Novel Contract Signature based on Key Exchange

A contract signature is a particular form of digital multi-signature that only involves two signers. Contract signing plays a critical role in any business transaction, particularly in situations where the involved parties do not trust each other. One of the most significant concerns in exchange signatures is the fraudulent and unfair exchange, which occurs when one party gets the signature of another party without giving his own signature. In the view of these security concerns, this thesis presents a secure and fair contract signature scheme based on key exchange protocol. The security and protection of the proposed scheme is based on solving hard computational assumptions such as discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The proposed protocol is abuse-free. The proposed scheme targets to have lesser computational overhead and high-security features than existing scheme[1]. The proposed scheme has wide application in real life scenarios, such as in electronic cash system

Fair and optimistic quantum contract signing

We present a fair and optimistic quantum contract signing protocol between two clients that requires no communication with the third trusted party during the exchange phase. We discuss its fairness and show that it is possible to design such a protocol for which the probability of a dishonest client to cheat becomes negligible, and scales as N^{-1/2}, where N is the number of messages exchanged between the clients. Our protocol is not based on the exchange of signed messages: its fairness is based on the laws of quantum mechanics. Thus, it is abuse-free, and the clients do not have to generate new keys for each message during the Exchange phase. We discuss a real-life scenario when the measurement errors and qubit state corruption due to noisy channels occur and argue that for real, good enough measurement apparatus and transmission channels, our protocol would still be fair. Our protocol could be implemented by today's technology, as it requires in essence the same type of apparatus as the one needed for BB84 cryptographic protocol. Finally, we briefly discuss two alternative versions of the protocol, one that uses only two states (based on B92 protocol) and the other that uses entangled pairs, and show that it is possible to generalize our protocol to an arbitrary number of clients.Comment: 11 pages, 2 figure

Organizing High Tech: Unions & Their Future

[Excerpt] Statistics compiled by the American Electronics Association—a leading defender of high tech\u27s union-free environment\u27—indicate the difficulty unions have had organizing electronics workers. The AEA surveyed almost 1,200 firms about union activity in their plants between 1971 and 1982. They reported fewer than 100 NLRB representation elections during that period, with unions winning only 21. These figures understate labor\u27s problem. Through a sophisticated mixture of paternalism and repression, the high tech industry has prevented the vast majority of employee organizing efforts from reaching the stage of a Labor Board election. As a result, the AEA\u27s 1900 member companies have only 90 union contracts. In this article, we will examine the job problems facing high tech workers, the factors inhibiting union organizing in their industry, the experiences of some recent high tech campaigns, and strategies for overcoming the obstacles to worker self-organization in this crucial sector of the U.S. economy

Music Aggregators and Intermediation of the Digital Music Market

This article demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, the advent of the Internet has not made intermediaries in the music market obsolete. Individual artists and independent record labels who want to sell their music in digital music stores must deliver their records via third-party companies called music aggregators. Drawing on the concepts of new institutional economics, the article demonstrates that the emergence of music aggregators is a market response to the high level of transaction costs and bargaining asymmetry associated with selling digital music online. The conclusion suggests that the major music conglomerates may seek ownership links with music aggregators, leading to the emergence of vertically integrated companies, which may have profound consequences for cultural markets