22,552 research outputs found
Negation 'presupposition' and metarepresentation: a response to Noel Burton-Roberts
Metalinguistic negation (MN) is interesting for at least the following two reasons: (a) it is one instance of the much broader, very widespread and various phenomenon of metarepresentational use in linguistic communication, whose semantic and pragmatic properties are currently being extensively explored by both linguists and philosophers of language; (b) it plays a central role in recent accounts of presupposition-denial cases, such as ‘The king of France is not bald; there is no king of France’. It is this latter employment that discussion of metalinguistic negation has focused on since Horn (1985)'s key article on the subject. While Burton-Roberts (1989a, 1989b) saw the MN account of presupposition-denials as providing strong support for his semantic theory of presupposition, I have offered a multi-layered pragmatic account of these cases, which also involves MN, but maintains the view that the phenomenon of presupposition is pragmatic (Carston 1994, 1996, 1998a)
Strict and non-strict negative concord in Hungarian: A unified analysis
Surányi (2006) observed that Hungarian has a hybrid (strict + non-strict) negative concord system. This paper proposes a uniform analysis of that system within the general framework of Zeijlstra (2004, 2008) and, especially, Chierchia (2013), with the following new ingredients. Sentential negation NEM is the same full negation in the presence of both strict and non-strict concord items. Preverbal SENKI `n-one’ type negative concord items occupy the specifier position of either NEM `not' or SEM `nor'. The latter, SEM spells out IS `too, even’ in the immediate scope of negation; it is a focus-sensitive head on the clausal spine. SEM can be seen as an overt counterpart of the phonetically null head that Chierchia dubs NEG; it is capable of invoking an abstract (disembodied) negation at the edge of its projection
The positive side of a negative reference: the delay between linguistic processing and common ground
Interlocutors converge on names to refer to entities. For example, a speaker might refer to a novel looking object as the jellyfish and, once identified, the listener will too. The hypothesized mechanism behind such referential precedents is a subject of debate. The common ground view claims that listeners register the object as well as the identity of the speaker who coined the label. The linguistic view claims that, once established, precedents are treated by listeners like any other linguistic unit, i.e. without needing to keep track of the speaker. To test predictions from each account, we used visual-world eyetracking, which allows observations in real time, during a standard referential communication task. Participants had to select objects based on instructions from two speakers. In the critical condition, listeners sought an object with a negative reference such as not the jellyfish. We aimed to determine the extent to which listeners rely on the linguistic input, common ground or both. We found that initial interpretations were based on linguistic processing only and that common ground considerations do emerge but only after 1000 ms. Our findings support the idea that-at least temporally-linguistic processing can be isolated from common ground
Negation, 'presupposition' and the semantics/pragmatics distinction
A cognitive pragmatic approach is taken to some long-standing problem cases of negation, the so-called presupposition denial cases. It is argued that a full account of the processes and levels of representation involved in their interpretation typically requires the sequential pragmatic derivation of two different propositions expressed. The first is one in which the presupposition is preserved and, following the rejection of this, the second involves the echoic (metalinguistic) use of material falling in the scope of the negation. The semantic base for these processes is the standard anti-presuppositionalist wide-scope negation. A different view, developed by Burton-Roberts (1989a, b), takes presupposition to be a semantic relation encoded in natural language and so argues for a negation operator that does not cancel presuppositions. This view is shown to be flawed, in that it makes the false prediction that presupposition denial cases are semantic contradictions and it is based on too narrow a view of the role of pragmatic inferencing
Eligibility and inscrutability
The philosophy of intentionality asks questions such as: in virtue of what
does a sentence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a certain
way? The subquestion I focus upon here concerns the semantic properties
of language: in virtue of what does a name such as ‘London’ refer
to something or a predicate such as ‘is large’ apply to some object?
This essay examines one kind of answer to this “metasemantic”1
question: interpretationism, instances of which have been proposed by
Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and others. I characterize the “twostep”
form common to such approaches and briefl y say how two versions
described by David Lewis fi t this pattern. Then I describe a fundamental
challenge to this approach: a “permutation argument” that contends,
by interpretationist lights, there can be no fact of the matter about lexical
content (e.g., what individual words refer to). Such a thesis cannot be sustained,
so the argument threatens a reductio of interpretationism.
In the second part of the article, I will give what I take to be the
best interpretationist response to the inscrutability paradox: David Lewis’s
appeal to the differential “eligibility” of semantic theories. I contend that,
given an independently plausible formulation of interpretationism, the
eligibility response is an immediate consequence of Lewis’s general analysis
of the theoretical virtue of simplicity.
In the fi nal sections of the article, I examine the limitations of Lewis’s
response. By focusing on an alternative argument for the inscrutability
of reference, I am able to describe conditions under which the eligibility
result will deliver the wrong results. In particular, if the world is complex
enough and our language suffi ciently simple, then reference may
be determinately secured to the wrong things
Correction by contrastive focus
'Correction' is the name of a sentence with contrastive focus' the phonological/phonetic realization of which is a single contrastive pitch accent. These sentences predominantly appear in (fictional) dialogues. The first speaker uses grammatical entities against which the next speaker protests with a sentence nearly identical except that it contains a prosodically marked corrective element. This paper makes contrastive focus visible by means of 'KF' (contrastive focus)
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