Strategic Interaction With Multiple Tools: A New Empirical Model

The Lanchester model of strategic interaction typically considers only two-firm rivalry and one strategic tool. This paper presents an alternative that considers rivalry among several firms using multiple tools. Marketing decisions are dynamically optimal and use equations of motion for market share that are consistent with optimal consumer choice. Using a single-market case study that consists of five years of monthly data on ready to eat cereal sales, advertising, product development investments and new product introductions, we test our model against a similar Lanchester specification. Non-nested specification tests fail to reject the proposed model, but reject the Lanchester alternative.advertising, brands, cereal, dynamic, Lanchester, oligopoly, strategic interaction., Marketing,

Public Policy and Market Competition: How the Master Settlement Agreement Changed the Cigarette Industry

This paper investigates the large and unexpected increase in cigarette prices that followed the 1997 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). We integrate key features of rational addiction theory into a discrete-choice model of the demand for a differentiated product. We find that following the MSA firms set prices on a more elastic region of their demand curves. Using these estimates, we predict prices that would be charged under a variety of industry structures and pricing rules. Under the assumptions of firms’ perfect foresight and constant marginal costs, we fail to reject the hypothesis that firms collude on a dynamic pricing strategy.Cigarettes, Master Settlement Agreement, Demand, Collusion, Rational Addiction.

DYNAMIC STRATEGIC INTERACTION: A SYNTHESIS OF MODELING METHODS

Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing

This is the post-print version of the final paper published in Games and Economic Behavior. The published article is available from the link below. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Copyright @ 2008 Elsevier B.V.I consider an oligopoly model where, prior to price competition, firms invest in persuasive advertising and induce brand loyalty in consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market. This setting, in which persuasive advertising is introduced to homogeneous product markets, provides an alternative explanation for price dispersion phenomena. Despite ex ante symmetry, the equilibrium profile of advertising outlays is asymmetric. It follows that endogenously determined brand loyal consumer bases are not symmetric across firms. This raises a robustness question regarding Varian's “model of sales” where symmetry is exogenously assumed.IVI

Empirical Analysis of Competitive Interaction in Food Product Categories

This paper provides an overview of recent research on estimating competitive interaction in food product categories. In particular, the focus of this review is on research using scanner data conducted at the disaggregate (e.g., store, chain or local market) level, including empirical studies of vertical (i.e., within-channel) conduct. Studies addressing the competitive interaction on price, as well as non-price variables (e.g., in-store display and feature advertising) are considered. The author first describes the methodologies available for measuring the competitive interaction between firms and then briefly summarizes recent empirical developments. Given the complexity of the interactions that take place in practice, it is argued that much of the richness of actual competitive behavior is lost in aggregate analysis. Competitive interaction is the result of a complex set of variables and influences-demand side factors, market and industry structure, firm "personality", and category characteristics all interact in a complex fashion to determine strategic behavior of retailers and manufacturers.competition, competitive strategy, channel behavior, Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization,

Food Retailers' Pricing and Marketing Strategies, with Implications for Producers

This paper examines grocery retailers' ability to influence prices charged to consumers and paid to suppliers. We discuss how retailer market power manifests itself in terms of pricing and marketing strategies by setting forth and offering evidence in support of eight "stylized facts" of retailer pricing and brand decisions. We argue that little, if any, of this behavior can be explained by a model of a competitive, price-taking retailer, but that most of the indicated behavior was also inconsistent with traditional models of market power. Finally, we discuss the impacts of aspects of this retailer behavior on the upstream farm sector.grocery retailer, market power, price spread, sales, Agribusiness, Marketing,

Dynamic Explanations of Industry Structure and Performance

Industrial Organization,

Product Differentiation Costs and Global Competition

The growing competitive intensity on the markets determines the emergence of competition costs that are expressed at a corporate level and have implicit repercussions for the supply system. This type of costs makes it possible to identify a close link between competition costs and supply differentiation costs. Classification by competitive intensity presupposes that the analysis performed identifies the classification of company costs as the discriminating element, in terms of the competitive pressure of the context in which the firm operates. The emergence of competition costs is linked to an attempt to squeeze them as an aspect of vertical, or more specifically, horizontal cooperation strategies.Product Differentiation; Differentiation Costs; Over-Supply; Global Competition; Marketing; Market-Driven Management; Global Corporations; Global Markets DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2005.1.06garbelli

Analytic solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations

Closed form solutions are found for a particular class of Hamilton- Jacobi-Bellman equations emerging from a differential game among fims competing over quantities in a simultaneous oligopoly framework. After the derivation of the solutions, a microeconomic example in a non-standard market is presented where feedback equilibrium is calculated with the help of one of the previous formulas