The Advice Complexity of a Class of Hard Online Problems

The advice complexity of an online problem is a measure of how much knowledge of the future an online algorithm needs in order to achieve a certain competitive ratio. Using advice complexity, we define the first online complexity class, AOC. The class includes independent set, vertex cover, dominating set, and several others as complete problems. AOC-complete problems are hard, since a single wrong answer by the online algorithm can have devastating consequences. For each of these problems, we show that $\log\left(1+(c-1)^{c-1}/c^{c}\right)n=\Theta (n/c)$ bits of advice are necessary and sufficient (up to an additive term of $O(\log n)$) to achieve a competitive ratio of $c$. The results are obtained by introducing a new string guessing problem related to those of Emek et al. (TCS 2011) and B\"ockenhauer et al. (TCS 2014). It turns out that this gives a powerful but easy-to-use method for providing both upper and lower bounds on the advice complexity of an entire class of online problems, the AOC-complete problems. Previous results of Halld\'orsson et al. (TCS 2002) on online independent set, in a related model, imply that the advice complexity of the problem is $\Theta (n/c)$. Our results improve on this by providing an exact formula for the higher-order term. For online disjoint path allocation, B\"ockenhauer et al. (ISAAC 2009) gave a lower bound of $\Omega (n/c)$ and an upper bound of $O((n\log c)/c)$ on the advice complexity. We improve on the upper bound by a factor of $\log c$. For the remaining problems, no bounds on their advice complexity were previously known.Comment: Full paper to appear in Theory of Computing Systems. A preliminary version appeared in STACS 201

Online Multi-Coloring with Advice

We consider the problem of online graph multi-coloring with advice. Multi-coloring is often used to model frequency allocation in cellular networks. We give several nearly tight upper and lower bounds for the most standard topologies of cellular networks, paths and hexagonal graphs. For the path, negative results trivially carry over to bipartite graphs, and our positive results are also valid for bipartite graphs. The advice given represents information that is likely to be available, studying for instance the data from earlier similar periods of time.Comment: IMADA-preprint-c

Online graph coloring against a randomized adversary

Electronic version of an article published as Online graph coloring against a randomized adversary. "International journal of foundations of computer science", 1 Juny 2018, vol. 29, núm. 4, p. 551-569. DOI:10.1142/S0129054118410058 © 2018 copyright World Scientific Publishing Company. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129054118410058We consider an online model where an adversary constructs a set of 2s instances S instead of one single instance. The algorithm knows S and the adversary will choose one instance from S at random to present to the algorithm. We further focus on adversaries that construct sets of k-chromatic instances. In this setting, we provide upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio for the online graph coloring problem as a function of the parameters in this model. Both bounds are linear in s and matching upper and lower bound are given for a specific set of algorithms that we call “minimalistic online algorithms”.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures

This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity. The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii) to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures, focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v

Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction

We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient allocations. The role of interaction in markets has received significant attention in economic thinking, e.g. in Hayek's 1945 classic paper. We consider this problem in the framework of simultaneous communication complexity. We analyze the amount of simultaneous communication required for achieving an approximately efficient allocation. In particular, we consider two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. For both settings we first show that non-interactive systems have enormous communication costs relative to interactive ones. On the other hand, we show that limited interaction enables us to find approximately efficient allocations

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard

State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with $m$ items achieve approximation guarantees of $O((\log \log m)^3)$ [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an $m^{1/2-\varepsilon}$-approximation for any $\varepsilon > 0$ [Dobzinski and Vondr\'ak, 2016]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms. We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of truthfulness, which we term implementation in advised strategies, and that has been previously studied in relation to "Implementation in Undominated Strategies" [Babaioff et al, 2009]. Specifically, advice maps a tentative strategy either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say that a player follows advice as long as they never play actions which are dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guarantees an $\alpha$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies if there exists poly-time advice for each player such that an $\alpha$-approximation is achieved whenever all players follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate demand queries (which can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a slight modification of) the [Assadi and Singla, 2019] mechanism achieves the same $O((\log \log m)^3)$-approximation in implementation in advised strategies