. I present a compositional semantics for natural language in which these questions can be posed and addressed, and argue that propositional attitudes fit into this semantics best when we use a nonclassical semantics for negation. I go on to explore several options that have been proposed by logicians of various stripes for the semantics of negation, providing a general framework in which the options can be evaluated. Finally, I show how taking non-classical negations seriously opens new doors in the philosophy of vagueness

Existence Assumptions and Logical Principles: Choice Operators in Intuitionistic Logic

Hilbert’s choice operators τ and ε, when added to intuitionistic logic, strengthen it. In the presence of certain extensionality axioms they produce classical logic, while in the presence of weaker decidability conditions for terms they produce various superintuitionistic intermediate logics. In this thesis, I argue that there are important philosophical lessons to be learned from these results. To make the case, I begin with a historical discussion situating the development of Hilbert’s operators in relation to his evolving program in the foundations of mathematics and in relation to philosophical motivations leading to the development of intuitionistic logic. This sets the stage for a brief description of the relevant part of Dummett’s program to recast debates in metaphysics, and in particular disputes about realism and anti-realism, as closely intertwined with issues in philosophical logic, with the acceptance of classical logic for a domain reflecting a commitment to realism for that domain. Then I review extant results about what is provable and what is not when one adds epsilon to intuitionistic logic, largely due to Bell and DeVidi, and I give several new proofs of intermediate logics from intuitionistic logic+ε without identity. With all this in hand, I turn to a discussion of the philosophical significance of choice operators. Among the conclusions I defend are that these results provide a finer-grained basis for Dummett’s contention that commitment to classically valid but intuitionistically invalid principles reflect metaphysical commitments by showing those principles to be derivable from certain existence assumptions; that Dummett’s framework is improved by these results as they show that questions of realism and anti-realism are not an “all or nothing” matter, but that there are plausibly metaphysical stances between the poles of anti-realism (corresponding to acceptance just of intutionistic logic) and realism (corresponding to acceptance of classical logic), because different sorts of ontological assumptions yield intermediate rather than classical logic; and that these intermediate positions between classical and intuitionistic logic link up in interesting ways with our intuitions about issues of objectivity and reality, and do so usefully by linking to questions around intriguing everyday concepts such as “is smart,” which I suggest involve a number of distinct dimensions which might themselves be objective, but because of their multivalent structure are themselves intermediate between being objective and not. Finally, I discuss the implications of these results for ongoing debates about the status of arbitrary and ideal objects in the foundations of logic, showing among other things that much of the discussion is flawed because it does not recognize the degree to which the claims being made depend on the presumption that one is working with a very strong (i.e., classical) logic

Logical Localism in the Context of Combining Logics

[eng] Logical localism is a claim in the philosophy of logic stating that different logics are correct in different domains. There are different ways in which this thesis can be motivated and I will explore the most important ones. However, localism has an obvious and major challenge which is known as ‘the problem of mixed inferences’. The main goal of this dissertation is to solve this challenge and to extend the solution to the related problem of mixed compounds for alethic pluralism. My approach in order to offer a solution is one that has not been considered in the literature as far as I am aware. I will study different methods for combining logics, concentrating on the method of juxtaposition, by Joshua Schechter, and I will try to solve the problem of mixed inferences by making a finer translation of the arguments and using combination mechanisms as the criterion of validity. One of the most intriguing aspects of the dissertation is the synergy that is created between the philosophical debate and the technical methods with the problem of mixed inferences at the center of that synergy. I hope to show that not only the philosophical debate benefits from the methods for combining logics, but also that these methods can be developed in new and interesting ways motivated by the philosophical problem of mixed inferences. The problem suggests that there are relevant interactions between connectives, justified by the philosophical considerations for conceptualising different logic systems, that the methods for combining logics should allow to emerge. The recognition of this fact is what drives the improvements on the method of juxtaposition that I develop. That is, in order to allow for the emergence of desirable interaction principles, I will propose alternative ways of combining logic systems -specifically classical and intuitionistic logics- that go beyond the standard for combinations, which is based on minimality conditions so as to avoid the so-called collapse theorems.[spa] El localismo lógico es una tesis en filosofía de la lógica según la cual diferentes sistemas lógicos son correctos en función del dominio en el que se aplican. Dicha tesis cuenta, prima facie, con cierta plausibilidad y con varios argumentos que la respaldan como mostraré. Sin embargo, el localismo se presta a un evidente y poderoso contraargumento conocido como ‘el problema de las inferencias mixtas’. El objetivo principal de esta disertación es dar respuesta a ese problema y extender la solución al problema afín de los compuestos mixtos que afecta al pluralismo alético. La manera de abordar el problema de las inferencias mixtas consistirá en analizar casos paradigmáticos en la literatura a la luz de los métodos de combinación de lógicas. En concreto, me centraré en el método de la yuxtaposición, desarrollado por Joshua Schechter. Así, ofreceré una solución al problema de las inferencias mixtas que pasará por realizar un análisis más sutil y una formalización más precisa de las mismas, para después aplicar los mecanismos de combinación como criterio de validez. Además, mostraré que el problema de las inferencias mixtas provee de multitud de ejemplos que invitan a desarrollar los métodos de combinación de lógicas de formas novedosas. Una de las aportaciones más relevantes de la disertación consistirá en modificar el método de la yuxtaposición para obtener mecanismos que van más allá del estándar de las extensiones mínimas conservativas. En concreto, propondré diferentes mecanismos para combinar la lógica clásica y la intuicionista, de manera que se permita la aparición de distintos principios puente para los que tenemos buenas razones que los justifican, sin que ello conduzca al colapso de las lógicas que se combinan

