2,124 research outputs found
ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks
While the centralization of SDN brought advantages such as a faster pace of
innovation, it also disrupted some of the natural defenses of traditional
architectures against different threats. The literature on SDN has mostly been
concerned with the functional side, despite some specific works concerning
non-functional properties like 'security' or 'dependability'. Though addressing
the latter in an ad-hoc, piecemeal way, may work, it will most likely lead to
efficiency and effectiveness problems. We claim that the enforcement of
non-functional properties as a pillar of SDN robustness calls for a systemic
approach. As a general concept, we propose ANCHOR, a subsystem architecture
that promotes the logical centralization of non-functional properties. To show
the effectiveness of the concept, we focus on 'security' in this paper: we
identify the current security gaps in SDNs and we populate the architecture
middleware with the appropriate security mechanisms, in a global and consistent
manner. Essential security mechanisms provided by anchor include reliable
entropy and resilient pseudo-random generators, and protocols for secure
registration and association of SDN devices. We claim and justify in the paper
that centralizing such mechanisms is key for their effectiveness, by allowing
us to: define and enforce global policies for those properties; reduce the
complexity of controllers and forwarding devices; ensure higher levels of
robustness for critical services; foster interoperability of the non-functional
property enforcement mechanisms; and promote the security and resilience of the
architecture itself. We discuss design and implementation aspects, and we prove
and evaluate our algorithms and mechanisms, including the formalisation of the
main protocols and the verification of their core security properties using the
Tamarin prover.Comment: 42 pages, 4 figures, 3 tables, 5 algorithms, 139 reference
BlockTag: Design and applications of a tagging system for blockchain analysis
Annotating blockchains with auxiliary data is useful for many applications.
For example, e-crime investigations of illegal Tor hidden services, such as
Silk Road, often involve linking Bitcoin addresses, from which money is sent or
received, to user accounts and related online activities. We present BlockTag,
an open-source tagging system for blockchains that facilitates such tasks. We
describe BlockTag's design and present three analyses that illustrate its
capabilities in the context of privacy research and law enforcement
Measuring, Characterizing, and Detecting Facebook Like Farms
Social networks offer convenient ways to seamlessly reach out to large
audiences. In particular, Facebook pages are increasingly used by businesses,
brands, and organizations to connect with multitudes of users worldwide. As the
number of likes of a page has become a de-facto measure of its popularity and
profitability, an underground market of services artificially inflating page
likes, aka like farms, has emerged alongside Facebook's official targeted
advertising platform. Nonetheless, there is little work that systematically
analyzes Facebook pages' promotion methods. Aiming to fill this gap, we present
a honeypot-based comparative measurement study of page likes garnered via
Facebook advertising and from popular like farms. First, we analyze likes based
on demographic, temporal, and social characteristics, and find that some farms
seem to be operated by bots and do not really try to hide the nature of their
operations, while others follow a stealthier approach, mimicking regular users'
behavior. Next, we look at fraud detection algorithms currently deployed by
Facebook and show that they do not work well to detect stealthy farms which
spread likes over longer timespans and like popular pages to mimic regular
users. To overcome their limitations, we investigate the feasibility of
timeline-based detection of like farm accounts, focusing on characterizing
content generated by Facebook accounts on their timelines as an indicator of
genuine versus fake social activity. We analyze a range of features, grouped
into two main categories: lexical and non-lexical. We find that like farm
accounts tend to re-share content, use fewer words and poorer vocabulary, and
more often generate duplicate comments and likes compared to normal users.
Using relevant lexical and non-lexical features, we build a classifier to
detect like farms accounts that achieves precision higher than 99% and 93%
recall.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS
Continuous Release of Data Streams under both Centralized and Local Differential Privacy
In this paper, we study the problem of publishing a stream of real-valued
data satisfying differential privacy (DP). One major challenge is that the
maximal possible value can be quite large; thus it is necessary to estimate a
threshold so that numbers above it are truncated to reduce the amount of noise
that is required to all the data. The estimation must be done based on the data
in a private fashion. We develop such a method that uses the Exponential
Mechanism with a quality function that approximates well the utility goal while
maintaining a low sensitivity. Given the threshold, we then propose a novel
online hierarchical method and several post-processing techniques.
Building on these ideas, we formalize the steps into a framework for private
publishing of stream data. Our framework consists of three components: a
threshold optimizer that privately estimates the threshold, a perturber that
adds calibrated noises to the stream, and a smoother that improves the result
using post-processing. Within our framework, we design an algorithm satisfying
the more stringent setting of DP called local DP (LDP). To our knowledge, this
is the first LDP algorithm for publishing streaming data. Using four real-world
datasets, we demonstrate that our mechanism outperforms the state-of-the-art by
a factor of 6-10 orders of magnitude in terms of utility (measured by the mean
squared error of answering a random range query)
Online advertising: analysis of privacy threats and protection approaches
Online advertising, the pillar of the “free” content on the Web, has revolutionized the marketing business in recent years by creating a myriad of new opportunities for advertisers to reach potential customers. The current advertising model builds upon an intricate infrastructure composed of a variety of intermediary entities and technologies whose main aim is to deliver personalized ads. For this purpose, a wealth of user data is collected, aggregated, processed and traded behind the scenes at an unprecedented rate. Despite the enormous value of online advertising, however, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of these practices prompt serious privacy concerns. This article surveys the online advertising infrastructure and its supporting technologies, and presents a thorough overview of the underlying privacy risks and the solutions that may mitigate them. We first analyze the threats and potential privacy attackers in this scenario of online advertising. In particular, we examine the main components of the advertising infrastructure in terms of tracking capabilities, data collection, aggregation level and privacy risk, and overview the tracking and data-sharing technologies employed by these components. Then, we conduct a comprehensive survey of the most relevant privacy mechanisms, and classify and compare them on the basis of their privacy guarantees and impact on the Web.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Using Metrics Suites to Improve the Measurement of Privacy in Graphs
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.Social graphs are widely used in research (e.g., epidemiology) and business (e.g., recommender systems). However, sharing these graphs poses privacy risks because they contain sensitive information about individuals. Graph anonymization techniques aim to protect individual users in a graph, while graph de-anonymization aims to re-identify users. The effectiveness of anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms is usually evaluated with privacy metrics. However, it is unclear how strong existing privacy metrics are when they are used in graph privacy. In this paper, we study 26 privacy metrics for graph anonymization and de-anonymization and evaluate their strength in terms of three criteria: monotonicity indicates whether the metric indicates lower privacy for stronger adversaries; for within-scenario comparisons, evenness indicates whether metric values are spread evenly; and for between-scenario comparisons, shared value range indicates whether metrics use a consistent value range across scenarios. Our extensive experiments indicate that no single metric fulfills all three criteria perfectly. We therefore use methods from multi-criteria decision analysis to aggregate multiple metrics in a metrics suite, and we show that these metrics suites improve monotonicity compared to the best individual metric. This important result enables more monotonic, and thus more accurate, evaluations of new graph anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms
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