Working Paper 65 - Governance in Africa: The Role for Information and Communication Technologies

The information and knowledge age is upon us due to rapid advances ininformation and communication technologies (ICTs). These new technologies arechanging the way we live and work, and they are transforming many aspects ofsocial and economic organization in ways we could have hardly imagined less thantwo decades ago. ICTs offer developing countries formidable and cost-effectivetools for accelerated development. This paper assesses the role that ICTs can playin Africa’s development with special emphasis on governance. The 21st centurychallenges for governance in Africa are reviewed. The paper summarizes the usesof ICTs in governance and discusses possible risks. It also attempts to offer ideasthat should be considered in employing ICTs for governance, and identifies keyareas for intervention by African countries and the African Development Bank. Thepaper stresses the importance of the human factor in realizing good governance,given that ICTs are only tools.

Private military and security companies, territoriality and the transformation of western security governance

The field of security governance holds a special place within the context of the debate over the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors, from national to international authorities and from governments to markets in Western democracies. Not only has the provision of the ‘public good’ security been considered one of the main functions of government, but also has it played a major role in justifying the centralization of power and authority within and by the nation-state (Krahmann, 2010; Leander 2006). The contemporary proliferation of private military and security companies, i.e. companies that sell armed and non-armed security services to public and private customers, poses a particular challenge to state-centric notions of national and global governance. This chapter seeks to examine the consequences of the diffusion of security governance functions among military and security companies in Europe and North America

Governance matters IV : governance indicators for 1996-2004

The authors present the latest update of their aggregate governance indicators, together with new analysis of several issues related to the use of these measures. The governance indicators measure the following six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political instability and violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. They cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 organizations. The authors present estimates of the six dimensions of governance for each period, as well as margins of error capturing the range of likely values for each country. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, the authors give examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure. The authors also analyze in detail changes over time in their estimates of governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant changes in country governance over time. The ability to identify significant changes in governance over time is much higher for aggregate indicators than for any individual indicator. While the authors find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has changed significantly (in both directions), they also provide evidence suggesting that there are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance. Finally, they interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low-income countries.Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance,National Governance,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Governance Indicators

Reforming the investment climate : lessons for practitioners

Most people agree that a good investment climate is essential for growth and poverty reduction. Less clear is how to achieve it. Many reforms are complex, involving more than technical design and content. They are both political, facing opposition from organized and powerful groups-and institutionally demanding, cutting across different departments and levels of government. Reform thus requires paying as much attention to understanding the politics and institutional dimensions as to policy substance, which is the goal of this paper. Drawing from more than 25 case studies, it shows that there is no single recipe or"manual"for reform, given diverse contexts and serendipity in any reform effort. But three broad lessons emerge. The first is to recognize and seize opportunities for reform. Crisis and new governments are important catalysts, but so is the competition generated by trade integration and new benchmarking information. The second is to invest early in the politics of reform. Central to this process is using education and persuasion strategies to gain wider acceptance and neutralize opponents. Pilot programs can be valuable for demonstrating the benefits and feasibility of change. And the third is to pay greater attention to implementation and monitoring. This does not require full scale public management reforms. Reformers can draw on private sector change management techniques to revitalize public institutions responsible for implementation. Given the cross-cutting nature of reform, new oversight mechanisms may be needed to monitor and sustain reform. The paper concludes with an emerging checklist for reformers and identifies areas for future work.Enterprise Development&Reform,Children and Youth,Economic Theory&Research,Population Policies,Markets and Market Access

