Multi-keyword multi-click advertisement option contracts for sponsored search

In sponsored search, advertisement (abbreviated ad) slots are usually sold by a search engine to an advertiser through an auction mechanism in which advertisers bid on keywords. In theory, auction mechanisms have many desirable economic properties. However, keyword auctions have a number of limitations including: the uncertainty in payment prices for advertisers; the volatility in the search engine's revenue; and the weak loyalty between advertiser and search engine. In this paper we propose a special ad option that alleviates these problems. In our proposal, an advertiser can purchase an option from a search engine in advance by paying an upfront fee, known as the option price. He then has the right, but no obligation, to purchase among the pre-specified set of keywords at the fixed cost-per-clicks (CPCs) for a specified number of clicks in a specified period of time. The proposed option is closely related to a special exotic option in finance that contains multiple underlying assets (multi-keyword) and is also multi-exercisable (multi-click). This novel structure has many benefits: advertisers can have reduced uncertainty in advertising; the search engine can improve the advertisers' loyalty as well as obtain a stable and increased expected revenue over time. Since the proposed ad option can be implemented in conjunction with the existing keyword auctions, the option price and corresponding fixed CPCs must be set such that there is no arbitrage between the two markets. Option pricing methods are discussed and our experimental results validate the development. Compared to keyword auctions, a search engine can have an increased expected revenue by selling an ad option.Comment: Chen, Bowei and Wang, Jun and Cox, Ingemar J. and Kankanhalli, Mohan S. (2015) Multi-keyword multi-click advertisement option contracts for sponsored search. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, 7 (1). pp. 1-29. ISSN: 2157-690

Crowdsourcing Without a Crowd: Reliable Online Species Identification Using Bayesian Models to Minimize Crowd Size

We present an incremental Bayesian model that resolves key issues of crowd size and data quality for consensus labeling. We evaluate our method using data collected from a real-world citizen science program, BeeWatch, which invites members of the public in the United Kingdom to classify (label) photographs of bumblebees as one of 22 possible species. The biological recording domain poses two key and hitherto unaddressed challenges for consensus models of crowdsourcing: (1) the large number of potential species makes classification difficult, and (2) this is compounded by limited crowd availability, stemming from both the inherent difficulty of the task and the lack of relevant skills among the general public. We demonstrate that consensus labels can be reliably found in such circumstances with very small crowd sizes of around three to five users (i.e., through group sourcing). Our incremental Bayesian model, which minimizes crowd size by re-evaluating the quality of the consensus label following each species identification solicited from the crowd, is competitive with a Bayesian approach that uses a larger but fixed crowd size and outperforms majority voting. These results have important ecological applicability: biological recording programs such as BeeWatch can sustain themselves when resources such as taxonomic experts to confirm identifications by photo submitters are scarce (as is typically the case), and feedback can be provided to submitters in a timely fashion. More generally, our model provides benefits to any crowdsourced consensus labeling task where there is a cost (financial or otherwise) associated with soliciting a label