Management of local citizen energy communities and bilateral contracting in multi-agent electricity markets

ABSTRACT: Over the last few decades, the electricity sector has experienced several changes, resulting in different electricity markets (EMs) models and paradigms. In particular, liberalization has led to the establishment of a wholesale market for electricity generation and a retail market for electricity retailing. In competitive EMs, customers can do the following: freely choose their electricity suppliers; invest in variable renewable energy such as solar photovoltaic; become prosumers; or form local alliances such as Citizen Energy Communities (CECs). Trading of electricity can be done in spot and derivatives markets, or by bilateral contracts. This article focuses on CECs. Specifically, it presents how agent-based local consumers can form alliances as CECs, manage their resources, and trade on EMs. It also presents a review of how agent-based systems can model and support the formation and interaction of alliances in the electricity sector. The CEC can trade electricity directly with sellers through private bilateral agreements. During the negotiation of private bilateral contracts, the CEC receives the prices and volumes of their members and according to its negotiation strategy, tries to satisfy the electricity demands of all members and reduce their costs for electricity.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation

With the sustained deployment of distributed generation capacities and the more proactive role of consumers, power systems and their operation are drifting away from a conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity market structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution. Respecting the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature of modern power systems would translate to designing peer-to-peer markets or, at least, to using such an underlying decentralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on a Multi-Bilateral Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is introduced, allowing for multi-bilateral trading with product differentiation, for instance based on consumer preferences. A Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is described to solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-to-peer market structures can effectively yield market outcomes that are different from centralized market structures and optimal in terms of respecting consumers preferences while maximizing social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving approach allows for a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with a negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information being shared.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Power System

Lightweight Blockchain Framework for Location-aware Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading can facilitate integration of a large number of small-scale producers and consumers into energy markets. Decentralized management of these new market participants is challenging in terms of market settlement, participant reputation and consideration of grid constraints. This paper proposes a blockchain-enabled framework for P2P energy trading among producer and consumer agents in a smart grid. A fully decentralized market settlement mechanism is designed, which does not rely on a centralized entity to settle the market and encourages producers and consumers to negotiate on energy trading with their nearby agents truthfully. To this end, the electrical distance of agents is considered in the pricing mechanism to encourage agents to trade with their neighboring agents. In addition, a reputation factor is considered for each agent, reflecting its past performance in delivering the committed energy. Before starting the negotiation, agents select their trading partners based on their preferences over the reputation and proximity of the trading partners. An Anonymous Proof of Location (A-PoL) algorithm is proposed that allows agents to prove their location without revealing their real identity. The practicality of the proposed framework is illustrated through several case studies, and its security and privacy are analyzed in detail

Comparing policy gradient and value function based reinforcement learning methods in simulated electrical power trade

In electrical power engineering, reinforcement learning algorithms can be used to model the strategies of electricity market participants. However, traditional value function based reinforcement learning algorithms suffer from convergence issues when used with value function approximators. Function approximation is required in this domain to capture the characteristics of the complex and continuous multivariate problem space. The contribution of this paper is the comparison of policy gradient reinforcement learning methods, using artificial neural networks for policy function approximation, with traditional value function based methods in simulations of electricity trade. The methods are compared using an AC optimal power flow based power exchange auction market model and a reference electric power system model

Small-Scale Markets for Bilateral Resource Trading in the Sharing Economy

We consider a general small-scale market for agent-to-agent resource sharing, in which each agent could either be a server (seller) or a client (buyer) in each time period. In every time period, a server has a certain amount of resources that any client could consume, and randomly gets matched with a client. Our target is to maximize the resource utilization in such an agent-to-agent market, where the agents are strategic. During each transaction, the server gets money and the client gets resources. Hence, trade ratio maximization implies efficiency maximization of our system. We model the proposed market system through a Mean Field Game approach and prove the existence of the Mean Field Equilibrium, which can achieve an almost 100% trade ratio. Finally, we carry out a simulation study motivated by an agent-to-agent computing market, and a case study on a proposed photovoltaic market, and show the designed market benefits both individuals and the system as a whole

Peer-to-peer and community-based markets: A comprehensive review

The advent of more proactive consumers, the so-called "prosumers", with production and storage capabilities, is empowering the consumers and bringing new opportunities and challenges to the operation of power systems in a market environment. Recently, a novel proposal for the design and operation of electricity markets has emerged: these so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets conceptually allow the prosumers to directly share their electrical energy and investment. Such P2P markets rely on a consumer-centric and bottom-up perspective by giving the opportunity to consumers to freely choose the way they are to source their electric energy. A community can also be formed by prosumers who want to collaborate, or in terms of operational energy management. This paper contributes with an overview of these new P2P markets that starts with the motivation, challenges, market designs moving to the potential future developments in this field, providing recommendations while considering a test-case

Allocation of tie-line costs in power exchange scheduling using amulti-agent approach

After deregulations in power industries, the original boundary lines have been removed and how to support optimal cross-border electricity trade planning has become an important issue. Decentralization, or all market participants have the rights to participate in decision making, is one of the directions. In this paper a decentralized structure is suggested to solve the problem using multi-agent technology. In this structure the information centralization is prevented and each market participant behaves rationally based on local information. Although the market participants make decisions to protect its own benefits, the minimum production and transmission cost of the whole system can be finally reached. This structure is based on the method proposed in another paper by the authors and implemented on computer via a multi-agent system using Java programming language. A demonstration on a 5-area test system shows that the suggested new approach is effective and promising.published_or_final_versio

Assessing financial and flexibility incentives for integrating wind energy in the grid via agent-based modeling

This article provides an agent-based model of a hypothetical standalone electricity network to identify how the feed-in tariffs and the installed capacity of wind power, calculated in percentage of total system demand, affect the electricity consumption from renewables. It includes the mechanism of electricity pricing on the Day Ahead Market (DAM) and the Imbalance Market (IM). The extra production volumes of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (RES-E) and the flexibility of electrical consumption of industries is provided as reserves on the IM. Five thousand simulations were run by using the agent-based model to gather data that were then fit in linear regression models. This helped to quantify the effect of feed-in tariffs and installed capacity of wind power on the consumption from renewable energy and market prices. The consumption from renewable sources, expressed as percentage of total system consumption, increased by 8.17% for every 10% increase in installed capacity of wind power. The sharpest increase in renewable energy consumption is observed when a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh is provided to the wind farm owners, resulting in an average increase of 9.1% and 5.1% in the consumption from renewable sources while the maximum installed capacity of wind power is 35% and 100%, respectively. The regression model for the annualized DAM prices showed an increase by 0.01 €cents/kWh in the DAM prices for every 10% increase in the installed wind power capacity. With every increase of 0.01 €/kWh in the value of feed-in tariffs, the mean DAM price is lowered as compared to the previous value of the feed-in tariff. DAM prices only decrease with increasing installed wind capacity when a feed-in tariff of 0.04 €/kWh is provided. This is observed because all wind power being traded on DAM at a very cheap price. Hence, no volume of electricity is being stored for availability on IM. The regression models for predicting IM prices show that, with every 10% increase in installed capacity of wind power, the annualized IM price decreases by 0.031 and 0.34 €cents/kWh, when installed capacity of wind power is between 0 and 25%, and between 25 and 100%, respectively. The models also showed that, until the maximum installed capacity of wind power is less than 25%, the IM prices increase when the value of feed-in tariff is 0.01 and 0.04 €/kWh, but decrease for a feed-in tariff of 0.02 and 0.03 €/kWh. When installed capacity of wind power is between 25 and 100%, increasing feed-in tariffs to the value of 0.03 €/kWh result in lowering the mean IM price. However, at 0.04 €/kWh, the mean IM price is higher, showing the effect of no storage reserves being available on IM and more expensive reserves being engaged on the IM. The study concludes that the effect of increasing installed capacity of wind power is more significant on increasing consumption of renewable energy and decreasing the DAM and IM prices than the effect of feed-in tariffs. However, the effect of increasing values of both factors on the profit of RES-E producers with storage facilities is not positive, pointing to the need for customized rules and incentives to encourage their market participation and investment in storage facilities

Agent-based homeostatic control for green energy in the smart grid

With dwindling non-renewable energy reserves and the adverse effects of climate change, the development of the smart electricity grid is seen as key to solving global energy security issues and to reducing carbon emissions. In this respect, there is a growing need to integrate renewable (or green) energy sources in the grid. However, the intermittency of these energy sources requires that demand must also be made more responsive to changes in supply, and a number of smart grid technologies are being developed, such as high-capacity batteries and smart meters for the home, to enable consumers to be more responsive to conditions on the grid in real-time. Traditional solutions based on these technologies, however, tend to ignore the fact that individual consumers will behave in such a way that best satisfies their own preferences to use or store energy (as opposed to that of the supplier or the grid operator). Hence, in practice, it is unclear how these solutions will cope with large numbers of consumers using their devices in this way. Against this background, in this paper, we develop novel control mechanisms based on the use of autonomous agents to better incorporate consumer preferences in managing demand. These agents, residing on consumers' smart meters, can both communicate with the grid and optimise their owner's energy consumption to satisfy their preferences. More specifically, we provide a novel control mechanism that models and controls a system comprising of a green energy supplier operating within the grid and a number of individual homes (each possibly owning a storage device). This control mechanism is based on the concept of homeostasis whereby control signals are sent to individual components of a system, based on their continuous feedback, in order to change their state so that the system may reach a stable equilibrium. Thus, we define a new carbon-based pricing mechanism for this green energy supplier that takes advantage of carbon-intensity signals available on the internet in order to provide real-time pricing. The pricing scheme is designed in such a way that it can be readily implemented using existing communication technologies and is easily understandable by consumers. Building upon this, we develop new control signals that the supplier can use to incentivise agents to shift demand (using their storage device) to times when green energy is available. Moreover, we show how these signals can be adapted according to changes in supply and to various degrees of penetration of storage in the system. We empirically evaluate our system and show that, when all homes are equipped with storage devices, the supplier can significantly reduce its reliance on other carbon-emitting power sources to cater for its own shortfalls. By so doing, the supplier reduces the carbon emission of the system by up to 25% while the consumer reduces its costs by up to 14.5%. Finally, we demonstrate that our homeostatic control mechanism is not sensitive to small prediction errors and the supplier is incentivised to accurately predict its green production to minimise costs