Adversarial Reprogramming of Text Classification Neural Networks

Adversarial Reprogramming has demonstrated success in utilizing pre-trained neural network classifiers for alternative classification tasks without modification to the original network. An adversary in such an attack scenario trains an additive contribution to the inputs to repurpose the neural network for the new classification task. While this reprogramming approach works for neural networks with a continuous input space such as that of images, it is not directly applicable to neural networks trained for tasks such as text classification, where the input space is discrete. Repurposing such classification networks would require the attacker to learn an adversarial program that maps inputs from one discrete space to the other. In this work, we introduce a context-based vocabulary remapping model to reprogram neural networks trained on a specific sequence classification task, for a new sequence classification task desired by the adversary. We propose training procedures for this adversarial program in both white-box and black-box settings. We demonstrate the application of our model by adversarially repurposing various text-classification models including LSTM, bi-directional LSTM and CNN for alternate classification tasks

Why Adversarial Reprogramming Works, When It Fails, and How to Tell the Difference

Adversarial reprogramming allows repurposing a machine-learning model to perform a different task. For example, a model trained to recognize animals can be reprogrammed to recognize digits by embedding an adversarial program in the digit images provided as input. Recent work has shown that adversarial reprogramming may not only be used to abuse machine-learning models provided as a service, but also beneficially, to improve transfer learning when training data is scarce. However, the factors affecting its success are still largely unexplained. In this work, we develop a first-order linear model of adversarial reprogramming to show that its success inherently depends on the size of the average input gradient, which grows when input gradients are more aligned, and when inputs have higher dimensionality. The results of our experimental analysis, involving fourteen distinct reprogramming tasks, show that the above factors are correlated with the success and the failure of adversarial reprogramming

Few-Shot Malware Detection Using A Novel Adversarial Reprogramming Model

The increasing sophistication of malware has made detecting and defending against new strains a major challenge for cybersecurity. One promising approach to this problem is using machine learning techniques that extract representative features and train classification models to detect malware in an early stage. However, training such machine learning-based malware detection models represents a significant challenge that requires a large number of high-quality labeled data samples while it is very costly to obtain them in real-world scenarios. In other words, training machine learning models for malware detection requires the capability to learn from only a few labeled examples. To address this challenge, in this thesis, we propose a novel adversarial reprogramming model for few-shot malware detection. Our model is based on the idea to re-purpose high-performance ImageNet classification model to perform malware detection using the features of malicious and benign files. We first embed the features of software files and a small perturbation to a host image chosen randomly from ImageNet, and then create an image dataset to train and test the model; after that, the model transforms the output into malware and benign classes. We evaluate the effectiveness of our model on a dataset of real-world malware and show that it significantly outperforms baseline few-shot learning methods. Additionally, we evaluate the impact of different pre-trained models, different data sizes, and different parameter values. Overall, our results suggest that the proposed adversarial reprogramming model is a promising direction for improving few-shot malware detection

Stateful Detection of Adversarial Reprogramming

Adversarial reprogramming allows stealing computational resources by repurposing machine learning models to perform a different task chosen by the attacker. For example, a model trained to recognize images of animals can be reprogrammed to recognize medical images by embedding an adversarial program in the images provided as inputs. This attack can be perpetrated even if the target model is a black box, supposed that the machine-learning model is provided as a service and the attacker can query the model and collect its outputs. So far, no defense has been demonstrated effective in this scenario. We show for the first time that this attack is detectable using stateful defenses, which store the queries made to the classifier and detect the abnormal cases in which they are similar. Once a malicious query is detected, the account of the user who made it can be blocked. Thus, the attacker must create many accounts to perpetrate the attack. To decrease this number, the attacker could create the adversarial program against a surrogate classifier and then fine-tune it by making few queries to the target model. In this scenario, the effectiveness of the stateful defense is reduced, but we show that it is still effective