3,577 research outputs found

    Are Self-Driving Cars Secure? Evasion Attacks against Deep Neural Networks for Steering Angle Prediction

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    Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have tremendous potential in advancing the vision for self-driving cars. However, the security of DNN models in this context leads to major safety implications and needs to be better understood. We consider the case study of steering angle prediction from camera images, using the dataset from the 2014 Udacity challenge. We demonstrate for the first time adversarial testing-time attacks for this application for both classification and regression settings. We show that minor modifications to the camera image (an L2 distance of 0.82 for one of the considered models) result in mis-classification of an image to any class of attacker's choice. Furthermore, our regression attack results in a significant increase in Mean Square Error (MSE) by a factor of 69 in the worst case.Comment: Preprint of the work accepted for publication at the IEEE Workshop on the Internet of Safe Things, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 23, 201

    Analysis of adversarial attacks against CNN-based image forgery detectors

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    With the ubiquitous diffusion of social networks, images are becoming a dominant and powerful communication channel. Not surprisingly, they are also increasingly subject to manipulations aimed at distorting information and spreading fake news. In recent years, the scientific community has devoted major efforts to contrast this menace, and many image forgery detectors have been proposed. Currently, due to the success of deep learning in many multimedia processing tasks, there is high interest towards CNN-based detectors, and early results are already very promising. Recent studies in computer vision, however, have shown CNNs to be highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, small perturbations of the input data which drive the network towards erroneous classification. In this paper we analyze the vulnerability of CNN-based image forensics methods to adversarial attacks, considering several detectors and several types of attack, and testing performance on a wide range of common manipulations, both easily and hardly detectable

    Adversary Detection in Neural Networks via Persistent Homology

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    We outline a detection method for adversarial inputs to deep neural networks. By viewing neural network computations as graphs upon which information flows from input space to out- put distribution, we compare the differences in graphs induced by different inputs. Specifically, by applying persistent homology to these induced graphs, we observe that the structure of the most persistent subgraphs which generate the first homology group differ between adversarial and unperturbed inputs. Based on this observation, we build a detection algorithm that depends only on the topological information extracted during training. We test our algorithm on MNIST and achieve 98% detection adversary accuracy with F1-score 0.98.Comment: 16 page

    Detecting Adversarial Image Examples in Deep Networks with Adaptive Noise Reduction

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    Recently, many studies have demonstrated deep neural network (DNN) classifiers can be fooled by the adversarial example, which is crafted via introducing some perturbations into an original sample. Accordingly, some powerful defense techniques were proposed. However, existing defense techniques often require modifying the target model or depend on the prior knowledge of attacks. In this paper, we propose a straightforward method for detecting adversarial image examples, which can be directly deployed into unmodified off-the-shelf DNN models. We consider the perturbation to images as a kind of noise and introduce two classic image processing techniques, scalar quantization and smoothing spatial filter, to reduce its effect. The image entropy is employed as a metric to implement an adaptive noise reduction for different kinds of images. Consequently, the adversarial example can be effectively detected by comparing the classification results of a given sample and its denoised version, without referring to any prior knowledge of attacks. More than 20,000 adversarial examples against some state-of-the-art DNN models are used to evaluate the proposed method, which are crafted with different attack techniques. The experiments show that our detection method can achieve a high overall F1 score of 96.39% and certainly raises the bar for defense-aware attacks.Comment: 14 pages, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8482346&isnumber=435869

    Global-Local Face Upsampling Network

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    Face hallucination, which is the task of generating a high-resolution face image from a low-resolution input image, is a well-studied problem that is useful in widespread application areas. Face hallucination is particularly challenging when the input face resolution is very low (e.g., 10 x 12 pixels) and/or the image is captured in an uncontrolled setting with large pose and illumination variations. In this paper, we revisit the algorithm introduced in [1] and present a deep interpretation of this framework that achieves state-of-the-art under such challenging scenarios. In our deep network architecture the global and local constraints that define a face can be efficiently modeled and learned end-to-end using training data. Conceptually our network design can be partitioned into two sub-networks: the first one implements the holistic face reconstruction according to global constraints, and the second one enhances face-specific details and enforces local patch statistics. We optimize the deep network using a new loss function for super-resolution that combines reconstruction error with a learned face quality measure in adversarial setting, producing improved visual results. We conduct extensive experiments in both controlled and uncontrolled setups and show that our algorithm improves the state of the art both numerically and visually

