Evaluation of traffic assignment models through simulation

Assignment methodologies attempt to determine the traffic flow over each network arc based on its characteristics and the total flow over the entire area. There are several methodologies—some fast and others that are more complex and require more time to complete the calculation. In this study, we evaluated different assignment methodologies using a computer simulation and tested the results in a specific case study. The results showed that the “all-or-nothing” methods and the incremental assignment methods generally yield results with an unacceptable level of error unless the traffic is divided into four or more equal parts. The method of successive averages (MSA) was valid starting from a relatively low number of iterations, while the user equilibrium methodologies (approximated using the Frank and Wolfe algorithm) were valid starting from an even lower number of iterations. These results may be useful to researchers in the field of computer simulation and planners who apply these methodologies in similar cases.Research Contract entitled “Simulación y Análisis de Tráfico dentro del Estudio Informativo de la Autovía Orbital B-40” (Simulation and Traffic Analysis within the Study Report of the B-40 Orbital Highway) between GPYO Innova, S.L. and the University of Burgos (Spain) with reference number W24T06

Toll competition in highway transportation networks

Within a highway transportation network, the social welfare implications of two different groups of agents setting tolls in competition for revenues are studied. The first group comprises private sector toll road operators aiming to maximise revenues. The second group comprises local governments or jurisdictions who may engage in tax exporting. Extending insights from the public economics literature, jurisdictions tax export because when setting tolls to maximise welfare for their electorate, they simultaneously benefit from revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. Hence the tolls levied by both groups will be higher than those intended solely to internalise congestion, which then results in welfare losses. Therefore the overarching question investigated is the extent of welfare losses stemming from such competition for toll revenues. While these groups of agents are separately studied, the interactions between agents in each group in competition can be modelled within the common framework of Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints. Several solution algorithms, adapting methodologies from microeconomics as well as evolutionary computation, are proposed to identify Nash Equilibrium toll levels. These are demonstrated on realistic transportation networks. As an alternative paradigm to competition, the possibilities for co-operation between agents in each group are also explored. In the case of toll road operators, the welfare consequences of competition could be positive or adverse depending on the interrelationships between the toll roads in competition. The results therefore generalise those previously obtained to a more realistic setting investigated here. In the case of competition between jurisdictions, it is shown that the fiscal externality of tax exporting resulting from their toll setting decisions can substantially reduce the welfare gains from internalising congestion. The ability of regulation, co-operation and bilateral bargaining to reduce the welfare losses are assessed. The research thus contributes to informing debates regarding the appropriate level of institutional governance for toll pricing policies