The declining representativeness of the British party system, and why it matters

In a recent article, Michael Laver has explained ‘Why Vote-Seeking Parties May Make Voters Miserable’. His model shows that, while ideological convergence may boost congruence between governments and the median voter, it can reduce congruence between the party system and the electorate as a whole. Specifically, convergence can increase the mean distance between voters and their nearest party. In this article we show that this captures the reality of today’s British party system. Policy scale placements in British Election Studies from 1987 to 2010 confirm that the pronounced convergence during the past decade has left the Conservatives and Labour closer together than would be optimal in terms of minimising the policy distance between the average voter and the nearest major party. We go on to demonstrate that this comes at a cost. Respondents who perceive themselves as further away from one of the major parties in the system tend to score lower on satisfaction with democracy. In short, vote-seeking parties have left the British party system less representative of the ideological diversity in the electorate, and thus made at least some British voters miserable

Proportionally Representative Clustering

In recent years, there has been a surge in effort to formalize notions of fairness in machine learning. We focus on clustering -- one of the fundamental tasks in unsupervised machine learning. We propose a new axiom ``proportional representation fairness'' (PRF) that is designed for clustering problems where the selection of centroids reflects the distribution of data points and how tightly they are clustered together. Our fairness concept is not satisfied by existing fair clustering algorithms. We design efficient algorithms to achieve PRF both for unconstrained and discrete clustering problems. Our algorithm for the unconstrained setting is also the first known polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the well-studied Proportional Fairness (PF) axiom (Chen, Fain, Lyu, and Munagala, ICML, 2019). Our algorithm for the discrete setting also matches the best known approximation factor for PF.Comment: Revised version includes a new author (Jeremy Vollen) and new results: Our algorithm for the unconstrained setting is also the first known polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the well-studied Proportional Fairness (PF) axiom (Chen, Fain, Lyu, and Munagala, ICML, 2019). Our algorithm for the discrete setting also matches the best known approximation factor for P

Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results

We model Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting systems as a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted variants of this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there are no constant-factor approximation algorithms. Yet, we also show cases where good approximation algorithms exist (briefly put, these variants correspond to optimizing total voter satisfaction under Borda scores, within Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems).Comment: 26 pages, 1 figur

Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a India-Wide Randomized Policy Experiment

This paper uses political reservations for women in India to study the impact of women's leadership on policy decisions. In 1998, one third of all leadership positions of Village Councils in West Bengal were randomly selected to be reserved for a woman: in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head. Village Councils are responsible for the provision on many local public good in rural areas. Using a data set we collected on 165 Village Councils, we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved Villages Councils. We show that women invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of rural women (water, fuel, and roads), while men invest more in education. Women are more likely to participate in the policy-making process if the leader of their village council is a woman.

Democracy and government performance: holding incumbents accountable in English local governments

notes: Representative democracy, public management, elections, performance management, political control, incumbents, local governmentpublication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleThe link between government performance and support for incumbents is a key mechanism of accountable government. We model vote share of incumbent administrations in local government as proportional and non-proportional responses to public service performance. We evaluate the models using a panel data set covering performance and elections from 2001 to 2007 in English local governments where an incumbent party or coalition was up for re-election. We control for the previous vote, whether the incumbent administration is of the national governing party and local economic conditions. We find evidence for the non-proportional, performance threshold hypothesis, which implies that voters’ behavior is affected by clear gradations of performance. Only the difference between low performance and at least mediocre performance matters. There is no reward for high performance. Instead our findings suggest negativity bias in the relationship between performance and electoral support for incumbent

America\u27s Electoral Problem: The Shortcomings of the Electoral College in Contemporary American Democracy

Our Constitution mandates the president of the United States be elected through the electoral college, a mechanism originally engineered to be a compromise between a popular vote by qualified citizens and a vote by Congress. The electoral college existed without controversy up until the 21st century because it consistently produced a winning candidate which mirrored the popular vote, our contemporary perception of a democratic voting method. The legitimacy of the electoral college in the 21st century, however, has been called into question after two of the last five presidents have failed to win the popular vote. Critics of the institution commonly allege that it is inconsistent with American democratic values because it allows individual votes to hold different weights depending on the voter’s state of origin. In this thesis, I construct a statistical model measuring the voting power of individuals in every state to estimate the levels of inequality between individuals in the current electoral college. I apply my model to every election in American history to understand the longitudinal behavior of inequality within the electoral college, and how it has changed over time. My findings indicate that some of level of inequality between individuals can exist and still be consistent with American democracy. The levels of inequality in today’s current electoral college, however, fall significantly outside the established parameters for acceptable levels of inequality to persist. Based off these findings, I conclude that the electoral college must be abolished, and that we move towards a presidential election method that reconciles state recognition in federal government within the demographic environment of America in the 21st century