Chemical detection of explosives in soil for locating buried landmines.

Trinitrotoluene (TNT) is a highly explosive nitroaromatic compound that is used for military and terrorist activities such as the development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines and is the main charge or explosive in most of the anti-personal and anti-vehicle mines. Different chemicals/ contaminants associated with TNT in soils near buried land mines comprise the microbial transformation products of TNT (2-amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene [2-Am-DNT] and 4-amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene [4-Am-DNT]), manufacturing impurities of TNT (2,4-DNT, 2,6-DNT, and 1,3-DNB), and TNT. Time, cost, and casualties associated with demining have necessitated the demand for improved detection techniques with reduced false positives by directly detecting the explosive material, rather than casing material of mines. Different analytical methods used to detect trace level of explosives in soil include ion mobility mass spectrometry, gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS), and liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS) that require samples to be collected from hazardous sites to laboratories. This is extremely unsafe, time consuming, involve large and expensive instrumentation cost and specially trained staff. Thus, detecting chemical signatures of these nitroaromatics in soil infected with these chemicals due to leaked TNT mines can provide location of landmines/ landmine prone zones to aide humanitarian demining process. This paper illustrates soil analysis for explosives and selected contaminants by Raman spectroscopy as a chemical, nondestructive, remote sensing method. As with advancement of Raman-based standoff detection techniques, field-portable instruments and UAV deployable probes, this technique can be effectively employed in detecting buried landmines based on specific chemical signatures of target analyte. In this present study, TNT-based nitroaromatic was assessed in contaminated soil samples using Raman spectroscopy, where uncontaminated soil was used as background and matrix for spiking target contaminants at different concentrations

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 24.2 (2020)

Editorial: HMA and COVID-19: A Donor\u27s Perspective Editorial: Time To Focus on Real Minefield Data Mine Action Information Management in Iraq and Northeast Syria IMAS 10.60 Update: Investigation and Reporting of Accidents and Incidents The Mine Free Sarajevo Project SALW in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the DRC Gender and Diversity in Mine Action Victim Assistance in Ukraine Landmines in the American Civil War Risk Education in Colombia R&D: The Odyssey2025 Projec

Mine Action 2020: Book of Papers

Book of papers that was to be presented at the 2020 Mine Action Symposium in Croatia. The Symposium canceled due to COVID-19

Issue 25.1 Endnotes

Issue 25.1 Endnote

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 24.1 (2020)

Mine Action on the Korean Peninsula Raising the Profile of Mine Action A New Approach to IMAS Compliance Disposal of EO and Environmental Risk Mitigation Explosive Ordnance Risk Education - Measuring Behavior Chang

Drones and Butterflies : A Low-Cost UAV System for Rapid Detection and Identification of Unconventional Minefields

Aerially-deployed plastic landmines in post-conflict nations present unique detection and disposal challenges. Their small size, randomized distribution during deployment, and low-metal content make these mines more difficult to identify using traditional methods of electromagnetic mine detection. Perhaps the most notorious of these mines is the Sovietera PFM-1 “butterfly mine,” widely used during the decade-long Soviet-Afghan conflict between 1979 and 1989. Predominantly used by the Soviet forces to block otherwise inaccessible mountain passages, many PFM-1 minefields remain in place due to the high associated costs of access and demining. While the total number of deployed PFM-1 mines in Afghanistan is poorly documented, PFM-1 landmines make up a considerable percentage of the estimated 10 million landmines remaining in place across Afghanistan. Their detection and disposal presents a unique logistical challenge for largely the same reasons that their deployment was rationalized in inaccessible and sparsely populated areas of the country

Norwegian People\u27s Aid Weapons Policy

As a field-based organization working in conflict areas and specializing in operations that address weapons and ammunition, NPA has proven that it is well placed to contribute to processes to develop and strengthen international policies, rules, and norms to better protect civilians and the environment from unacceptable harm. Building on the experience of our contributions to the global movements that successfully banned antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions, NPA will continue to have a strong voice on other unresolved or emerging weapons-related issues that call for an international response. Some of the weapons issues for which an NPA policy is set out in this document are threats that NPA works to address on a daily basis through our operations and advocacy. Others are issues where NPA currently is involved to a lesser or less continuous degree; where we stand ready to act if the weapons in question are used in an area where we implement operations; or where we only support the efforts of other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but have found it beneficial to clearly formulate NPA’s views. Additional issues of concern other than those mentioned in this document may be taken up where a pressing need is identified and where NPA can make a difference. On the basis of this policy, the collective advocacy efforts of NPA’s head office and our external offices will be tailored to promote greater understanding of specific weapons-related challenges and concrete steps that can be taken to address them, and to influence policy and practice within the UN and other institutions and ultimately within states