A model of the emergence and evolution of integrated worldviews

It \ud is proposed that the ability of humans to flourish in diverse \ud environments and evolve complex cultures reflects the following two \ud underlying cognitive transitions. The transition from the \ud coarse-grained associative memory of Homo habilis to the \ud fine-grained memory of Homo erectus enabled limited \ud representational redescription of perceptually similar episodes, \ud abstraction, and analytic thought, the last of which is modeled as \ud the formation of states and of lattices of properties and contexts \ud for concepts. The transition to the modern mind of Homo \ud sapiens is proposed to have resulted from onset of the capacity to \ud spontaneously and temporarily shift to an associative mode of thought \ud conducive to interaction amongst seemingly disparate concepts, \ud modeled as the forging of conjunctions resulting in states of \ud entanglement. The fruits of associative thought became ingredients \ud for analytic thought, and vice versa. The ratio of \ud associative pathways to concepts surpassed a percolation threshold \ud resulting in the emergence of a self-modifying, integrated internal \ud model of the world, or worldview

Abstraction and its Limits: Finding Space for Novel Explanation.

Several modern accounts of explanation acknowledge the importance of abstraction and idealization for our explanatory practice. However, once we allow a role for abstraction, questions remain. I ask whether the relation between explanations at different theoretical levels should be thought of wholly in terms of abstraction, and argue that changes of variable between theories can lead to novel explanations that are not merely abstractions of some more detailed picture. I use the example of phase transitions as described by statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to illustrate this, and to demonstrate some details of the relationship between abstraction, idealization, and novel explanation

Whitehead and Pythagoras

While the appeal of scientific materialism has been weakened by developments in theoretical physics, chemistry and biology, Pythagoreanism still attracts the allegiance of leading scientists and mathematicians. It is this doctrine that process philosophers must confront if they are to successfully defend their metaphysics. Peirce, Bergson and Whitehead were acutely aware of the challenge of Pythagoreanism, and attempted to circumvent it. The problem addressed by each of these thinkers was how to account for the success of mathematical physics if the world consists of creative processes. In this paper I critically examine the nature of the challenge posed by Pythagoreanism to process philosophy and examine the efforts by process philosophers, particularly Whitehead, to overcome it, and offer some suggestions for advancing these efforts

Exploration through drawings in the conceptual stages of product design

This paper argues that sequences of exploratory drawings - constructed by designer's movements and decisions - trace systematic and logical paths from ideas to designs. This argument has three parts. First, sequences of exploratory sketches produced by product designers, against the same task specification, are analyzed in terms of the cognitive categories of reinterpretation, emergence and abstraction. Second, a computational model is outlined for the process of exploration through drawing and third the model is applied to elucidate the logic in the sequences of exploratory sketches examined earlier

How we might be able to Understand the Brain

Current methodologies in the neurosciences have difficulty in accounting for complex phenomena such as language, which can however be quite well characterised in phenomenological terms. This paper addresses the issue of unifying the two approaches. We typically understand complicated systems in terms of a collection of models, each characterisable in principle within a formal system, it being possible to explain higher-level properties in terms of lower level ones by means of a series of inferences based on these models. We consider the nervous system to be a mechanism for implementing the demands of an appropriate collection of models, each concerned with some aspect of brain and behaviour, the observer mechanism of Baas playing an important role in matching model and behaviour in this context. The discussion expounds these ideas in detail, showing their potential utility in connection with real problems of brain and behaviour, important areas where the ideas can be applied including the development of higher levels of abstraction, and linguistic behaviour, as described in the works of Karmiloff-Smith and Jackendoff respectively

A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness

A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness addresses the fundamental mechanism that allows physical events to transcend into subjective experiences, termed the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Consciousness is made available as the abstract product of self-referent realization of information by strange loops through the levels of processing of the brain. Readers are introduced to the concept of the Hard Problem of Consciousness and related concepts followed by a critical discourse of different theories of consciousness. Next, the author identifies the fundamental flaw of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and proposes an alternative that avoids the cryptic intelligent design and panpsychism of the IIT. This author also demonstrates how something can be created out of nothing without resorting to quantum theory, while pointing out neurobiological alternatives to the bottom-up approach of quantum theories of consciousness. The book then delves into the philosophy of qualia in different physiological knowledge networks (spatial, temporal and olfactory, cortical signals, for example) to explain an action-based model consistent with the generational principles of Predictive Coding, which maps prediction and predictive-error signals for perceptual representations supporting integrated goal-directed behaviors. Conscious experiences are considered the outcome of abstractions realized out of map overlays and provided by sustained oscillatory activity. The key feature of this blueprint is that it offers a perspective of the Hard Problem of Consciousness from the point of view of the subject; the experience of ‘being the subject’ is predicted to be the realization of inference inversely mapped out of hidden causes of global integrated actions. The author explains the consistencies of his blueprint with ideas of the Global Neuronal Workspace and the Adaptive Resonance Theory of consciousness as well as with the empirical evidence supporting the Integrated Information Theory. A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness offers a unique perspective to readers interested in the scientific philosophy and cognitive neuroscience theory in relation to models of the theory of consciousness

Ecological Economics and Human Ecology

While economic theory has been enormously influential since the eighteenth century, the level of dominance of culture, politics and ethics gained by it in the last few decades is unprecedented. Not only has economic theory taken the place of political philosophy and ethical discourse and imposed its own concepts and image of society on other social sciences, it has redefined the natural sciences through its own categories as nothing but instruments of production, investment in which is to be judged in terms of its profitability. In this chapter I challenge all this, arguing for the primacy of political philosophy inspired by T.H. Green, showing how A.N. Whitehead provided the natural philosophy to defend Green's social liberalism. I then defend ecological economics and human ecology based on assumptions deriving from Whitehead to replace current economic and political doctrines as the basis for formulating public policy