On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games

We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and partial indifference to other agents' identities as in anonymous games, which occur in many natural settings. This is achieved by specifying a graph on the set of actions, so that the payoff of an agent for selecting a strategy depends only on the number of agents playing each of the neighboring strategies in the action graph. We present a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for computing mixed Nash equilibria of AGGs with constant treewidth and a constant number of agent types (and an arbitrary number of strategies), together with hardness results for the cases when either the treewidth or the number of agent types is unconstrained. In particular, we show that even if the action graph is a tree, but the number of agent-types is unconstrained, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and PPAD-complete to compute a mixed Nash equilibrium (even an approximate one); similarly for symmetric AGGs (all agents belong to a single type), if we allow arbitrary treewidth. These hardness results suggest that, in some sense, our PTAS is as strong of a positive result as one can expect

On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games

We study the existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria in two-person perfect information games. There is a state space X and each period player's possible actions are a subset of X. This set of feasible actions depends on the current state, which is determined by the choice of the other player in the previous period. We assume that X is a compact Hausdorff space and that the action correspondence has an acyclic and asymmetric graph. For some states there may be no feasible actions and then the game ends. Payoffs are either discounted sums of utilities of the states visited, or the utility of the state where the game ends. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium e.g. in case when either feasible action sets are finite or when players' payoffs are continuously dependent on each other. The latter class of games includes zero-sum games and pure coordination games.dynamic games, Markov perfect equilibrium

Timed Parity Games: Complexity and Robustness

We consider two-player games played in real time on game structures with clocks where the objectives of players are described using parity conditions. The games are \emph{concurrent} in that at each turn, both players independently propose a time delay and an action, and the action with the shorter delay is chosen. To prevent a player from winning by blocking time, we restrict each player to play strategies that ensure that the player cannot be responsible for causing a zeno run. First, we present an efficient reduction of these games to \emph{turn-based} (i.e., not concurrent) \emph{finite-state} (i.e., untimed) parity games. Our reduction improves the best known complexity for solving timed parity games. Moreover, the rich class of algorithms for classical parity games can now be applied to timed parity games. The states of the resulting game are based on clock regions of the original game, and the state space of the finite game is linear in the size of the region graph. Second, we consider two restricted classes of strategies for the player that represents the controller in a real-time synthesis problem, namely, \emph{limit-robust} and \emph{bounded-robust} winning strategies. Using a limit-robust winning strategy, the controller cannot choose an exact real-valued time delay but must allow for some nonzero jitter in each of its actions. If there is a given lower bound on the jitter, then the strategy is bounded-robust winning. We show that exact strategies are more powerful than limit-robust strategies, which are more powerful than bounded-robust winning strategies for any bound. For both kinds of robust strategies, we present efficient reductions to standard timed automaton games. These reductions provide algorithms for the synthesis of robust real-time controllers

Potential games in volatile environments

This papers studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potential games. Action revision, link creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this process in closed form, as well as the marginal distribution over action profiles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomogeneous random graph. Furthermore, a characterization of the set of stochastically stable states is provided, generalizing existing results to models with endogenous interaction structures.

Hypergraph conditions for the solvability of the ergodic equation for zero-sum games

The ergodic equation is a basic tool in the study of mean-payoff stochastic games. Its solvability entails that the mean payoff is independent of the initial state. Moreover, optimal stationary strategies are readily obtained from its solution. In this paper, we give a general sufficient condition for the solvability of the ergodic equation, for a game with finite state space but arbitrary action spaces. This condition involves a pair of directed hypergraphs depending only on the ``growth at infinity'' of the Shapley operator of the game. This refines a recent result of the authors which only applied to games with bounded payments, as well as earlier nonlinear fixed point results for order preserving maps, involving graph conditions.Comment: 6 pages, 1 figure, to appear in Proc. 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2015

On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths

We study computational problems arising from the iterated removal of weakly dominated actions in anonymous games. Our main result shows that it is NP-complete to decide whether an anonymous game with three actions can be solved via iterated weak dominance. The two-action case can be reformulated as a natural elimination problem on a matrix, the complexity of which turns out to be surprisingly difficult to characterize and ultimately remains open. We however establish connections to a matching problem along paths in a directed graph, which is computationally hard in general but can also be used to identify tractable cases of matrix elimination. We finally identify different classes of anonymous games where iterated dominance is in P and NP-complete, respectively.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS