Coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chains considering retailer innovation inputs

In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers' innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer's product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains

Risk Decision for Dual-Channel Supply Chain of Agricultural Products Under Disturbance

This paper presents a decision analysis model for the dual-channel supply chain of agricultural products under the disturbance of emergency. Mean variance analysis tool and utility function risk tool are used to describe risk indicators in supply chain. In this study, retailer plays a leading role in agricultural supply chain. By means of the Kuhn-Tucker condition of the retailer’s maximum utility, the optimal price and optimal demand are obtained. The study also shows that risk averse retailer has higher wholesale price, lower retail price and greater supply as well as the demand for the pursuit of greater utility; Supplier has a certain robustness to the sudden event disturbance, when the disturbance is large, the quantity of initial supply quantity will be adjusted. The relationship between the demand change rate of the two channels and the market share of the channel is found. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results. The study provides a possible way of thinking in emergency decision analysis

National advertising and cooperation in a manufacturer-two-retailers channel

We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperative one is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in national advertising and the whole sale price. Then, the retailers determine non-cooperatively the price for consumers. The second case is a partial-cooperative one where retailers decide jointly for the price. In the third case, all members of the channel cooperate by maximizing a joint profit function. The spending in advertising and the quantity sold are the lowest in the partial-cooperative case, while retailers' price is the highest. Interestingly, when the degree of substituability between the two products proposed by retailers is low, these latter are worse off with partial-cooperation with respect to non-cooperation. Partial-cooperation is always the worst case for the manufacturer, the whole channel, consumers' surplus and social welfare, while cooperation is the best case. Cooperating members can share the extra-profit by a whole sale price

National advertising and cooperation in a manufacturer-two-retailers channel

We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperation case is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in national advertising and the wholesale price. Then, the retailers determine non-cooperatively the price for consumers. In the partial-cooperation case, retailers decide jointly for the price. In the full-cooperation case, all members of the channel cooperate by maximizing a joint profit function. Interestingly, partial-cooperation reduces the profits of retailers with respect to non-cooperation, when the degree of substituability between the two products proposed by retailers is low. Because of symmetry, this also implies that the total profit of retailers may decrease with partial-cooperation. We propose a cooperative implementable contract between all channel members, which shares the extra-profit due to full-cooperation. We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumers' surplus which positively depends not only on the price-demand function but also on the spending in national advertising. Partial-cooperation is always the worst case for the manufacturer, the whole channel, consumers' surplus and social welfare, while full-cooperation is the best case

Digital supply chain through dynamic inventory and smart contracts

This paper develops a digital supply chain game, modeling marketing and operation interactions between members. The main novelty of the paper concerns a comparison between static and dynamic solutions of the supply chain game achieved when moving from traditional to digital platforms. Therefore, this study proposes centralized and decentralized versions of the game, comparing their solutions under static and dynamic settings. Moreover, it investigates the decentralized supply chain by evaluating two smart contracts: Revenue sharing and wholesale price contracts. In both cases, the firms use an artificial intelligence system to determine the optimal contract parameters. Numerical and qualitative analyses are used for comparing configurations (centralized, decentralized), settings (static, dynamic), and contract schemes (revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract). The findings identify the conditions under which smart revenue sharing mechanisms are worth applying

International Marketing

International Marketing, a compilation of open educational resources and Lynn Library-licensed material, discusses how organizations market goods and services internationally, and how the scope of marketing subsequently broadens as it interacts with other dimensions like national culture and countries’ political, legal, and economic systems. The text reveals how, when marketing across national boundaries, organizations must decide what it is going to sell, what markets to target, and what marketing mix (product, place, promotion, price, and people) to embrace. Course: MKT 392https://spiral.lynn.edu/ludp/1012/thumbnail.jp

Optimization of a Dual-Channel Retailing System with Customer Returns

A plethora of retailers have begun to embrace a dual-channel retailing strategy wherein items are provided to consumers through both an online store and a physical store. As a result of standards and competitive measures, many retailers provide buyers who are unhappy with their purchases with the ability to achieve a full refund. In a dualchannel retailing system, full reimbursements can be done through what is called a crosschannel return, when a buyer purchases a product from an online store and returns it to a physical store. They can also be done through what is called a same-channel return, when a buyer purchases a product from a physical store and returns it back to the physical store, or purchases a product from an online store and returns it back to the online store. No existing research has examined all common types of customer returns in the context of a dual-channel retailing system. Be notified that the practice of cross-returning an item purchased from the physical store back to the online store is not common. Thus, it is not considered in this dissertation. We first study the optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. We consider two factors: the dual-channel retailer’s performance under centralization with unified and differential pricing schemes, and the dual-channel retailer’s performance under decentralization with the Stackelberg and Nash games. How dual-channel pricing behaviour is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. In this study, a channel’s sales requests is a linear function of a channel’s own pricing strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy. The second problem is an extension of the first problem. The optimal pricing policies and online channel’s responsiveness level for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns are studied. Indeed, the online store is normally the distribution centre of the enterprise and is not limited to the customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store experiences a much higher return rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the capability and the need to optimize its responsiveness to customer returns along with its pricing strategy. A channel’s sales requests, in the second problem, is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a crosschannel’s price, and the online store’s responsiveness level. The third problem studies the dilemma of whether or not to allow unsatisfactory online purchases to be cross-returned to the physical store. If not properly considered, those returns may create havoc to the system and a retailer might overestimate or underestimate a channel’s order quantity. Therefore, we study and compare between four vi different strategies, and propose models to determine optimal order quantities for each strategy when a dual-channel retailer offers both same and cross-channel returns. Several decision making insights on choosing between the different cross-channel return strategies and some properties of the optimal solutions are presented. From the retailer’s perspective of outsourcing the e-channel’s management to a third party logistics and service provider, we finally study three different inventory strategies, namely transaction-based fee, flat-based fee, and gain sharing. For each strategy, we find both channels’ optimal inventory policies and expected profits. The performances of the different strategies are compared and the managerial insights are given using analytical and numerical analysis. Methodologies, insights, comparative analysis, and computational results are delivered in this dissertation for the above aforementioned problems