Network Interdiction under Uncertainty

We consider variants to one of the most common network interdiction formulations: the shortest path interdiction problem. This problem involves leader and a follower playing a zero-sum game over a directed network. The leader interdicts a set of arcs, and arc costs increase each time they are interdicted. The follower observes the leader\u27s actions and selects a shortest path in response. The leader\u27s optimal interdiction strategy maximizes the follower\u27s minimum-cost path. Our first variant allows the follower to improve the network after the interdiction by lowering the costs of some arcs, and the leader is uncertain regarding the follower\u27s cardinality budget restricting the arc improvements. We propose a multiobjective approach for this problem, with each objective corresponding to a different possible improvement budget value. To this end, we also present the modified augmented weighted Tchebychev norm, which can be used to generate a complete efficient set of solutions to a discrete multi-objective optimization problem, and which tends to scale better than competing methods as the number of objectives grows. In our second variant, the leader selects a policy of randomized interdiction actions, and the follower uses the probability of where interdictions are deployed on the network to select a path having the minimum expected cost. We show that this continuous non-convex problem becomes strongly NP-hard when the cost functions are convex or when they are concave. After formally describing each variant, we present various algorithms for solving them, and we examine the efficacy of all our algorithms on test beds of randomly generated instances

Prioritizing Satellite Payload Selection via Optimization

This thesis develops optimization models for prioritizing payloads for inclusion on satellite buses with volume, power, weight and budget constraints. The first model considers a single satellite launch for which the budget is uncertain and constellation requirements are not considered. Subsequently, we include constellation requirements and provide a more enhanced model. Both single-launch models provide a prioritized list of payloads to include on the launch before the budget is realized. The single-launch models are subsequently extended to a sequence of multiple launches in two cases, both of which incorporate an explicit dependence on the constellation composition at each launch epoch. The first case ignores future launches and solves a series of independent single-launch problems. The second case considers all launches simultaneously. The optimization models for single- and multiple-launch cases are evaluated through a computational study. It was found that, when the budget distribution is skewed, the prioritization model outperforms a greedy payload selection heuristic in the single-launch model. For the multiple-launch models, it was found that the consideration of future launches can significantly improve the objective function values

Games for the Optimal Deployment of Security Forces

In this thesis, we develop mathematical models for the optimal deployment of security forces addressing two main challenges: adaptive behavior of the adversary and uncertainty in the model. We address several security applications and model them as agent-intruder games. The agent represents the security forces which can be the coast guard, airport control, or military assets, while the intruder represents the agent's adversary such as illegal fishermen, terrorists or enemy submarines. To determine the optimal agent's deployment strategy, we assume that we deal with an intelligent intruder. This means that the intruder is able to deduce the strategy of the agent. To take this into account, for example by using randomized strategies, we use game theoretical models which are developed to model situations in which two or more players interact. Additionally, uncertainty may arise at several aspects. For example, there might be uncertainty in sensor observations, risk levels of certain areas, or travel times. We address this uncertainty by combining game theoretical models with stochastic modeling, such as queueing theory, Bayesian beliefs, and stochastic game theory. This thesis consists of three parts. In the first part, we introduce two game theoretical models on a network of queues. First, we develop an interdiction game on a network of queues where the intruder enters the network as a regular customer and aims to route to a target node. The agent is modeled as a negative customer which can inspect the queues and remove intruders. By modeling this as a queueing network, stochastic arrivals and travel times can be taken into account. The second model considers a non-cooperative game on a queueing network where multiple players decide on a route that minimizes their sojourn time. We discuss existence of pure Nash equilibria for games with continuous and discrete strategy space and describe how such equilibria can be found. The second part of this thesis considers dynamic games in which information that becomes available during the game plays a role. First, we consider partially observable agent-intruder games (POAIGs). In these types of games, both the agent and the intruder do not have full information about the state space. However, they do partially observe the state space, for example by using sensors. We prove the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon and provide methods to find (approximate) solutions for both POAIGs with a finite time horizon and POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we consider anti-submarine warfare operations with time dependent strategies where parts of the agent's strategy becomes available to the intruder during the game. The intruder represents an enemy submarine which aims to attack a high value unit. The agent is trying to prevent this by the deployment of both frigates and helicopters. In the last part of this thesis we discuss games with restrictions on the agent's strategy. We consider a special case of security games dealing with the protection of large areas for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes, such that some given operational conditions on the agent's mobility are met. First, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. Second, we develop a dynamic variant of this game by using stochastic games. This ensures that strategies are constructed that consider both past actions and expected future risk levels. In the last chapter, we consider Stackelberg security games with a large number of pure strategies. In order to construct operationalizable strategies we limit the number of pure strategies that is allowed in the optimal mixed strategy of the agent. We investigate the cost of these restrictions by introducing the price of usability and develop algorithmic approaches to calculate such strategies efficiently

Aeronautical Engineering: A special bibliography with indexes, supplement 39

This special bibliography lists 417 reports, articles, and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in December 1973

Justice Sutherland Reconsidered

In the annals of Supreme Court history, George Sutherland occupies a curious place. Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1921 to 1938, the Utah native has long been identified as one of the infamous Four Horsemen, known largely for his role as a judicial conservative instrumental in the Court\u27s invalidation of significant aspects of the New Deal. Yet Sutherland was also the author of several influential opinions involving matters as diverse as civil rights, freedom of expression, and others that recognized the broad authority of the federal government in the realm of foreign and military affairs. A proponent of limited government intervention into private economic activities, he also advocated the public interest in the exercise of reasonable controls of private land use. Moreover, Sutherland did not hesitate to support workers\u27 compensation and other exercises of governmental authority intended to promote the public welfare. Accordingly, Justice Sutherland might appear to the modern observer as somewhat of a judicial enigma, who, except for an occasional progressive lapse, more often than not, imbued his analysis reference in print to Sutherland and his fellow bloc of dissenters on the Hughes Court

