Clarifying ethical intuitionism

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non-inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non-inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non- inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non- inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism’s core claim

Towards a goal-oriented agent-based simulation framework for high-performance computing

Currently, agent-based simulation frameworks force the user to choose between simulations involving a large number of agents (at the expense of limited agent reasoning capability) or simulations including agents with increased reasoning capabilities (at the expense of a limited number of agents per simulation). This paper describes a first attempt at putting goal-oriented agents into large agentbased (micro-)simulations. We discuss a model for goal-oriented agents in HighPerformance Computing (HPC) and then briefly discuss its implementation in PyCOMPSs (a library that eases the parallelisation of tasks) to build such a platform that benefits from a large number of agents with the capacity to execute complex cognitive agents.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Value Congruence Among Transformative Leaders in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Values have been defined as a generalized enduring organization of beliefs about the personal and social desirability of modes of conduct or “end-states of existence” (Klende, 2005). The congruence of personal values and organizational values represent an important opportunity for positive business results and outcomes (Klende, 2005). Based on the results of this qualitative study among transformative African American women leaders in the pharmaceutical industry, it is possible that value congruence may be a factor in the success experienced by these study participants. Three value themes are reported to describe the leadership values of these study participants. They are: “people,” “think,” and “company.” These value themes are supportive of tenets that comprise the transformative leadership model

Visualizations for an Explainable Planning Agent

In this paper, we report on the visualization capabilities of an Explainable AI Planning (XAIP) agent that can support human in the loop decision making. Imposing transparency and explainability requirements on such agents is especially important in order to establish trust and common ground with the end-to-end automated planning system. Visualizing the agent's internal decision-making processes is a crucial step towards achieving this. This may include externalizing the "brain" of the agent -- starting from its sensory inputs, to progressively higher order decisions made by it in order to drive its planning components. We also show how the planner can bootstrap on the latest techniques in explainable planning to cast plan visualization as a plan explanation problem, and thus provide concise model-based visualization of its plans. We demonstrate these functionalities in the context of the automated planning components of a smart assistant in an instrumented meeting space.Comment: PREVIOUSLY Mr. Jones -- Towards a Proactive Smart Room Orchestrator (appeared in AAAI 2017 Fall Symposium on Human-Agent Groups

Models, Idols, and the Great White Whale: Toward a Christian Faith of Nonattachment

The juxtaposition of models of God and Christian faith may seem repugnant to many, as models are tentative and faith aims at an abiding certainty. In fact, for many Christians, using models of God in worship amounts to idolatry. By examining Biblical and extra-Biblical views of idolatry, I argue that models are not idols. To the contrary, the practice of God-modeling inoculates Christians against one of the most seductive idols of our age: the love of certainty. Furthermore, by examining meditations upon certainty in Melville’s Moby Dick and the early discourses of the Buddha, I suggest that overweening conviction is a vice that hinders rather than guarantees Christian discipleship, and that Christian faith is better defined as any or all of the following: relative confidence in propositions, faithful relationship, and a virtue of disciplined credulity

Religious Evidentialism

Should religious believers proportion their religious beliefs to their evidence? They should: Religious faith is better, ceteris paribus, when the beliefs accompanying it are evidence-proportioned. I offer two philosophical arguments and a biblical argument. The philosophical arguments conclude that love and trust, two attitudes belonging to faith, are better, ceteris paribus, when accompanied by evidence-proportioned belief, and that so too is the faith in question. The biblical argument concludes that beliefs associated with faith, portrayed in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, are typically, and normatively, exhorted on the basis of evidence. I hope to convince religious believers and nonbelievers alike that religious beliefs should be evidence-proportioned