308,516 research outputs found
Adaptation is a Game
Control data variants of game models such as Interface Automata are suitable for the design and analysis of self-adaptive systems
Adaptation is a game
Control data variants of game models such as Interface Automata are suitable for the design and analysis of self-adaptive systems
Stability and Diversity in Collective Adaptation
We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe
collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic
model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that
locally achieves the best action and memory loss that leads to randomized
behavior. We show that, although individual agents interact with their
environment and other agents in a purely self-interested way, macroscopic
behavior can be interpreted as game dynamics. Application to several familiar,
explicit game interactions shows that the adaptation dynamics exhibits a
diversity of collective behaviors. The simplicity of the assumptions underlying
the macroscopic equations suggests that these behaviors should be expected
broadly in collective adaptation. We also analyze the adaptation dynamics from
an information-theoretic viewpoint and discuss self-organization induced by
information flux between agents, giving a novel view of collective adaptation.Comment: 22 pages, 23 figures; updated references, corrected typos, changed
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The Role of Proactive Adaptation in International Climate Change Mitigation Agreements
This paper investigates the role of proactive adaptation in international mitigation coalition formation. Adaptation is introduced into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. We analytically derive the optimal level of mitigation and proactive adaptation for the singletons and coalition members. We introduce the AD-STACO model which is constructed based on the STACO model, which is an applied three-stage cartel formation model with 12 heterogenous regions
Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive,
as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and
theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in
oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size
populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies
are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize
replicator dynamics with players that have different adaptation rates. We show
analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses
the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing
strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often
relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such
situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different
strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others
without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When
not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow
adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player.Comment: 4 figure
Game Theory Models for the Verification of the Collective Behaviour of Autonomous Cars
The collective of autonomous cars is expected to generate almost optimal
traffic. In this position paper we discuss the multi-agent models and the
verification results of the collective behaviour of autonomous cars. We argue
that non-cooperative autonomous adaptation cannot guarantee optimal behaviour.
The conjecture is that intention aware adaptation with a constraint on
simultaneous decision making has the potential to avoid unwanted behaviour. The
online routing game model is expected to be the basis to formally prove this
conjecture.Comment: In Proceedings FVAV 2017, arXiv:1709.0212
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