Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral

Cognitive Radio Networks: Realistic or Not?

A large volume of research has been conducted in the cognitive radio (CR) area the last decade. However, the deployment of a commercial CR network is yet to emerge. A large portion of the existing literature does not build on real world scenarios, hence, neglecting various important interactions of the research with commercial telecommunication networks. For instance, a lot of attention has been paid to spectrum sensing as the front line functionality that needs to be completed in an efficient and accurate manner to enable an opportunistic CR network architecture. This is necessary to detect the existence of spectrum holes without which no other procedure can be fulfilled. However, simply sensing (cooperatively or not) the energy received from a primary transmitter cannot enable correct dynamic spectrum access. For example, the low strength of a primary transmitter's signal does not assure that there will be no interference to a nearby primary receiver. In addition, the presence of a primary transmitter's signal does not mean that CR network users cannot access the spectrum since there might not be any primary receiver in the vicinity. Despite the existing elegant and clever solutions to the DSA problem no robust, implementable scheme has emerged. In this paper, we challenge the basic premises of the proposed schemes. We further argue that addressing the technical challenges we face in deploying robust CR networks can only be achieved if we radically change the way we design their basic functionalities. In support of our argument, we present a set of real-world scenarios, inspired by realistic settings in commercial telecommunications networks, focusing on spectrum sensing as a basic and critical functionality in the deployment of CRs. We use these scenarios to show why existing DSA paradigms are not amenable to realistic deployment in complex wireless environments.Comment: Work in progres

Spectrum sharing security and attacks in CRNs: a review

Cognitive Radio plays a major part in communication technology by resolving the shortage of the spectrum through usage of dynamic spectrum access and artificial intelligence characteristics. The element of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio is a fundament al approach in utilising free channels. Cooperatively communicating cognitive radio devices use the common control channel of the cognitive radio medium access control to achieve spectrum sharing. Thus, the common control channel and consequently spectrum sharing security are vital to ensuring security in the subsequent data communication among cognitive radio nodes. In addition to well known security problems in wireless networks, cognitive radio networks introduce new classes of security threats and challenges, such as licensed user emulation attacks in spectrum sensing and misbehaviours in the common control channel transactions, which degrade the overall network operation and performance. This review paper briefly presents the known threats and attacks in wireless networks before it looks into the concept of cognitive radio and its main functionality. The paper then mainly focuses on spectrum sharing security and its related challenges. Since spectrum sharing is enabled through usage of the common control channel, more attention is paid to the security of the common control channel by looking into its security threats as well as protection and detection mechanisms. Finally, the pros and cons as well as the comparisons of different CR - specific security mechanisms are presented with some open research issues and challenges

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud \ud In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum

Block Outlier Methods for Malicious User Detection in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

Block outlier detection methods, based on Tietjen-Moore (TM) and Shapiro-Wilk (SW) tests, are proposed to detect and suppress spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks by malicious users in cooperative spectrum sensing. First, we consider basic and statistical SSDF attacks, where the malicious users attack independently. Then we propose a new SSDF attack, which involves cooperation among malicious users by masking. In practice, the number of malicious users is unknown. Thus, it is necessary to estimate the number of malicious users, which is found using clustering and largest gap method. However, we show using Monte Carlo simulations that, these methods fail to estimate the exact number of malicious users when they cooperate. To overcome this, we propose a modified largest gap method.Comment: Accepted in Proceedings of 79th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference-Spring (VTC-Spring), May 2014, Seoul, South Kore