13 research outputs found
Degenerate Curve Attacks
Invalid curve attacks are a well-known class of attacks against
implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems, in which an
adversary tricks the cryptographic device into carrying out scalar
multiplication not on the expected secure curve, but on some other,
weaker elliptic curve of his choosing. In their original form, however,
these attacks only affect elliptic curve implementations using
addition and doubling formulas that are independent of at least one
of the curve parameters. This property is typically satisfied for
elliptic curves in Weierstrass form but not for newer models that
have gained increasing popularity in recent years, like Edwards and
twisted Edwards curves. It has therefore been suggested (e.g. in
the original paper on invalid curve attacks) that such alternate
models could protect against those attacks.
In this paper, we dispel that belief and present the first attack of
this nature against (twisted) Edwards curves, Jacobi quartics, Jacobi
intersections and more. Our attack differs from invalid curve attacks
proper in that the cryptographic device is tricked into carrying out a
computation not on another elliptic curve, but on a group isomorphic
to the multiplicative group of the underlying base field. This often
makes it easy to recover the secret scalar with a single invalid
computation.
We also show how our result can be used constructively, especially on
curves over random base fields, as a fault attack countermeasure
similar to Shamir\u27s trick
Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key reveals
When a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets; long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analyzed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. We provide a generic {group key exchange} construction that is strongly secure, meaning that the attacker is allowed to learn both long-term and ephemeral keys (but not both from the same participant, as this would trivially disclose the session key). Our design can be seen as a compiler, in the sense that it builds on a 2-party key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and transforms it into a strongly secure group key exchange protocol by adding only one extra round of communication. When applied to an existing 2-party protocol from Bergsma et al., the result is a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure in the standard model, thus yielding the first construction with this property
DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense
modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs
allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily
understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and
Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However
there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different
features and goals. The objective of this survey is to present a complete
overview of graphical attack and defense modeling techniques based on DAGs.
This consists of summarizing the existing methodologies, comparing their
features and proposing a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article
also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user
requirements
Truncated Differential Based Known-Key Attacks on Round-Reduced Simon
At Crypto 2015, Blondeau, Peyrin and Wang proposed a truncated-differential-based known-key attack on full PRESENT, a nibble oriented lightweight blockcipher with a SPN structure.
The truncated difference they used is derived from the existing multidimensional linear characteristics.
An innovative technique of their work is the design of a MITM layer added before the characteristic that covers extra rounds with a complexity lower than that of a generic construction.
We notice that there are good linear hulls for bit-oriented block cipher Simon corresponding to highly qualified truncated differential characteristics.
Based on these characteristics, we propose known-key distinguishers on round-reduced Simon block cipher family, which is bit oriented and has a Feistel structure.
Similar to the MITM layer, we design a specific start-from-the-middle method for pre-adding extra rounds with complexities lower than generic bounds.
With these techniques, we launch basic known-key attacks on round-reduced Simon.
We also involve some key guessing technique and further extend the basic attacks to more rounds.
Our known-key attacks can reach as many as 29/32/38/48/63-rounds of Simon32/48/64/96/128, which comes quite close to the full number of rounds.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first known-key results on the block cipher Simon
SAND: an AND-RX Feistel lightweight block cipher supporting S-box-based security evaluations
We revisit designing AND-RX block ciphers, that is, the designs assembled with the most fundamental binary operations---AND, Rotation and XOR operations and do not rely on existing units. Likely, the most popular representative is the NSA cipher \texttt{SIMON}, which remains one of the most efficient designs, but suffers from difficulty in security evaluation.
As our main contribution, we propose \texttt{SAND}, a new family of lightweight AND-RX block ciphers. To overcome the difficulty regarding security evaluation, \texttt{SAND} follows a novel design approach, the core idea of which is to restrain the AND-RX operations to be within nibbles. By this, \texttt{SAND} admits an equivalent representation based on a \textit{synthetic S-box} (). This enables the use of classical S-box-based security evaluation approaches. Consequently, for all versions of \texttt{SAND}, (a) we evaluated security bounds with respect to differential and linear attacks, and in both single-key and related-key scenarios; (b) we also evaluated security against impossible differential and zero-correlation linear attacks.
This better understanding of the security enables the use of a relatively simple key schedule, which makes the ASIC round-based hardware implementation of \texttt{SAND} to be one of the state-of-art Feistel lightweight ciphers. As to software performance, due to the natural bitslice structure, \texttt{SAND} reaches the same level of performance as \texttt{SIMON} and is among the most software-efficient block ciphers
MILP-based Differential Attack on Round-reduced GIFT
At Asiacrypt 2014, Sun et al. proposed a MILP model to search for differential characteristics of bit-oriented block ciphers. In this paper, we improve this model to search for differential characteristics of GIFT, a new lightweight block cipher proposed at CHES 2017. GIFT has two versions, namely GIFT-64 and GIFT-128.
For GIFT-64, we find the best 12-round differential characteristic and a number of iterative 4-round differential characteristics with our MILP-based model. We give a key-recovery attack on 19-round GIFT-64.
For GIFT-128, we find a 18-round differential characteristic and give the first attack on 22-round GIFT-128
ASKPIR: Authorized Symmetric Keyword Privacy Information Retrieval Protocol Based on DID
Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) is a stronger PIR protocol that ensures both client and server privacy. In many cases, the client needs authorization from the data subject before querying data. However, this also means that the server can learn the identity of the data subject. To solve such problems, we propose a new SPIR primitive, called authorized symmetric keyword information retrieval protocol (ASKPIR). Specifically, we designed an efficient DID identification algorithm based on the Pedersen Commitment, which is used to solve the identity management and privacy problems of data subject when data is shared by multiple parties in a distributed environment. Then, we present a novel authorization algorithm combining NIZK proof and DID, which can preserve client privacy. Finally, to improve the efficiency of client retrieval, our protocol constructs PSI-Payload with mqRPMT and OTE so as to support batch keyword searches. In addition, we provide a formal security analysis for the anonymity and unforgeability of the protocol and demonstrate that ASKPIR can achieve malicious security under the UC framework. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the ASKPIR protocol is more efficient than other related works and solves the problem of incompatibility between data subject authorization and client privacy
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license