Deontological morality can be experimentally enhanced by increasing disgust. A transcranial direct current stimulation study

Previous studies empirically support the existence of a distinctive association between deontological (but not altruistic) guilt and both disgust and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Given that the neural substrate underlying deontological guilt comprises brain regions strictly implicated in the emotion of disgust (i.e. the insula), the present study aimed to test the hypothesis that indirect stimulation of the insula via transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) would enhance disgust and morality in the deontological domain. A randomized, sham-controlled, within-subject design was used. Thirty-seven healthy individuals (25 women) underwent 15-min anodal and sham tDCS over T3 in two different days, while their heart rate (HR) was recorded to derive measures of parasympathetic nervous system activity (HR variability; HRV). After the first 10-min of sham or active tDCS stimulation, participants were asked to 1) complete a series of 6-item words that could be completed with either a disgust-related word (cleaning/dirtiness) or neutral alternatives; 2) rate how much a series of vignettes, each depicting a behavior that violated a specific moral foundation, were morally wrong. Levels of trait anxiety, depression, disgust sensitivity, scrupulosity, and altruism as well as pre- and post- stimulation momentary emotional states were assessed. Compared to the sham condition, after active stimulation of T3 a) HRV significantly increased and participants b) completed more words in terms of cleaning/dirtiness and c) reported greater subjective levels of disgust, all suggesting the elicitation of the emotion of disgust. Although the results are only marginally significant, they point to the absence of difference between the two experimental conditions for moral vignettes in the altruistic domain (i.e., animal care, emotional and physical human care), but not in the deontological domain (i.e., authority, fairness, liberty, and sacrality), where vignettes were judged as more morally wrong in the active compared to the sham condition. Moreover, scores on the OCI-R correlated with how much vignettes were evaluated as morally wrong in the deontological domain only. Results preliminarily support the association between disgust and morality in the deontological domain, with important implications for OC disorder (OCD). Future studies should explore the possibility of decreasing both disgust and morality in patients with OCD by the use of non-invasive brain stimulation techniques

An Investigation of the Divergences and Convergences of Trait Empathy across Two Cultures

The extent to which individuals with a variety of cultural backgrounds differ in empathic responsiveness is unknown. This paper describes the differences in trait empathy in one independent and one interdependent society (i.e., United States and Iran respectively). The analysis of data collected from self-reported questionnaires answered by 326 adults indicated a significant difference in the cognitive component of empathy concerning participants’ affiliation to either egocentric or socio-centric society: Iranian participants with interdependent cultural norms, reported higher cognitive empathy compared to American participants who share independent cultural norms. In line with previous studies, gender differences were observed in all subscales of questionnaires except the Empathy Quotient. Female participants demonstrated more empathy than males in both samples. Implications for understanding the cross-cultural differences of various components of empathy are discussed

Empathy and Practical Deliberation

This thesis falls in the long discussion in philosophy and psychology on the study of empathy. The aim of the thesis is to advance our understanding of the complicated relationship between empathy and the moral life. Discussion of empathy appears within numerous contexts, such as pop culture and media, political views, clinical psychology, studies on psychopathy, moral development, bioethics and more. In most of those contexts, empathy is commonly linked to the ability to gain an understanding of other people’s minds. In discussions of the moral life, empathy is usually associated with motivation for prosocial moral behavior and the development of moral judgment. The problem is that the term ‘empathy’ is being used to refer to different psychological components or mental states, which makes it difficult to keep track of which components or states are being referred to. Thus, I propose a new concept of empathy, empathy as a skill, which characterizes empathy as a complex process consisting of a specific skill set that allows one to acquire a firsthand grasp of another person’s mental state in a given situation. I explain that the skills required for empathy are self-oriented perspective-shifting and otheroriented affective matching. Although conceptualizing empathy is important, the major goal of this thesis is to propose a novel role for empathy that focuses on the practical application of empathy. Thus, I argue that empathy is a skill set, not an affective response, which allows rational agents to acquire information needed for practical deliberation in certain situations, primarily those involving advice-giving on final ends or ultimate goals

Psychological Contracts, OCB and Customer Service: An Exploratory Examination

This paper examines the relationships among the psychological contract, fairness, OCB, and customer service. We report on two exploratory studies that provide insight into psychological contract violations and subsequent perceptions of fairness, as well as OCB activity. A linkage is made between psychological contracts and behavior directed internally and those directed externally (i.e., customer service). We extend the current theory to suggest implications for effectively managing customer service employee OCB. Finally, suggestions are made for both practice and future research to be conducted in a multidisciplinary design

Free will, temptation, and self-control: We must believe in free will, we have no choice (Isaac B. Singer).

Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, and Vohs (2007) sketch a theory of free will as the humanability to exert self-control. Self-control can produce goal-directed behavior, which free will conceptualized as random behavior cannot. We question whether consumer psychology can shed light on the ontological question of whether free will exists. We suggest that it is more fruitful for consumer psychology to examine consumers' belief in freewill. Specifically, we propose that this belief arises from consumers' phenomenological experience of exercising self-control in the face of moral or intertemporal conflicts of will. Based on extant literature in philosophy, psychology, and economics, we offer both a narrower conceptualization of the nature of self-control problems and a more general conceptualization of self-control strategies, involving not only will power but also precommitment. We conclude with a discussion of the consequences of consumers' belief in free will.

Why Immoral Art Cannot Morally Harm Us

Both philosophers and literary critics have championed artworks as necessary to moral education. As a result many of these critics believe that art that is bad or immoral can causally affect our character, resulting in moral harm. Moral harm is the idea that artworks possess a strong disposition to affect our moral beliefs such that we are less able to distinguish between what is good and what is bad. I examine this concept of moral harm and argue that immoral artworks do not have this kind of causal power over our moral beliefs. Proponents of the moral harm thesis are in error to attribute such a power to artworks. Additionally, I propose a definition of immoral artworks consistent with moral harm, as well as discuss the distinction between immoral artworks and artworks that are merely elicit disgust or offense

Justice Expectations and Applicant Perceptions

Expectations, which are beliefs about a future state of affairs, constitute a basic psychological mechanism that underlies virtually all human behavior. Although expectations serve as a central component in many theories of organizational behavior, they have received limited attention in the organizational justice literature. The goal of this paper is to introduce the concept of justice expectations and explore its implications for understanding applicant perceptions. To conceptualize justice expectations, we draw on research on expectations conducted in multiple disciplines. We discuss the three sources of expectations – direct experience, indirect influences, and other beliefs - and use this typology to identify the likely antecedents of justice expectations in selection contexts. We also discuss the impact of expectations on attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors, focusing specifically on outcomes tied to selection environments. Finally, we explore the theoretical implications of incorporating expectations into research on applicant perceptions and discuss the practical significance of justice expectations in selection contexts