Acceptance and Use of the \u27Digital Measures\u27 System in an Organized Anarchy

The literature reveals that researchers have examined the adoption of different types of systems, both voluntary and mandatory, by different groups of individuals affiliated with different types of organizations. Adoption studies may exhibit the following characteristics: a) the research participants are drawn from multiple levels of the organization’s hierarchy, and b) the research participants attach similar interpretations regarding the adoption of the information system. It is not inconceivable that individuals within the same group attach different interpretations of voluntariness to the same information system. This may be applicable in Colleges and Universities in which faculty, in particular, comprise an “organized anarchy”. Taking the case of “Activity Insight”, a commercially-available software product (hereafter referred to as Digital Measures) meant for employees in colleges and universities to report their activities. This study provides a scenario for research on whether interpretations regarding voluntariness may result in findings that stray from the norm

What is Meant by Freedom?

In 1955, in a neglected article in the Harvard Law Review entitled Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, Lon L. Fuller provided a framework for the basic definition of freedom. More importantly, he tendered a question about the conditions of a free society: “How can the freedom of human beings be affected or advanced by social arrangements, that is, by laws, customs, institutions, or other forms of social order that can be changed or preserved by purposive human actions?” This is the critical question this Article addresses through constructing a comprehensive definition by first, considering etymology and then establishing the various modalities in which freedom operates. These modalities include the space defined by the rule of law and various antithetical non-rule-of-law states, the role of democracy and representative government in disparate levels of society, the importance of rights as trumps on power, and the challenges posed by social justice. Finally, Fuller’s question raises the issue of “laws, customs, institutions [and] other forms of social order,” all of which luminaries such as John Stuart Mill saw as unfortunate, but necessary, evils when considering freedom. Rather than necessary evils, this article will consider the productive role ascribed to law and institutions by Scott Shapiro, who views law as a form of social planning that effectuates choices, thus enhancing freedom

Creating a Working Vocabulary of Sovereignty: Language at the International Court of Justice

“What is sovereignty?” If there are questions international legal and political scholars ought to be able to answer, this is certainly one. State sovereignty is arguably the basis of all political and legal international relations. And, yet, what it means remains elusive. As we discuss whether we are witnessing the demise of the Westphalian system, it is critical to understand state sovereignty today. Despite the resurgence in sovereignty scholarship, there has been little empirical work done that combines political and legal theory. This project addresses that gap in the current literature between political science and international legal research by providing an empirical study of how sovereignty is conceptualized in international legal discourse. The theoretical basis for this paper is largely informed by international relations theory of binding states and the variability of sovereignty. The methodological approach is legal case analysis. Because sovereignty is such a slippery concept, the question of how to study it is tricky. This paper will follow Jens Bartelson’s approach and avoid the direct question “what is sovereignty?” and instead ask the question “how do we discuss sovereignty?” The project provides an analysis of advisory opinions and contentious cases before the International Court of Justice over the last fifteen years. The results of the research contribute to a general understanding of contemporary sovereignty in two main ways: Firstly, the study provides a framework of “ideal types” which suggests that contemporary notions of sovereignty fall into three main categories: (1) as the final and supreme power of the state requiring no justification (“The Prince”), (2) as a supreme power justified by the state’s ability to protect its citizens from both internal and external threats (“The Protector”), and (3) as a privilege granted by citizens of the state and the international community in return for accepting certain norms and fulfilling certain responsibilities (“The Citizen”). Secondly, the paper suggests that with a viable working vocabulary, legal and political scholars can then address questions concerning how the legal discussion of sovereignty interacts with international relations structure

Alternative futures: anarchy, gated communities or global learning

In dem vorliegenden Beitrag werden drei Zukunftsszenarien entwickelt. Zunächst beschreibt der Autor die aktuellen Faktoren, die den allgemeinen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Wandel ausmachen. Es wird dabei besonders auf die Veränderungen seit 1989/91 und nach dem 11. September 2001 eingegangen. Im Anschluss daran werden die Faktoren definiert, die in den nächsten zehn Jahren die wichtigsten globalen Folgen bestimmen werden, nämlich die Stabilitäts- und Kooperationserwartungen. Abschließend werden drei Szenarien entworfen: (1) eine kommende Anarchie; (2) gated communities und (3) globales Lernen. Diese drei Szenarien werden für verschiedene Fälle entwickelt: für Kapitalströme, Energieströme und Content Flows; für die regionalen Blöcke USA, russische Föderation, Europäische Union, und China; für regionale Konflikte und strukturelle Probleme. (ICD

Waging Wars in Cyberspace: How International Law On Aggression And Self-Defense Falls Short Of Addressing Cyber Warfare. Could Iran Legally Retaliate For The Stuxnet Attack?

The technical capabilities of the Stuxnet worms-launched by the US and Israel against Iran\u27s nuclear facility-prove that the operation could be considered an act of aggression, as defined in the Rome Statute. Further, this paper asserts that Article 51 of the UN Charter is insufficient to addressing malignant cyber operations. The paper is organized as following: 1) Introduction, 2) Research Limitations, 3) Context: International Relations Theory and Types of International Law, 4) Understanding “Cyber” Within The Scope Of This Paper, 5) The Stuxnet Operation, 6) Historical and Legal Roots of “Aggression” and “Self-Defense”, 7) Stuxnet as an act of aggression, 8) Why Iran Cannot Legally Retaliate, 9) Conclusion, 10) Bibliography. I draw my analysis from ICJ cases, the UN Charter and other foundational documents, technical analyses of the Stuxnet operation, and other historical and political books and articles