33,320 research outputs found
Explicit Formulas for Repeated Games with Absorbing States
Explicit formulas for the asymptotic value and the asymptotic minmax of finite discounted absorbing games are provided. New simple proofs for the existence of the limits when the players are more and more patient (i.e. when the discount factor goes zero) are given. Similar characterizations for stationary Nash equilibrium payoffs are obtained. The results may be extended to absorbing games with compact action sets and jointly continuous payoff functions.Repeated games, stochastic games, value, minmax, Nash equilibrium
The Role of Opportunistic Punishment in the Evolution of Cooperation: An application of stochastic dynamics to public good game
This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly
to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider
opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public
good game; instead of putting action choice first before punishment, the
commitment of punishment is declared first before choosing the action of each
participant. In this commitment-first setting, punisher may use information
about her team, and may defect to increase her fitness in the team. Reversing
sequence of public good game can induce different behavior of punisher, which
cannot be considered in standard setting where punisher always chooses
cooperation. Based on stochastic dynamics developed by evolutionary economists
and biologists, we show that opportunistic punisher can make cooperation evolve
where cooperative punisher fails. This alternative route for the evolution of
cooperation relies paradoxically on the players' selfishness to profit from
others' unconditional cooperation and defection.Comment: 30 page, 9 figure
Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people are able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to choose their interaction neighborhood. We conduct experiments with medium sized and large groups and show that neighborhood choice indeed leads to coordination on the fully efficient equilibrium, irrespective if group size. This leads to substantial welfare effects. Achieved welfare is between 40 and 60 percent higher in games with neighborhood choice than without neighborhood choice. We identify exclusion as the simple but very effective mechanism underlying this result. In early rounds, high performers exclude low performers who in consequence 'learn' to become high performers.efficient coordination, weakest-link, minimum effort, neighborhood choice, experiment
Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to choose their interaction neighborhood. We conduct experiments with medium sized and large groups and show that neighborhood choice indeed leads to coordination on the fully efficient equilibrium, irrespective of group size. This leads to substantial welfare effects. Achieved welfare is between 40 and 60 percent higher in games with neighborhood choice than without neighborhood choice. We identify exclusion as the simple but very effective mechanism underlying this result. In early rounds, high performers exclude low performers who in consequence ‘learn’ to become high performers.efficient coordination, weakest-link, minimum effort, neighborhood choice, experiment
Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly theinability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. Wehypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they havesufficient freedom to choose their interaction neighborhood. We conduct experiments with mediumsized and large groups and show that neighborhood choice indeed leads to coordination on the fullyefficient equilibrium, irrespective of group size. This leads to substantial welfare effects.Achieved welfare is between 40 and 60 percent higher in games with neighborhood choice thanwithout neighborhood choice. We identify exclusion as the simple but very effective mechanismunderlying this result. In early rounds, high performers exclude low performers who in consequence‘learn’ to become high performers.microeconomics ;
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