Static Enforcement of Role-Based Access Control

We propose a new static approach to Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policy enforcement. The static approach we advocate includes a new design methodology, for applications involving RBAC, which integrates the security requirements into the system's architecture. We apply this new approach to policies restricting calls to methods in Java applications. We present a language to express RBAC policies on calls to methods in Java, a set of design patterns which Java programs must adhere to for the policy to be enforced statically, and a description of the checks made by our static verifier for static enforcement.Comment: In Proceedings WWV 2014, arXiv:1409.229

A Web-Based Tool for Analysing Normative Documents in English

Our goal is to use formal methods to analyse normative documents written in English, such as privacy policies and service-level agreements. This requires the combination of a number of different elements, including information extraction from natural language, formal languages for model representation, and an interface for property specification and verification. We have worked on a collection of components for this task: a natural language extraction tool, a suitable formalism for representing such documents, an interface for building models in this formalism, and methods for answering queries asked of a given model. In this work, each of these concerns is brought together in a web-based tool, providing a single interface for analysing normative texts in English. Through the use of a running example, we describe each component and demonstrate the workflow established by our tool

IEEE Standard 1500 Compliance Verification for Embedded Cores

Core-based design and reuse are the two key elements for an efficient system-on-chip (SoC) development. Unfortunately, they also introduce new challenges in SoC testing, such as core test reuse and the need of a common test infrastructure working with cores originating from different vendors. The IEEE 1500 Standard for Embedded Core Testing addresses these issues by proposing a flexible hardware test wrapper architecture for embedded cores, together with a core test language (CTL) used to describe the implemented wrapper functionalities. Several intellectual property providers have already announced IEEE Standard 1500 compliance in both existing and future design blocks. In this paper, we address the problem of guaranteeing the compliance of a wrapper architecture and its CTL description to the IEEE Standard 1500. This step is mandatory to fully trust the wrapper functionalities in applying the test sequences to the core. We present a systematic methodology to build a verification framework for IEEE Standard 1500 compliant cores, allowing core providers and/or integrators to verify the compliance of their products (sold or purchased) to the standar

Security Policy Consistency

With the advent of wide security platforms able to express simultaneously all the policies comprising an organization's global security policy, the problem of inconsistencies within security policies become harder and more relevant. We have defined a tool based on the CHR language which is able to detect several types of inconsistencies within and between security policies and other specifications, namely workflow specifications. Although the problem of security conflicts has been addressed by several authors, to our knowledge none has addressed the general problem of security inconsistencies, on its several definitions and target specifications.Comment: To appear in the first CL2000 workshop on Rule-Based Constraint Reasoning and Programmin

Concurrently Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge in the Authenticated Public-Key Model

We consider a type of zero-knowledge protocols that are of interest for their practical applications within networks like the Internet: efficient zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge that remain secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks. In an effort to reduce the setup assumptions required for efficient zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge that remain secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks, we consider a model, which we call the Authenticated Public-Key (APK) model. The APK model seems to significantly reduce the setup assumptions made by the CRS model (as no trusted party or honest execution of a centralized algorithm are required), and can be seen as a slightly stronger variation of the Bare Public-Key (BPK) model from \cite{CGGM,MR}, and a weaker variation of the registered public-key model used in \cite{BCNP}. We then define and study man-in-the-middle attacks in the APK model. Our main result is a constant-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for any polynomial-time relation (associated to a language in $\mathcal{NP}$), under the (minimal) assumption of the existence of a one-way function family. Furthermore,We show time-efficient instantiations of our protocol based on known number-theoretic assumptions. We also note a negative result with respect to further reducing the setup assumptions of our protocol to those in the (unauthenticated) BPK model, by showing that concurrently non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge in the BPK model are only possible for trivial languages