170,291 research outputs found

    A focused force: Australia's Defence priorities in the Asian century

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    The biggest questions for Australia’s defence white paper concern China. How does China's rise affect Australia's strategic situation and what does it mean for our defence needs? Just as Australia's strategic outlook has been dominated in past decades by American primacy in Asia, so in future it will be shaped more than anything else by what follows as America's primacy fades and China's grows. The biggest risk is not that China becomes a direct threat to Australia but that the erosion of American power unleashes strategic competition among Asia's strongest states, which in turn increases the risk that Australia could face a number of military threats to its interests, even its territorial security. The blunt truth is that our existing and planned forces will not be able to achieve the strategic objectives set for them over the past decade, let alone any wider objectives that may be set in future. To provide future Australian governments with genuine military options to protect Australia's strategic interests if Asia becomes more contested, our defence planning needs to focus on the capabilities that provide those options most cost-effectively. At sea, we should invest in a much bigger fleet of submarines, which are most cost-effective for maritime denial, and stop building highly vulnerable and extremely expensive surface ships for which there is no clear strategic purpose. In the air we need to ensure a robust air combat and strike capacity against the kinds of forces that major-power adversaries will have in the 2020s and '30s. That means aircraft at least as capable as the joint strike fighter, and many more of them than planned at present. To build a focused force to achieve Australia's long-term strategic objectives as they are now defined would need spending 2.5 per cent of GDP or more

    Defending Australia: a history of Australia’s defence white papers

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    This paper provides a summary of each of Australia’s defence white papers issued between 1976 and 2013 and seeks to draw out common themes that emerge in some or all of them. Executive summary Australia published defence white papers in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2009 and 2013 and a new white paper is expected in 2015. A community consultation process was undertaken as part of the 2000 and 2009 defence white papers and a similar process is being carried out for the upcoming 2015 defence white paper. The need to defend Australia against a major aggressor remains the primary driver in Australian defence policy. Regional security and contributing to the global order have been secondary, but still important priorities in Australian defence planning. Each of the defence white papers has been created on the basis that Australia should be able to defend itself against a potential aggressor without outside assistance (the principle of self-reliance), while at the same time stressing the importance of the alliance with the United States. Threat perceptions have changed from the Cold War influences reflected in the 1976 and 1987 white papers to a contemporary focus on terrorism while also incorporating emerging threats such as cyber attacks and the rise of China. Defence white papers are not produced in a vacuum but are informed by key reviews of Australia’s strategic situation, industry policy and force posture. Defence policy is subject to the broader economic conditions of the time and the Department of Defence must contend with many other priorities for government funding. The financial plans set out in the various defence white papers are often ambitious and rarely brought to fruition. On the whole, capability choices have displayed continuity between the different white papers regardless of changes in government. This is understandable given the length of time required for major capital equipment acquisitions. Recent white papers have placed a greater emphasis on regional engagement. The contribution of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, as well as to border protection activities, has also been included in the most recent white papers

    Considering a war with Iran

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    The paper is a strategic studies analyis of the war-fronts, weapon systems and political-military tactics of a U.S.-Iranian war, including the U.S. use of nuclear weapons

    Terms of engagement: Australia’s regional defence diplomacy

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    Australia is in the process of pivoting back to our own region and looking for new strategies for Defence re-engagement. But the Defence Cooperation Program hasn’t been scrutinised in any depth since an audit report by the Auditor-General in 2001. That pointed to a lack of financial information management and clear and public articulation of the goals and objectives of defence cooperation activities.A fundamental conclusion of the report is that these criticisms remain valid today. The emphasis has shifted over the years from assisting regional countries to build their own defence forces more towards working together to promote a secure region. The report makes a number of recommendations including that our defence engagement in the priority regions should focus on the maritime dimension. The highest priority should be attached to implementing the Pacific Maritime Security Project as the cornerstone of our maritime security engagement in the South Pacific

    Advice and Indecision Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis

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    A Breaking Military: Overextension Threatens Readiness

