82 research outputs found
Engineering Trustworthy Systems by Minimizing and Strengthening their TCBs using Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) describes the part of an IT system that is responsible for enforcing a certain security property of the system. In order to engineer a trustworthy system, the TCB must be as secure as possible. This can be achieved by reducing the number, size and complexity of components that are part of the TCB and by using hardened components as part of the TCB. Worst case scenario is for the TCB to span the complete IT system. Best case is for the TCB to be reduced to only a strengthened Root of Trust such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM). One such very secure HSMs with many capabilities is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
This thesis demonstrates how the TCB of a system can be largely or even solely reduced to the TPM for a variety of security policies, especially in the embedded domain. The examined scenarios include the policies for securing of device resident data at rest also during firmware updates, the enforcement of firmware product lines at runtime, the securing of payment credentials in Plug and Charge controllers, the recording of audit trails over attestation data and a very generic role-based access management. In order to allow evaluating these different solutions, the notion of a dynamic lifecycle dimension for a TCB is introduced. Furthermore, an approach towards engineering such systems based on a formal framework is presented.
These scenarios provide evidence for the potential to enforce even complex security policies in small and thus strong TCBs. The approach for implementing those policies can often be inspired by a formal methods based engineering process or by means of additive functional engineering, where a base system is expanded by increased functionality in each step. In either case, a trustworthy system with high assurance capabilities can be achieved
Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the
4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential
computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the
Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) with encrypted CPU state and memory, integrity
protection, and remote attestation. TDX aims to enforce hardware-assisted
isolation for virtual machines and minimize the attack surface exposed to host
platforms, which are considered to be untrustworthy or adversarial in the
confidential computing's new threat model. TDX can be leveraged by regulated
industries or sensitive data holders to outsource their computations and data
with end-to-end protection in public cloud infrastructure.
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of TDX to potential
adopters, domain experts, and security researchers looking to leverage the
technology for their own purposes. We adopt a top-down approach, starting with
high-level security principles and moving to low-level technical details of
TDX. Our analysis is based on publicly available documentation and source code,
offering insights from security researchers outside of Intel
Astrobee Periodic Technical Review (PTR) Delta 3
Astrobee is a free flying robot for the inside of the International Space Station (ISS). The Periodic Technical Review (PTR) delta 3 is the final design review of the system presented to stakeholders
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ENABLING IOT AUTHENTICATION, PRIVACY AND SECURITY VIA BLOCKCHAIN
Although low-power and Internet-connected gadgets and sensors are increasingly integrated into our lives, the optimal design of these systems remains an issue. In particular, authentication, privacy, security, and performance are critical success factors. Furthermore, with emerging research areas such as autonomous cars, advanced manufacturing, smart cities, and building, usage of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices is expected to skyrocket. A single compromised node can be turned into a malicious one that brings down whole systems or causes disasters in safety-critical applications. This dissertation addresses the critical problems of (i) device management, (ii) data management, and (iii) service management in IoT systems. In particular, we propose an integrated platform solution for IoT device authentication, data privacy, and service security via blockchain-based smart contracts. We ensure IoT device authentication by blockchain-based IC traceability system, from its fabrication to its end-of-life, allowing both the supplier and a potential customer to verify an ICās provenance. Results show that our proposed consortium blockchain framework implementation in Hyperledger Fabric for IC traceability achieves a throughput of 35 transactions per second (tps). To corroborate the blockchain information, we authenticate the IC securely and uniquely with an embedded Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). For reliable Weak PUF-based authentication, our proposed accelerated aging technique reduces the cumulative burn-in cost by ā¼ 56%. We also propose a blockchain-based solution to integrate the privacy of data generated from the IoT devices by giving users control of their privacy. The smart contract controlled trust-base ensures that the users have private access to their IoT devices and data. We then propose a remote configuration of IC features via smart contracts, where an IC can be programmed repeatedly and securely. This programmability will enable users to upgrade IC features or rent upgraded IC features for a fixed period after users have purchased the IC. We tailor the hardware to meet the blockchain performance. Our on-die hardware module design enforces the hardware configurationās secure execution and uses only 2,844 slices in the Xilinx Zedboard Zynq Evaluation board. The blockchain framework facilitates decentralized IoT, where interacting devices are empowered to execute digital contracts autonomously
Towards 5G Zero Trusted Air Interface Architecture
5G is destined to be supporting large deployment of Industrial IoT (IIoT)
with the characteristics of ultra-high densification and low latency. 5G
utilizes a more intelligent architecture, with Radio Access Networks (RANs) no
longer constrained by base station proximity or proprietary infrastructure. The
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) covers telecommunication technologies
including RAN, core transport networks and service capabilities. Open RAN
Alliance (O-RAN) aims to define implementation and deployment architectures,
focusing on open-source interfaces and functional units to further reduce the
cost and complexity. O-RAN based 5G networks could use components from
different hardware and software vendors, promoting vendor diversity,
interchangeability and 5G supply chain resiliency. Both 3GPP and O-RAN 5G have
to manage the security and privacy challenges that arose from the deployment.
