Multiwinner Voting with Fairness Constraints

Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting a committee), or specified types such as political leaning (when selecting a subset of news items), an algorithm that chooses a subset by optimizing a multiwinner voting rule may be unbalanced in its selection -- it may under or over represent a particular gender or political orientation in the examples above. We introduce an algorithmic framework for multiwinner voting problems when there is an additional requirement that the selected subset should be "fair" with respect to a given set of attributes. Our framework provides the flexibility to (1) specify fairness with respect to multiple, non-disjoint attributes (e.g., ethnicity and gender) and (2) specify a score function. We study the computational complexity of this constrained multiwinner voting problem for monotone and submodular score functions and present several approximation algorithms and matching hardness of approximation results for various attribute group structure and types of score functions. We also present simulations that suggest that adding fairness constraints may not affect the scores significantly when compared to the unconstrained case.Comment: The conference version of this paper appears in IJCAI-ECAI 201

Effects of cumpulsory voting on visible minority representation

This thesis examines the effects of compulsory voting on visible minority representation in directly elected legislatures with proportional electoral systems. The hypothesis is that there compulsory voting creates a positive effect on visible minority representation. The results show that this is true, but the margin is so small that it is likely other factors have large amounts of influence as well. Some of these factors are discussed

Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee

Identifying the underlying structure and dynamic interactions in a voting network

We analyse the structure and behaviour of a specific voting network using a dynamic structure-based methodology which draws on Q-Analysis and social network theory. Our empirical focus is on the Eurovision Song Contest over a period of 20 years. For a multicultural contest of this kind, one of the key questions is how the quality of a song is judged and how voting groups emerge. We investigate structures that may identify the winner based purely on the topology of the network. This provides a basic framework to identify what the characteristics associated with becoming a winner are, and may help to establish a homogenous criterion for subjective measures such as quality. Further, we measure the importance of voting cliques, and present a dynamic model based on a changing multidimensional measure of connectivity in order to reveal the formation of emerging community structure within the contest. Finally, we study the dynamic behaviour exhibited by the network in order to understand the clustering of voting preferences and the relationship between local and global properties.Comment: 20 pages, 10 figures, 3 tables, submitted to Physica