The Final Determination Clause: Defense to Employee Section 301(a) Suits

In LMRA section 301(a) suits by individual employees, the courts have primarily focused upon the presence or absence of contractual arbitration clauses in deciding whether or not to dispose of these actions on a motion for summary judgment. Frequently, however, labor contracts also include final determination clauses, the intended effect of which is to restrict the employee to the grievance procedure exclusively for resolution of his complaint. By analyzing open-end grievance procedures, which have no provision for arbitration but which often contain final determination clauses, this comment seeks to determine ultimate legal consequences of such clauses and to ascertain whether or not the results are consistent with federal labor policy

New Light through Old Windows:Restraint of Trade in English, Scottish, and Australian Employment Laws - Emerging and Enduring Issues

The nature of the study to be pursued in this article concerns the extent to which the common law systems of England and Australia contain principles or rules designed to impinge on an employer's freedom of contract or legitimate trading interests in order to promote the ability of an employee to trade, work freely, and enjoy the benefits of his/her labour and innovations. This will entail spelling out the principal elements of both the English and Australian concepts and outlining the differences between them in light of new problems that have emerged as a result of recent developments in economic and social conditions

Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy

There is an important sense in which our Constitution\u27s structure is not what it appears to be--a set of activities or functions or geographies, the \u27judicial or the executive or the legislative power, the truly local and the truly national. Indeed, it is only if we put these notions to the side that we can come to grips with the importance of the generative provisions of the Constitution: the provisions that actually create our federal government; that bind citizens, through voting, to a House of Representatives, to a Senate, to a President, and even, indirectly, to a Supreme Court. In this article, the author contends that the deep structure of the Constitution is not a set of functions or geographies, but rather a political economy of relations between the governed and the governing. Based on standard assumptions common in institutional economics, she argues that these relations create incentives that can help us predict real (rather than simply theoretical) risks to structural change in actual cases involving both the separation of powers and federalism. By considering the risk from shifting relations not to activity-description but instead to majorities and minorities, we may come closer to understanding real risks to shifting power, from states to nation and from one national department to another. To this end, against the backdrop of constitutional law, the author brings to bear the converging meanings of history, political science, and lost constitutional text, all of which reveal that the canonical view of our Constitution is quite partial to courts and provides an incomplete picture of our Constitution as a whole

What drives contract design in strategic alliances? Taking stock and how to proceed

We collect and assess prior empirical evidence on contract design in alliances that has been published since Parkhe’s (1993) seminal study on inter-firm contracts. We elaborate on the effects of transaction-related factors, experience gained from prior relationships, and deliberate learning efforts on contracts. Our paper offers three contributions. First, we systematically review the existing literature on alliance contracts and summarize our findings. Second, while prior research has traditionally focused on contractual complexity, we place the content of contracts center stage and identify three contractual functions. While existing studies on contractual functions predominantly refer to safeguarding as a response to appropriation concerns, we also consider coordination and contingency adaptability as outcomes of adaptation concerns. Third, we disentangle the differential influences of previous experiences on distinct contractual functions and show that experience gained from prior relationships has different effects on safeguarding and contingency adaptability than on coordination. Overall, we add to the systematization of the current debate on alliance contract design and trace promising avenues for future research on the impact of transaction- and experience-related factors on the complexity and content of alliance contracts

Contract Formation through Preemptive Normative Conflict Resolution

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The Boolean SATisfiability Problem and the orthogonal group O(n)O(n)

We explore the relations between the Boolean Satisfiability Problem with $n$ literals and the orthogonal group $O(n)$ and show that all solutions lie in the compact and disconnected real manifold of dimension $n (n-1)/2$ of this group.Comment: 11 pages, no figures, 6 reference