    ROSA: Robust Salient Object Detection against Adversarial Attacks

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    Recently salient object detection has witnessed remarkable improvement owing to the deep convolutional neural networks which can harvest powerful features for images. In particular, state-of-the-art salient object detection methods enjoy high accuracy and efficiency from fully convolutional network (FCN) based frameworks which are trained from end to end and predict pixel-wise labels. However, such framework suffers from adversarial attacks which confuse neural networks via adding quasi-imperceptible noises to input images without changing the ground truth annotated by human subjects. To our knowledge, this paper is the first one that mounts successful adversarial attacks on salient object detection models and verifies that adversarial samples are effective on a wide range of existing methods. Furthermore, this paper proposes a novel end-to-end trainable framework to enhance the robustness for arbitrary FCN-based salient object detection models against adversarial attacks. The proposed framework adopts a novel idea that first introduces some new generic noise to destroy adversarial perturbations, and then learns to predict saliency maps for input images with the introduced noise. Specifically, our proposed method consists of a segment-wise shielding component, which preserves boundaries and destroys delicate adversarial noise patterns and a context-aware restoration component, which refines saliency maps through global contrast modeling. Experimental results suggest that our proposed framework improves the performance significantly for state-of-the-art models on a series of datasets.Comment: To be published in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetic

    Unifying Bilateral Filtering and Adversarial Training for Robust Neural Networks

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    Recent analysis of deep neural networks has revealed their vulnerability to carefully structured adversarial examples. Many effective algorithms exist to craft these adversarial examples, but performant defenses seem to be far away. In this work, we explore the use of edge-aware bilateral filtering as a projection back to the space of natural images. We show that bilateral filtering is an effective defense in multiple attack settings, where the strength of the adversary gradually increases. In the case of an adversary who has no knowledge of the defense, bilateral filtering can remove more than 90% of adversarial examples from a variety of different attacks. To evaluate against an adversary with complete knowledge of our defense, we adapt the bilateral filter as a trainable layer in a neural network and show that adding this layer makes ImageNet images significantly more robust to attacks. When trained under a framework of adversarial training, we show that the resulting model is hard to fool with even the best attack methods.Comment: 9 pages, 14 figure

    HyperNetworks with statistical filtering for defending adversarial examples

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    Deep learning algorithms have been known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in various tasks such as image classification. This problem was addressed by employing several defense methods for detection and rejection of particular types of attacks. However, training and manipulating networks according to particular defense schemes increases computational complexity of the learning algorithms. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective method to improve robustness of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to adversarial attacks by using data dependent adaptive convolution kernels. To this end, we propose a new type of HyperNetwork in order to employ statistical properties of input data and features for computation of statistical adaptive maps. Then, we filter convolution weights of CNNs with the learned statistical maps to compute dynamic kernels. Thereby, weights and kernels are collectively optimized for learning of image classification models robust to adversarial attacks without employment of additional target detection and rejection algorithms. We empirically demonstrate that the proposed method enables CNNs to spontaneously defend against different types of attacks, e.g. attacks generated by Gaussian noise, fast gradient sign methods (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and a black-box attack(Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2016)

    Interpretable Convolutional Neural Networks via Feedforward Design

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    The model parameters of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are determined by backpropagation (BP). In this work, we propose an interpretable feedforward (FF) design without any BP as a reference. The FF design adopts a data-centric approach. It derives network parameters of the current layer based on data statistics from the output of the previous layer in a one-pass manner. To construct convolutional layers, we develop a new signal transform, called the Saab (Subspace Approximation with Adjusted Bias) transform. It is a variant of the principal component analysis (PCA) with an added bias vector to annihilate activation's nonlinearity. Multiple Saab transforms in cascade yield multiple convolutional layers. As to fully-connected (FC) layers, we construct them using a cascade of multi-stage linear least squared regressors (LSRs). The classification and robustness (against adversarial attacks) performances of BP- and FF-designed CNNs applied to the MNIST and the CIFAR-10 datasets are compared. Finally, we comment on the relationship between BP and FF designs.Comment: 32 page

    Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methods

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    Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs that are close to natural inputs but classified incorrectly. In order to better understand the space of adversarial examples, we survey ten recent proposals that are designed for detection and compare their efficacy. We show that all can be defeated by constructing new loss functions. We conclude that adversarial examples are significantly harder to detect than previously appreciated, and the properties believed to be intrinsic to adversarial examples are in fact not. Finally, we propose several simple guidelines for evaluating future proposed defenses
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