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    In December 2004, Specialist Thomas Wilson, a scout on his way to Iraq with the Tennessee National Guard, caused a media firestorm by asking then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about Humvee armor shortages: "Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up-armor our vehicles and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?" Others in his unit agreed that they were undermanned and underequipped. Spc. Blaze Crook, a truck driver, said, "I don't think we have enough troops going in to do the job."Most military experts now agree that years of war and the spring 2007 "surge" have pushed our military to the breaking point. According to General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, "The demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply." Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has agreed, acknowledging that the current policy of an increased U.S. force presence in Iraq cannot continue past April 2008.The consequences of our overextension are dire. General Peter Pace, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes that there is a significant risk that the U.S. military will not be able to respond effectively if confronted with another crisis. By spring 2008, all four brigades of the 82nd Airborne, the Army's rapid response division, will be deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, leaving the Army without "a rapid response capability for other crises around the globe." Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, President Bush's new war adviser, has gone so far as to say that a military draft is worth considering.Forced to fill the ranks without a draft, the military has faced serious problems with recruitment. The Pentagon has responded by lowering age, education, and aptitude standards for new recruits, as well as increasing enlistment bonuses. In March 2007, the National Guard actually ran out of funds for marketing and advertising. The costs of retention have sky-rocketed to over 1billion,sixtimestheamountspentin2003.Themilitaryhasalsoheld70,000troopsonactivedutybeyondtheirexpectedcontractenddatesacontroversialpolicyknownas"StopLoss"andhascalledup15,000veterans,manyofwhomhavenotputonauniforminyears.Themilitarynowregularlyrequirestroopstoservemultiple,extendedcombattours.Over449,000troopshaveservedmorethanonecombattour,andmanyhavereturnedtowarafteronlyafewmonthsrest.ActivedutyArmycombattoursarenow15monthslong,withonlyhalftherecommended"dwelltime"athomebetweentours.Theincreasedtempoisexpectedtohaveamajorimpactonservicemembershealth.Accordingtoamilitarysurvey,soldiersservingmultipletoursare50percentmorelikelytosufferfromamentalhealthproblem.EquipmentshortageshavecontributedtotheplummetingreadinessratingsofArmyandMarineunits,threateningourabilitytocopewithforeignthreatsanddomesticemergencies.BySeptember2006,"RoughlyonehalfofallArmyunits(deployedandnondeployed,activeandreserves)receivedthelowestreadinessratinganyfullyformedunitcanreceive."AboutfourfifthsofArmyGuardandReserveunitsnotmobilizedreceivedthelowestpossiblereadinessrating.StateofficialsinCalifornia,KansasandOregonhavepubliclyexpressedgraveconcernsaboutthedamagedonetoourdomesticsecurity.AccordingtotheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,20statesandterritoriesnowhave"inadequatecapability"tofulfillkeydomesticsecuritymissions.Thissituationissodirethat,in2006,all50governorssignedalettercallingonPresidentBushtoensuretheNationalGuardisreequipped.AccordingtoDr.AndrewKrepinevich,PresidentoftheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,"[T]heArmyandMarineCorpsequipmentisinsuchastateofdisrepairthatitwilltakeyearsandtensofbillionsofdollarstorepairorreplace."TheArmyhasalreadyreceivedover1 billion, six times the amount spent in 2003. The military has also held 70,000 troops on active-duty beyond their expected contract enddates -- a controversial policy known as "Stop Loss" -- and has called up 15,000 veterans, many of whom have not put on a uniform in years.The military now regularly requires troops to serve multiple, extended combat tours. Over 449,000 troops have served more than one combat tour, and many have returned to war after only a few months rest. Active-duty Army combat tours are now 15 months long, with only half the recommended "dwell time" at home between tours. The increased tempo is expected to have a major impact on service members' health. According to a military survey, soldiers serving multiple tours are 50 percent more likely to suffer from a mental health problem.Equipment shortages have contributed to the plummeting readiness ratings of Army and Marine units, threatening our ability to cope with foreign threats and domestic emergencies. By September 2006, "Roughly one-half of all Army units (deployed and non-deployed, active and reserves) received the lowest readiness rating any fully formed unit can receive." About four-fifths of Army Guard and Reserve units not mobilized received the lowest possible readiness rating. State officials in California, Kansas and Oregon have publicly expressed grave concerns about the damage done to our domestic security. According to the Government Accountability Office, 20 states and territories now have "inadequate capability" to fulfill key domestic security missions. This situation is so dire that, in 2006, all 50 governors signed a letter calling on President Bush to ensure the National Guard is re-equipped.According to Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "[T]he Army and Marine Corps equipment is in such a state of disrepair that it will take years and tens of billions of dollars to repair or replace." The Army has already received over 38 billion dollars to repair or replace equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is estimated that reset costs will be $13 billion a year for the duration of combat

    Sector skills assessment : transportation and storage sector

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