18,652 research outputs found

    The Tobin Tax A Review of the Evidence

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    The debate about the Tobin Tax, and other financial transaction taxes (FTT), gives rise to strong views both for and against. Unfortunately, little of this debate is based on the now considerable body of evidence about the impact of such taxes. This review attempts to synthesise what we know from the available theoretical and empirical literature about the impact of FTTs on volatility in financial markets. We also review the literature on how a Tobin Tax might be implemented, the amount of revenue that it might realistically produce, and the likely incidence of the tax. We conclude that, contrary to what is often assumed, a Tobin Tax is feasible and, if appropriately designed, could make a significant contribution to revenue without causing major distortions. However, it would be unlikely to reduce market volatility and could even increase it.Tobin tax, financial transaction taxes, volatility, revenue, incidence, feasibility

    The influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market

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    This paper investigates the formation of prices in a perishable goods market where agents bargain repeatedly through pair-wise interactions. After extensive field observations, we chose to focus on two aspects that seem important to actors of this market : the passage of time and update in judgement when gathering information. The main feature of the market is that a seller bargaining with a buyer has incomplete information about buyer's willingness to pay and is not sure how her trading partner will evaluate an offer or compare it with other options. On the other hand, buyers have limited time to look for good sand cannot meet all possible sellers before making a decision. Hence agents cannot calculate the best price to offer but receive information through limited interactions, and use this information to choose their actions. An agent-based model was built to represent a frame work that mimics the observed market institution and where agent's possible behaviours and learning was made as consistent as possible with gathered data. Simulations were run, first for sensitivity analysis concerning main parameters, then to test the dependence of agents'learning to (a) the time buyers can spend on the market and (b) the frequency of update in learning by sellers. To validate the model, features produced by the simulated market are compared to the stylized facts gathered for negotiation about four goods. We reproduce the main features of the data on the dynamics of offers, transaction prices and agents'behavior during the bargaining phases.Cet article porte sur la formation des prix dans un marchĂ© de biens pĂ©rissables oĂč les agents nĂ©gocient de grĂ© Ă  grĂ© de façon rĂ©pĂ©tĂ©e. AprĂšs avoir accompli un important travail sur le terrain, nous choisissons de nous concentrer sur deux aspects importants pour les acteurs : le temps et les changements de jugements des individus qui reçoivent de nouvelles informations. Ce marchĂ© se caractĂ©rise par une mĂ©connaissance par le vendeur des critĂšres de choix de son client (valeur de rĂ©servation, comment ce client Ă©value les offres reçues et les compare aux autres options sur le marchĂ©). D'autre part, les acheteurs ont une contrainte temporelle et ne peuvent pas rencontrer tous les vendeurs avant de prendre une dĂ©cision. Ainsi, acheteurs et vendeurs ne peuvent pas calculer le meilleur prix Ă  offrir ou Ă  accepter mais, recevant des informations au cours de leurs rencontres, ils adaptent leur comportement Ă  cette information. Nous avons construit un modĂšle multi-agents dont l'environnement reproduit un marchĂ© empirique (le MIN, marchĂ© de gros en fruits et lĂ©gumes de Marseille) et dont les agents ont des rĂšgles de dĂ©cision et d'apprentissage cohĂ©rentes avec les donnĂ©es de terrain. Des simulations ont permis de tester l'impact marginal de chaque paramĂštre puis de deux variables prĂ©cises : (a) le temps que les acheteurs passent sur le marchĂ© et (b) la frĂ©quence de rĂ©Ă©valuation de ses croyances par le vendeur. Pour valider le modĂšle, nous comparons les faits produits par le marchĂ© simulĂ© et ceux provenant de donnĂ©es empiriques rĂ©elles concernant les nĂ©gociations et transactions pour 4 types de biens. Nous reproduisons les faits principaux concernant la dynamique des offres, les prix des transactions et l'Ă©mergence de nĂ©gociation

    Prices, planners, and producers : an agency problem in Soviet industry, 1928-1950

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    Soviet planners developed the “unchanged prices of 1926/27” to facilitate the solution of an agency problem -- the regulation of self-interested producers as they worked to fulfil plans for heterogeneous products denominated in rubles. The system limited but did not eliminate producers’ opportunistic behavior, which took the form of inflating the plan prices of new products. Through the 1930s and 1940s the “unchanged” prices proved resistant to reform, and following their abolition in 1950 the system was soon afterwards reinstated with a new base year. The history of the “unchanged” prices illustrates the limits of command

    Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited Capacity Suppliers

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    This paper reports on the design and comparison of two economically-inspired mechanisms for task allocation in environments where sellers have finite production capacities and a cost structure composed of a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost. Such mechanisms are required when a system consists of multiple self-interested stakeholders that each possess private information that is relevant to solving a system-wide problem. Against this background, we first develop a computationally tractable centralised mechanism that finds the set of producers that have the lowest total cost in providing a certain demand (i.e. it is efficient). We achieve this by extending the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to allow for multi-attribute bids and by introducing a novel penalty scheme such that producers are incentivised to truthfully report their capacities and their costs. Furthermore our extended mechanism is able to handle sellers' uncertainty about their production capacity and ensures that individual agents find it profitable to participate in the mechanism. However, since this first mechanism is centralised, we also develop a complementary decentralised mechanism based around the continuous double auction. Again because of the characteristics of our domain, we need to extend the standard form of this protocol by introducing a novel clearing rule based around an order book. With this modified protocol, we empirically demonstrate (with simple trading strategies) that the mechanism achieves high efficiency. In particular, despite this simplicity, the traders can still derive a profit from the market which makes our mechanism attractive since these results are a likely lower bound on their expected returns

    Entrepreneurship by Alliance

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    Recent years have seen the introduction of markets and a system of private property rights in China with a view to changing the composition of production and demand and enhancing welfare. Central to the success of these reforms is the rise of entrepreneurship with its potential to set the economy on a higher growth path by supplying the products which consumers need and want, creating new employment opportunities, and introducing new and more efficient technologies of production. But to what extent can we expect to see entrepreneurs in China behaving like their counterparts in the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe, Japan, and the United States? This is the question we address in this chapter. In our view, the reform programme has, indeed, opened up new opportunities for private enterprise activity; but idiosyncrasies of the business environment are at the same time generating novel institutional arrangements in support of entrepreneurs' investments. We agree, therefore, with Herrick and Kindleberger when they assert that "Development ought not to be viewed as a monotonic, stylized path, ever onward and upward, historically established and invariably repeated" (1983, p.62).entrepreneurship;economic growth;economic development;business networking;Western economies
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