Operational flexibility on complex enterprises : case studies from recent military operations

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, June 2009.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections."May 2009." Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references.An emerging requirement for 21st century enterprises is operational flexibility, a requirement particularly important for the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD). To achieve flexibility, most practice and research emphasizes process improvement, robust collaboration and "flattened" or "networked" organizations. Lateral alignment has also been proposed as a means to enable flexibility. Missing from these approaches is an appreciation and understanding of the role of architecture and hierarchy as well how to apply these ideas at the enterprise level of organization. The DoD has embraced information technology as one means to achieve flexibility via these methods. Within DoD the Air Force is a uniquely flexible combat arm, but it has proven particularly difficult to integrate air power at the level of inter-service (Joint) military operations in order to leverage this flexibility. Kometer (ESD Ph.D., 2005) used a complex, large-scale, interconnected, open, socio-technical (CLIOS) systems analysis to examine command and control of the Combat Air Operations System (CAOS), proposing new command and control concepts to gain flexibility. This thesis extends Kometer's research by using a qualitative architectural analysis to explore the twin ideas of hierarchy and laterality in enabling flexibility. We define lateral interactions as those within the same layer of an enterprise hierarchy. Lateral interactions enable formalized collaboration among peer entities, which can enable more operational alternatives and make these alternatives executable on more responsive timelines than possible with classic hierarchical structures.(cont.) We identify previously unexamined trends in the operational architecture of combat air operations that are related to flexibility and examine the trade-offs between flexibility and other enterprise properties. We find a pattern of increasing enterprise laterality from beginning to end of the case studies and an association between upper- and lower-echelon laterality, overall system flexibility and strategic coherence. To enrich the analytical framework, an analogous example of flexibility in the New England Patriots football team is developed and presented. We find that our architecture framework provides a rich addition to existing empirical research on combat air power and addresses difficult socio-technical analysis issues in a way that complements other approaches. We also find that traditional perspectives on flexibility, efficiency and effectiveness trade-offs are strongly dependent on hierarchical level of analysis. Our framework lays a foundation for rigorous holistic enterprise design efforts in the area of military operations and other socio-technical enterprises such as health care, disaster relief and large-scale defense acquisition.by John Q. Dickmann, Jr.Ph.D

The Limits of Command and Control

This thesis examines the role of the human operator in command and control systems designed and developed for the US Air Force during the 1950s and 1960s. As understood within the discourse of defence research, command and control involved the efficient capture and management of information from the battlefield in the pursuit of a particular military strategy. The digital computer, although then still very much the highly protean object of military-industrial-university research networks, was repeatedly proposed as a crucial technology that would allow for greater and more accurate control of the battlefield. I explore the discursive terrain occupied by the human operator through an analysis of two command and control systems, selected for their significance in employing digital computers to automate previously manual military practices. Firstly, I examine the operational principles established for Air Force crews in the SAGE system deployed in the late-1950s, tracing their elaboration within a series of psychological studies of stress led by psychologists at the RAND Corporation. In the absence of an actual Soviet invasion, SAGE crews fought simulated air wars while the effectiveness of their collective performance was systematically quantified. The second case study turns to the US Air Force's 'anti-infiltration' programme that targeted and bombed convoy routes used by the North Vietnamese Army to deliver supplies into South Vietnam. I focus on the role played by photo interpreters and systems analysts in the collection and verification of data used to confirm so-called 'vehicular activity' and 'truck kills'. In histories of Cold War technopolitics, both of these case studies have frequently been presented as exemplars of the application of a quantitative, computational rationality to the planning and conduct of military strategy. However, for all the extensive discussion in this literature about the central role of digital computers in automating parts of these systems, there still remained human operators who clearly played a significant, if seemingly recessive, role in their day-to-day functioning. My discussion of these case studies is based on close textual analyses of 'grey media'---the technical and administrative writing produced within bureaucratic institutions such as the US military and its defence research contractors. I foreground the effects grey media had on structuring and standardising specific operational practices, and consequently how it delimited the respective roles played by the human operator and the machine in the production of information about the battlefield. Drawing on a Foucauldian understanding of power as it functions through institutional discourse, I argue that the human operator was instrumental in codifying and authenticating information generated by and for the computer. This varied from the regular re-structuring of data in machine-readable forms, to the longer-term tasks of quantifying the strategic effectiveness of the system. Far from simply making the processing of information more efficient, these computerised systems were enmeshed in a vast and contradictory 'regime of practices' in which manual work proliferated. I contend that in order to fully grasp how digital, networked technologies have reshaped the field of possibility in war, foregrounding the grey, recessive role played by the human operator is vital

Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) 2019 Annual Report

Prepared for: Dr. Brian Bingham, CRUSER DirectorThe Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) provides a collaborative environment and community of interest for the advancement of unmanned systems (UxS) education and research endeavors across the Navy (USN), Marine Corps (USMC) and Department of Defense (DoD). CRUSER is a Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) initiative to build an inclusive community of interest on the application of unmanned systems (UxS) in military and naval operations. This 2019 annual report summarizes CRUSER activities in its eighth year of operations and highlights future plans.Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy PPOIOffice of Naval Research (ONR)Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited