Intelligent escalation and the principle of relativity

Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance in an auction), the agents play forever. The $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game with intelligent agents in which escalation arises. It shows at the light of research on cognitive psychology the difference between intelligence (algorithmic mind) and rationality (algorithmic and reflective mind) in decision processes. It also shows that depending on the point of view (inside or outside) the rationality of the agent may change which is proposed to be called the principle of relativity.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1306.228

CRAFTING THE MIND OF PROSOCS AGENTS

PROSOCS agents are software agents that are built according to the KGP model of agency. KGP is used as a model for the mind of the agent, so that the agent can act autonomously using a collection of logic theories, providing the mind's reasoning functionalities. The behavior of the agent is controlled by a cycle theory that specifies the agent's preferred patterns of operation. The implementation of the mind's generic functionality in PROSOCS is worked out in such a way so it can be instantiated by the platform for different agents across applications. In this context, the development of a concrete example illustrates how an agent developer might program the generic functionality of the mind for a simple application. 20 2-4 105 131 Cited By :1

Supernatural Agents of the Unconscious Mind: The Gothic Mode in Hamlet and Macbeth

Zadanie pt. „Digitalizacja i udostępnienie w Cyfrowym Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego kolekcji czasopism naukowych wydawanych przez Uniwersytet Łódzki” nr 885/P-DUN/2014 dofinansowane zostało ze środków MNiSW w ramach działalności upowszechniającej nauk

Free Will: Who Can Know

I have inquired as to what sort of knowledge humans need to make justifiable claims regarding free will. I defended the thesis that humans do not have the sort of knowledge which would allow them to make such claims. Adopting the view of mind based on cognitive science and Kant’s philosophy of mind, first I laid out the characteristics of that knowledge with the help of a simulation example I devised. Then, upon investigating the epistemic relations between the different sources of knowledge and the agents of a system (such as the relation between the programmer and the simulated agents as well as god and humans), I claimed that knowledge bearing those characteristics cannot be accessible to human beings

Social Learning over Weakly-Connected Graphs

In this paper, we study diffusion social learning over weakly-connected graphs. We show that the asymmetric flow of information hinders the learning abilities of certain agents regardless of their local observations. Under some circumstances that we clarify in this work, a scenario of total influence (or "mind-control") arises where a set of influential agents ends up shaping the beliefs of non-influential agents. We derive useful closed-form expressions that characterize this influence, and which can be used to motivate design problems to control it. We provide simulation examples to illustrate the results.Comment: To appear in 2017 in the IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Network

A Dynamic Model of Decision-making Under Cognitive Dissonance and Modularity of Mind

This paper attempts to explain how and why seemingly contradictory beliefs co-exist in an optimizing individual''s mind in the long run. We set up a dynamic model of decision-making inwhich the individual.s mind is composed of a coordinating principal and two conflicting agents. We take into account the cognitive dissonance experienced due to the conflict between the agents. Each agent (or self ) is specialized in perceiving a particular type of signal, which describes the world. Cognitive dissonance levels in our model are not constant. Instead, the individual''s split-selves are open to habituation, which can lead to a reduction in cognitive dissonance. We prove the existence of an optimal strategy with a threshold structure. Our results show that the co-existence of conflicting beliefs might be an equilibrium phenomenon even in an optimizing mind. Suggestions that may avoid the tension that occurs due to cognitive dissonance are made.microeconomics ;

Training the use of theory of mind using artificial agents

When engaging in social interaction, people rely on their ability to reason about unobservable mental content of others, which includes goals, intentions, and beliefs. This so-called theory of mind ability allows them to more easily understand, predict, and influence the behavior of others. People even use their theory of mind to reason about the theory of mind of others, which allows them to understand sentences like Alice believes that Bob does not know about the surprise party'. But while the use of higher orders of theory of mind is apparent in many social interactions, empirical evidence so far suggests that people do not use this ability spontaneously when playing strategic games, even when doing so would be highly beneficial. In this paper, we attempt to encourage participants to engage in higher-order theory of mind reasoning by letting them play a game against computational agents. Since previous research suggests that competitive games may encourage the use of theory of mind, we investigate a particular competitive game, the Mod game, which can be seen as a much larger variant of the well-known rock-paper-scissors game. By using a combination of computational agents and Bayesian model selection, we simultaneously determine to what extent people make use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning, as well as to what extent computational agents can encourage the use of higher-order theory of mind in their human opponents. Our results show that participants who play the Mod game against computational theory of mind agents adjust their level of theory of mind reasoning to that of their computer opponent. Earlier experiments with other strategic games show that participants only engage in low orders of theory of mind reasoning. Surprisingly, we find that participants who knowingly play against second- and third-order theory of mind agents apply up to fourth-order theory of mind themselves, and achieve higher scores as a result

Interactivist approach to representation in epigenetic agents

Interactivism is a vast and rather ambitious philosophical and theoretical system originally developed by Mark Bickhard, which covers plethora of aspects related to mind and person. Within interactivism, an agent is regarded as an action system: an autonomous, self-organizing, self-maintaining entity, which can exercise actions and sense their effects in the environment it inhabits. In this paper, we will argue that it is especially suited for treatment of the problem of representation in epigenetic agents. More precisely, we will elaborate on process-based ontology for representations, and will sketch a way of discussing about architectures for epigenetic agents in a general manner