Logical Localism in the Context of Combining Logics

Programa de Doctorat en Ciència Cognitiva i Llenguatge[eng] Logical localism is a claim in the philosophy of logic stating that different logics are correct in different domains. There are different ways in which this thesis can be motivated and I will explore the most important ones. However, localism has an obvious and major challenge which is known as ‘the problem of mixed inferences’. The main goal of this dissertation is to solve this challenge and to extend the solution to the related problem of mixed compounds for alethic pluralism. My approach in order to offer a solution is one that has not been considered in the literature as far as I am aware. I will study different methods for combining logics, concentrating on the method of juxtaposition, by Joshua Schechter, and I will try to solve the problem of mixed inferences by making a finer translation of the arguments and using combination mechanisms as the criterion of validity. One of the most intriguing aspects of the dissertation is the synergy that is created between the philosophical debate and the technical methods with the problem of mixed inferences at the center of that synergy. I hope to show that not only the philosophical debate benefits from the methods for combining logics, but also that these methods can be developed in new and interesting ways motivated by the philosophical problem of mixed inferences. The problem suggests that there are relevant interactions between connectives, justified by the philosophical considerations for conceptualising different logic systems, that the methods for combining logics should allow to emerge. The recognition of this fact is what drives the improvements on the method of juxtaposition that I develop. That is, in order to allow for the emergence of desirable interaction principles, I will propose alternative ways of combining logic systems -specifically classical and intuitionistic logics- that go beyond the standard for combinations, which is based on minimality conditions so as to avoid the so-called collapse theorems.[spa] El localismo lógico es una tesis en filosofía de la lógica según la cual diferentes sistemas lógicos son correctos en función del dominio en el que se aplican. Dicha tesis cuenta, prima facie, con cierta plausibilidad y con varios argumentos que la respaldan como mostraré. Sin embargo, el localismo se presta a un evidente y poderoso contraargumento conocido como ‘el problema de las inferencias mixtas’. El objetivo principal de esta disertación es dar respuesta a ese problema y extender la solución al problema afín de los compuestos mixtos que afecta al pluralismo alético. La manera de abordar el problema de las inferencias mixtas consistirá en analizar casos paradigmáticos en la literatura a la luz de los métodos de combinación de lógicas. En concreto, me centraré en el método de la yuxtaposición, desarrollado por Joshua Schechter. Así, ofreceré una solución al problema de las inferencias mixtas que pasará por realizar un análisis más sutil y una formalización más precisa de las mismas, para después aplicar los mecanismos de combinación como criterio de validez. Además, mostraré que el problema de las inferencias mixtas provee de multitud de ejemplos que invitan a desarrollar los métodos de combinación de lógicas de formas novedosas. Una de las aportaciones más relevantes de la disertación consistirá en modificar el método de la yuxtaposición para obtener mecanismos que van más allá del estándar de las extensiones mínimas conservativas. En concreto, propondré diferentes mecanismos para combinar la lógica clásica y la intuicionista, de manera que se permita la aparición de distintos principios puente para los que tenemos buenas razones que los justifican, sin que ello conduzca al colapso de las lógicas que se combinan