Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete

In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we show that the problem of deciding what move (set of rules) to play at each turn is an NP-complete problem

On the Road of Good Intentions: Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses

Associate Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan took the oath of office on October 16, 1956. At the time of Justice Brennan’s appointment to the Supreme Court, the Court had decided only a few cases involving the religion clauses of the first amendment, and judicial interpretation of the religion clauses had been sparing. In the thirty-four years of Justice Brennan’s tenure, the Court worked several revolutions in religion clause jurisprudence—revolutions guided by a sense of the needs of a changing society. Justice Brennan was one of several architects of a new order in establishment clause interpretation, and was the architect in reframing the constitutional view of the free exercise clause. In particular, the all-embracing interpretation of the establishment clause eventually was a catalyst used by a revisionist Supreme Court in 1990 to complete a revolution in free exercise jurisprudence. However, that revolution returned the legal interpretation of the free exercise of religion to an older order of things, and the middle level of generality used to evaluate establishment clause claims neither fostered the higher level goals of the Court nor created a specific understanding for governmental officials to guide their conduct. In other words, the good intentions by which the Supreme Court, including Justice Brennan, decided religion clause cases for much of the period between 1956 and 1990 have led to suspicion, misunderstanding, and confusion, not enlightenment, tolerance, and respect. So while Justice Brennan’s religion clause opinions were calculated to work a revolution in the sense of creating a new order, ultimately, this revolution sowed the seeds of a return to an older order. This revolution, which created Court-based protection for religious belief from legislative interference, appears destined to revolve into a situation in which religious belief is protected only through limited forms of legislative grace

“I think that’s what he’s doing”: effects of intentional reasoning on second language (L2) speech performance

This study advances our understanding of the effects of task design on task complexity and second language (L2) performance. The research reported here focused on examining the impact of degree of intentional reasoning, operationalised at two levels of task content and task instructions, on language performance and perceptions of task difficulty. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study drew on quantitative and qualitative data collected from 20 Jordanian L2 learners performing video-based oral narratives and completing retrospective questionnaires. The results suggest that intentional reasoning has a noticeable effect in generating more syntactically complex and accurate language, and also influences perceptions of task difficulty. However, a higher intentional reasoning demand is associated with less lexical diversity and inconsistent patterns of fluency. An important finding of the study is that the link between the cognitive demands and the language used to convey intentional reasoning should be carefully considered when selecting analytic measures of complexity and accuracy

Idiolectal error

A linguistic theory is correct exactly to the extent that it is the explicit statement of a body of knowledge possessed by a designated language-user. This popular psychological conception of the goal of linguistic theorizing is commonly paired with a preference for idiolectal over social languages, where it seems to be in the nature of idiolects that the beliefs one holds about one's own are ipso facto correct. Unfortunately, it is also plausible that the correctness of a genuine belief cannot consist merely in that belief's being held. This paper considers how best to eliminate this tension

The Ethos of the International Court of Justice Is Dependent Upon the Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse

This Comment argues that the Court\u27s practice of unofficially applying precedent, contrary to actual statutory authority, negatively impacts the Court\u27s authority. Specifically, the absence of an official doctrine of stare decisis diminishes the Court\u27s ethos and the rhetorical clout imputed to the Court\u27s decisions. 28 Part I discusses the Court\u27s character in providing states with a consistent, statutorily authorized rhetoric to refer to in their compromissory interactions, the Court\u27s acknowledgment of the written rules, and its subsequent use of precedent. Part I also examines the past under-utilization of the ICJ to settle treaty disputes, and the recent increasing trend in states\u27 reliance on the ICJ as the potential interpreter of treaties. Part II analyzes the ICJ\u27s statutory authority, and their interpretations and practices regarding that authority. Part III argues that without binding the Court statutorily the effect of precedent on later decisions of the ICJ undermines the rhetoric of the Court, thereby undermining the ethos, or authoritativeness, of the Court to decide conflicts between disputing states. Part III also argues that if the authoritativeness of the Court\u27s rhetoric is questionable, the increased reliance on the ICJ as the adjudicator of potential treaty disputes could be reversed, causing a return to under-utilization of the Court. Part III further argues that in order to prevent a return to under-utilization of the Court, the written statute that defines the Court should reflect the Court\u27s practices. This Comment concludes that binding the Court to its past decisions by amending the ICJ statute would increase the ICJ\u27s rhetorical ethos, thus adding more precedential weight to the Court\u27s decisions and authoritative use of its service