Many existing research studies have addressed the threats and vulnerabilities
within each system. 5G also has the overwhelming challenges in compliance with
privacy regulations and requirements which mandate the user identifiable
information need to be protected.
In this paper, we look into the 3GPP and O-RAN 5G security and privacy
designs and the identified threats and vulnerabilities. We also discuss how to
extend the Zero Trust Model to provide advanced protection over 5G air
interfaces and network components
Security and Trust in Safety Critical Infrastructures
Critical infrastructures such as road vehicles and railways are undergoing a major change, which increases the dependency of their operation and control on Information Technology (IT) and makes them more vulnerable to malicious intent. New complex communication infrastructures emerge using the increased connectivity of these safety-critical systems to enable efficient management of operational processes, service provisioning, and information exchange for various (third-party) actors. Railway Command and Control Systems (CCSs) turn with the introduction of digital interlocking into an āInternet of Railway Thingsā, where safety-critical railway signaling components are deployed on common-purpose platforms and connected via standard IP-based networks. Similarly, the mass adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and the need to supply their batteries with energy for charging has given rise to a Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) infrastructure, which connects vehicles to power grids and multiple service providers to coordinate charging and discharging processes and maintain grid
stability under varying power demands. The Plug-and-Charge feature brought in by the V2G communication standard ISO 15118 allows an EV to access charging and value-added services, negotiate charging schedules, and support the grid as a distributed energy resource in a largely automated way, by leveraging identity credentials installed in the vehicle for authentication and payment.
The fast deployment of this advanced functionality is driven by economical and political decisions including the EU Green Deal for climate neutrality. Due to the complex requirements and long standardization and development cycles, the standards and regulations, which play the key role in operating and protecting critical infrastructures, are under pressure to enable the timely and cost-effective adoption.
In this thesis, we investigate security and safety of future V2G and railway command and control systems with respect to secure communication, platform assurance as well as safety and security co-engineering. One of the major goals in this context
is the continuous collaboration and establishment of the proposed security solutions in upcoming domain-specific standards, thus ensuring their practical applicability and prompt implementation in real-world products.
We first analyze the security of V2G communication protocols and requirements for secure service provisioning via charging connections. We propose a new Plug-and-Patch protocol that enables secure update of EVs as a value-added service integrated into the V2G charging loop. Since EVs can also participate in energy trading by storing and feeding previously stored energy to grid, home, or other vehicles, we then investigate fraud detection methods that can be employed to identify manipulations and misbehaving users.
In order to provide a strong security foundation for V2G communications, we propose and analyze three security architectures employing a hardware trust anchor to enable trust establishment in V2G communications. We integrate these architectures into standard V2G protocols for load management, e-mobility services and value-added services in the V2G infrastructure, and evaluate the associated performance and security trade-offs.
The final aspect of this work is safety and security co-engineering, i.e., integration of safety and security processes vital for the adequate protection of connected safety-critical systems. We consider two application scenarios, Electric Vehicle Charging System (EVCS) and Object Controller (OC) in railway CCS, and investigate how security methods like trusted computing can be applied to provide both required safety and security properties. In the case of EVCS, we bind the trust boundary for safety functionality (certified configuration) to the trust boundary in the security domain and
design a new security architecture that enforces safety properties via security assertions. For the railway use case, we focus on ensuring non-interference (separation) between these two domains and develop a security architecture that
allows secure co-existence of applications with different criticality on the same hardware platform.
The proposed solutions have been presented to the committee ISO/TC 22/SC 31/JWG 1 that develops the ISO 15118 standard series and to the DKE working group āInformationssicherheit fĆ¼r ElektromobilitƤtā responsible for the respective application guidelines. Our security extension has been integrated in the newest edition ISO 15118-20 released in April 2022. Several manufacturers have already started concept validation for their future products using our results.
In this way, the presented analyses and techniques are fundamental contributions in improving the state of security for e-mobility and railway applications, and the overall resilience of safety-critical infrastructures to malicious attacks
Holistic security 4.0
The future computer climate will represent an ever more aligned world of integrating
technologies, affecting consumer, business and industry sectors. The vision was first outlined
in the Industry 4.0 conception. The elements which comprise smart systems or embedded
devices have been investigated to determine the technological climate.
The emerging technologies revolve around core concepts, and specifically in this project, the
uses of Internet of Things (IoT), Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and Internet of Everything
(IoE). The application of bare metal and logical technology qualities are put under the
microscope to provide an effective blue print of the technological field.
The systems and governance surrounding smart systems are also examined. Such an approach
helps to explain the beneficial or negative elements of smart devices. Consequently, this
ensures a comprehensive review of standards, laws, policy and guidance to enable security and
cybersecurity of the 4.0 systems
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