Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment

We report results from a weak-link – often also called minimum-effort – game experiment with multiple Pareto-ranked strict pure-strategy Nash equilibria, using a real-effort rather than a chosen-effort task: subjects have to sort and count coins and their payoff depends on the worst performance in the group. While in the initial rounds our subjects typically coordinate on inefficient outcomes, almost 80 percent of the groups are able to overcome coordination failure in the later rounds. Our results are in stark contrast to results typically reported in the literature.real effort, weak-link game, coordination, laboratory experiments.

Applying Grover's algorithm to AES: quantum resource estimates

We present quantum circuits to implement an exhaustive key search for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and analyze the quantum resources required to carry out such an attack. We consider the overall circuit size, the number of qubits, and the circuit depth as measures for the cost of the presented quantum algorithms. Throughout, we focus on Clifford$+T$ gates as the underlying fault-tolerant logical quantum gate set. In particular, for all three variants of AES (key size 128, 192, and 256 bit) that are standardized in FIPS-PUB 197, we establish precise bounds for the number of qubits and the number of elementary logical quantum gates that are needed to implement Grover's quantum algorithm to extract the key from a small number of AES plaintext-ciphertext pairs.Comment: 13 pages, 3 figures, 5 tables; to appear in: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2016

Is green a grey area? Sustainability and inclusivity; the ageing population and recycling

There are growing pressures (political, legislative and environmental) to increase material recovery through recycling. There are two basic recycling schemes in the UK; kerbside and bring-site schemes. With current kerbside schemes, when a householder becomes unable, through age, illness or disability, to physically move their waste containers (bins,boxes or bags) onto the pavement for collection, the refuse collection service provider will enter the property premises, take the containers out to the refuse collection vehicle (RCV), empty them before returning them to the starting point. Obviously, with bring sites, people travel to the site and place the recycling in the banks themselves. With an ageing population, increasing numbers of older people are requiring specialist recycling services. These are likely to become more time consuming and costly as household numbers increase. Bring sites have obvious limitations for older people with their limited mobility and reduce strength. To date little or no previous research has been undertaken about barriers to recycling for older people and the implications to waste management providers of an ageing population. This paper describes initial work beginning to assess this problem within Lab4Living at Sheffield Hallam University (SHU).In this positioning paper, we examine literature regarding barriers to recycling and relationships with age. We outline a hypothetical scenario for the impact of the ageing population on future material recovery rates in the UK, present the initial results of a survey and we describe the potential role that design can play to eliminate these barriers and our activities within this area in our project; ‘The Grey Areas of Green Design’

Stated belief and play in normal form games

Using data on one-shot games, we investigate the assumption that players respond to underlying expectations about their opponent�s behavior. In our laboratory experiments, subjects play a set of 14 two-person 3x3 games, and state first order beliefs about their opponent�s behavior. The sets of responses in the two tasks are largely inconsistent. Rather, we find evidence that the subjects perceive the games differently when they (i) choose actions, and (ii) state beliefs � they appear to pay more attention to the opponent�s incentives when they state beliefs than when they play the games. On average, they fail to best respond to their own stated beliefs in almost half of the games. The inconsistency is confirmed by estimates of a unified statistical model that jointly uses the actions and the belief statements. There, we can control for noise, and formulate a statistical test that rejects consistency. Effects of the belief elicitation procedure on subsequent actions are mostly insignificant