Globalization and Democratic Governance in Africa: An Assessment

There is an established linked of a mutually reinforcing kind between globalization and democracy. This interdependence is desirable for both movements that have driven the dynamics of experimentation with globalization that has inevitably spurred democratization in Africa since the 1980s. Globalization has reached its climax in the 21st century dating back to the industrial revolution; that accelerated the economic typology of global economic integration. Towards the end of the 19th Century, economic globalization gained speed and with the collapse of the former Soviet Union as consequences of perestroika and glasnost, globalization then spurred political reforms in favour of democracy. Between globalization and democracy is a complex wave of interdependence. At the behest of political reforms as an integral part of structural reforms of the 1990s, they impacted significantly on institutions and economic restructuring has also impacted the rule of law and respect for human rights (Mubangizi 2010). The intensification of integration of world economies as exemplified by free trade, massive movement of finance capital and interactions facilitated by technology is the process of globalization. These specific processes create a global market by intensifying competition. These have economic, social, technological and political components (Stiglitz, 2002) Brysk, 2002; Mubangizi, 2010). Globalization has in all its ramifications raised complexities and contradictions in its wake but especially for democracy in Africa. The democratic resurgence of the 1980s was couched to eliminate authoritarian rule in Africa which appeared in the form of one party system or military rule. In the 80s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa were straddled on the authoritarian continuum of military dictatorship or one party rule with the characteristic violation of human rights, lack of respect for the rule of law and arbitrariness in governance that was widespread due to lack of accountability and transparency. The democratization process spurred by globalization was designed to enthrone democracy as a system of rule in which political leaders or representative of the people would be chosen by the electorates, and in that contractual engagement would be accountable and responsive to the needs, interests and wishes of the people. Democracy entails on the minimum respect for rights of the people and the guarantee of equal opportunities for majority of the people (Mubangizi 2010, p.4). This broad conception of democracy reflects Huntington’s conservative and minimalist approach that it is a political system that “its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely complete for votes, and in which virtually all adult population is eligible to vote” (1991, p.40). Due to population dynamics and the complex nature of modern life, it is no longer possible for all adult citizens of a country to vote. But beyond this limitation, contemporary liberal democracy still resonate the antiquitic flare that it is built on an egalitarian idea of ruling and being ruled in turn (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999). Schmitter and Karl (1991, p.247) conceptualizes democracy in this characteristic framework of ruler-ruled relationship thus

University strategic planning in Cameroon: what lessons for sub-Saharan Africa?

This article argues that the global, regional, and local realities can complement rather than contradict each other in the process of strategic planning for universities in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Using the case of the University of Buea in Cameroon, it attempts to use the global trends of polarisation in knowledge production capacity as an input or tool for identifying strategic choice in the process of strategic planning in institutions. The national policy background is used to highlight the context and inherent role of the central government in the process of institutional strategic planning

Governance matters V: aggregate and individual governance indicators for 1996 - 2005

The authors report on the latest version of the worldwide governance indicators, covering 213 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance from 1996 until end-2005: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The latest indicators are based on hundreds of variables and reflect the views of thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents and experts worldwide. Although global averages of governance display no marked trends during 1996-2005, nearly one-third of countries exhibit significant changes [for better or for worse]on at least one dimension of governance. Three new features distinguish this update. (1) The authors have moved to annual reporting of governance estimates. This update includes new governance estimates for 2003 and 2005, as well as minor backward revisions to biannual historical data for 1996-2004. (2) The authors are, for the first time, publishing the individual measures of governance from virtually every data source underlying the aggregate governance indicators. The ready availability of the individual data sources underlying the aggregate governance indicators is aimed at further enhancing the transparency of the methodology and of the resulting aggregate indicators, as well as helping data users and policymakers identify specific governance challenges in individual countries. (3) The authors present new evidence on the reliability of expert assessments of governance which, alongside survey responses, form part of the aggregate measures of governance.Governance Indicators,National Governance,Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Scientific Research&Science Parks

Global Governance Initiative Annual Report 2005

This is an annual report of the WEF

Toward a Theory of Reciprocal Responsibility Between Clients and Lawyers: A Comment on David Wilkins’ \u3ci\u3eDo Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity Wars\u3c/i\u3e

On my plane flight to attend the American Association of Law Schools meeting at which Professor David Wilkins presented his paper, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons From the Diversity Wars, the pilot requested passengers to assist the flight attendants in their principal duty of providing safety to all passengers, following a recent incident with mid-flight turbulence in which one person died and several were injured. The pilot reminded us that service was only a secondary function of the flight attendants, with their principal duty being to ensure that all of us traveled and arrived safely, and that we should assist the flight attendants (not just cooperate with them) in this effort. Aha!, I thought, our culture is moving to a recognition of reciprocal responsibilities between providers and recipients of service, and that is what Professor Wilkins\u27 paper is about. It is also about the familiar recognition that ethical responsibilities are often complex and contradictory, with multiple sources of law and ethics guiding choices and behavior